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I investigate the material relationship between human and nonhuman objects in performance, 
asking what their shifting relations reveal about our contemporary condition. Through analysis of 
contemporary theatre and performance and theories of new materialism, I aim to uncover the 
dramaturgical models that shift focus towards the agency of objects, thereby exposing alternate 
models of relationality. Grounded in sensual interactions generated through the performance 
event, these relations are equipped to develop an expanded sensibility and responsivity in the 
human. Additionally, I examine how these events enable experiences of the body where the body 
is both actor and acted upon. Furthermore, I consider the significance of these embodied 
experiences and a sense of solidarity with objects on feelings of anxiety, depression, and panic 
that characterize the multiple senses of contemporary eco-crisis, climate, and technology. I argue 
that performance serves as a site in which to better understand our changing subject position, to 
imagine alternative human/nonhuman relationships, and to offer suggestions toward a more 





In researching the myriad connections that are active and agential in ongoing events, it goes 
without saying that I am acutely aware of the network of support that has made this project 
possible. 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my advisor Peter Eckersall for engaging in this work with me. 
Peter has been a constant source of insightful, critical, and enthusiastic support and guidance. 
Thank you for bringing my attention to different artists, for challenging me, and for the positive, 
invigorating conversations. 
 
I would also like to thank Erika Lin and Edward Miller, my committee members. Erika Lin came 
to each meeting with insightful and detailed advice, and brought a supportive and critical eye on 
the methodological frame and critical potential of the work. Edward Miller brought helpful 
framing as well as productive outlooks and associations, and I am grateful for his willingness to 
think in unexpected directions with me. The dissertation has benefited enormously from their 
advice, and I will carry their influence with me into future work. 
 
This research would not have been possible without the support of The Graduate Center, CUNY, 
and the funding that made living in New York City and attending so many performances 
possible. Furthermore, I am indebted to the Graduate Center community, and specifically to the 
Theatre and Performance department, for the support and comradeship I found there. Thank you 
to Phoebe Rumsey, Margit Edwards, Fabian Escalona, and Jennifer Thompson, for your 
	 vi	
friendship, editorial advice, and willingness to read so many pages. Thank you also to Eylul 
Akinci, Amir Farjoun, Cory Tamler, Bhargav Rani, and Kyueun Kim, for thinking deeply with 
me over coffee, in conference planning meetings, and in classes. And thank you to Alison Walls, 
Taylor Culbert, Chloe Edmonson, Benjamin Gillespie, Hansol Oh, Mara Valderrama, Bindi 
Kang, Andrew Goldberg, and Ugoran Prasad, for sharing with me the many shows, drinks, 
walks, and department parties. 
 
Over the past few years, I have had the pleasure of participating in a number of conferences and 
working groups, in which I have had the opportunity to workshop aspects of this research. In 
particular, I would like to thank the Objects of Study conference, hosted by the Doctoral Theatre 
Students’ Association and the CUNY Graduate Center Theatre and Performance Program, and 
the Puppetry and Material Performance and From the Curious to the Quantum working groups at 
ASTR, for providing helpful feedback, broadening the scope of my project, and building a 
community of supportive peers. I would also especially like to express my gratitude to 
Performance Studies international and the Future Advisory Board Summer School program, for 
the profoundly inspiring experiences fostered in their panels and workshops. Much of the 
inspiration in these experiences was found in the people. Thank you to Kristof van Baarle, 
Evelyn Wan, Kyoko Iwaki, Shawn Chua, and Felipe Cervera. I am grateful to have found friends 
who are as insightful, motivating, and brilliant as you. 
 
In the past year, I have had the pleasure of working on the editorial team at TDR. Thank you first 
to Richard Schechner, for your faith in me, your incredible support, and your inspirational 
contributions to the field, which brought me to Performance Studies. Thank you also to 
	 vii	
Mariellen Sandford and Sara Brady, for the opportunity to learn with you, for the collaboration, 
and the discussions about arts and the field. 
 
I’d also like to thank other influential mentors that have had a profound impact on my 
development, whether in person or through their writing. Thank you to Dr. Houchin, professor at 
Boston College in my undergraduate theatre program, for introducing me to the kind of 
experimental work that would go on to inspire my journey to graduate school. Thank you to Lisa 
Brenner, for your mentoring in teaching at Drew University, and for your guidance in 
professionalism and balance. Thank you also to José Esteban Muñoz and Patricia Clough, 
professors with whom coursework at NYU and the CUNY Graduate Center had a profound 
influence on my research interests. And thank you to Jill Dolan and Erika Fischer-Lichte, whose 
writing has influenced the way in which I view theatre and retain hope for its value and influence 
in the world. 
 
Special thanks also to my students at City College of New York and Drew University. I have 
learned so much from you all, and your enthusiasm gives me hope for the future. 
 
I’d also like to give thanks to a number of nonhuman collaborators. Thank you to Prospect Park, 
for your grounding space for my many walks to find peace of mind. Thank you to the Park Slope 
Food Coop, for feeding me quality produce on a budget, and giving me a real cooperative 
experience. Thank you to McConnell’s, for providing so much pleasure. And thank you to the 
Sawtooth Mountains in Idaho, for putting things in perspective. 
 
	 viii	
It cannot be overstated how grateful I am to my Book Club. Thank you Drew, Carly, Kaitlin, 
Chris, Jake, Dani, Laura, Anne, and Jhanay. To be able to think with you deeply, grow and 
develop, and share life’s highs and lows over these past nine years has been an immense gift. 
 
Thank you Ellie, for your emotional support, companionship, and unconditional love. Thank you 
Rosie, for your comfort and endless amusement. 
 
I also would like to thank my family, for their unconditional faith in me and for caring so deeply. 
Thank you Dad, for believing in me so fiercely. Thank you Mom and Peter, for your boundless 
support. 
 
And last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my partner Drew, for his love, for his 
support, for distracting me and never failing to make me laugh when I need it most, and for 




















        Page  




CHAPTER 1: Puppet Relations: Staging Human/Object Solidarity.............................................39 
Breaking Puppet Traditions in Hand to God.....................................................................60 
Casting Everyday Objects as Actors: Forced Entertainment’s  
Table Top Shakespeare......................................................................................................78 
Puppet Modeling for the Plastic Body: Phantom Limb Company’s Falling Out..............95 
CHAPTER 2: The Real Robot on Stage: Framing the Object Actor...........................................108  
The Lying Robot as Actor: After the Blast......................................................................127 
The Robot Theatre Project...............................................................................................135 
Framing the Object: Kris Verdonck’s Dancer Series......................................................153 
CHAPTER 3: Atmosphere in Performance: Shared Presence for Alternative Models of 
Agency.............................................................................................................................170  
Something (out of nothing): Staging the End of the World.............................................189 
Everything that happened and would happen: Feeling Entangled Agencies..................208 
CHAPTER 4: Experiencing the Body as Object: Solidarity Among Affective Relationality.....233 
Hansel and Gretel: The Body-Object’s Extensions.........................................................242 
The Explicit Body as Affective Object: Romeo Castellucci’s Julius Caesar.  
Spared Parts.....................................................................................................................261 






Fig 1. Tyrone in the traditional puppet show that begins Hand to God. Photo by Joan Marcus...63 
Fig 2. Jason (Steven Boyer) uses his hand while wearing Tyrone, with Jessica (Sarah Stiles). 
Photo by Joan Marcus........................................................................................................68 
Fig 3. The cast of Table Top Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Photo by author.........................83 
Fig 4. Terry O’Connor in performance of Table Top Shakespeare.  
Photo by Hugo Glendinning..............................................................................................85 
Fig 5. Dai Matsuoka and half of puppet, with mounds of plastic bags in the background, in 
Falling Out at Brooklyn Academy of Music. Photo courtesy of Phantom Limb 
Company..........................................................................................................................103 
Fig 6. Cristin Milioti as Anna and Arthur, After the Blast, Lincoln Center Theater, New York, 
2017. Photo by Sara Krulwich.........................................................................................131 
Fig 7. Geminoid F and Bryerly Long in Sayonara, Seinendan Theatre Company. Photo by 
Tatsuo Nambu..................................................................................................................137 
Fig 8. Hiroshi Ota and Minako Inoue in I, Worker with one Robovie R3, which is “dancing.” 
Photo by Japan Society....................................................................................................139 
Fig 9. Kris Verdonck’s Dancer #3. Photo by Reinout Hiel.........................................................157 
Fig 10. An object hangs over the figure in section three of Something (out of nothing). Photo by 
Bas de Brouwer................................................................................................................191 
Fig 11. Figures during section two of Something (out of nothing). 
 Photo by Kristof Vrancken.............................................................................................199 
Fig 12. Ensemble engaged in construction. Everything that happened and would happen, Park 
Avenue Armory. Photo by Stephanie Berger..................................................................214 
	 xi	
Fig 13. Smoke moving through the assemblage. Everything that happened and would happen. 
Photo by Thanasis Delgiannis..........................................................................................217 
Fig 14. Bin on casters moving through the space. Everything that happened and would happen, 
Theatre Olympics, Saint Petersburg................................................................................220 
Fig 15. “No Comment” news projected onto a de facto screen. Everything that happened and 
would happen, Theatre Olympics, St. Petersburg............................................................227 
Fig 16. View of Hansel and Gretel in the Park Avenue Armory Drill Hall, with drones above the 
audience. Photo by James Ewing.....................................................................................246 
Fig 17. My face appears in the second part of the exhibition in the Park Avenue Armory 
mansion. Photo by author................................................................................................248 
Fig 18. A morphed image of myself projected onto the floor’s grid. Photo by author................260 
Fig 19. The “vskji” nametag projected onto the dome ceiling of Federal Hall in Julius Caesar. 
Spared Parts. Photo by Maria Baranova.........................................................................263 
Fig 20. The endoscope’s projections of the actor’s throat during Julius Caesar. Spared Parts in 
Gdańsk.............................................................................................................................268 
Fig 21. The light bulb shattering machine used at the end of Julius Caesar. Spared Parts. Photo 
by Guido Mencari............................................................................................................276 




“But man and woman are not the measure of all things.” 
- Robert Bringhurst and Jan Zwicky, Learning to Die: Wisdom in the Age of Climate Crisis 
 
 
In June 2017, audience members in the Park Avenue Armory’s Drill Hall were tracked by drones 
flying overhead. Many responded playfully, posing as the drones took photos that were then 
projected as electromagnetic radiation shadows on the ground. Only later did they find that their 
images were also displayed elsewhere for another audience. Each audience member became an 
object of study, a face and body “captured,” objectified and reconsidered. This installation, 
Hansel and Gretel by architects Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron and artist Ai Weiwei, 
offers one example where the changing relationships between humans and objects in our 
everyday lives is being explored in performance. As developments in big data and surveillance 
emphasize the power and agency of nonhuman matter while defying assumptions of the primacy 
of human sovereignty, works like Hansel and Gretel point to the need for urgent consideration of 
these themes as they manifest in and are expressed through the arts. At the same time, the limits 
of human perception and our sense of control over the world are further exposed by the vast 
effects of the climate crisis, which urgently point to the need to reassess the ways in which we 
conceive of human agency and structures of causality. Traditionally theatre has been an 
anthropocentric art form, requiring at least one live (human) performer and (human) spectator to 
qualify as performance, but, as this thesis asserts, objects are also actors. In Hansel and Gretel, 
drones are the active agents while the human is objectified and flattened into a visual effect, in 
essence a rematerialized form or object. This in turn highlights the destabilizing effect of the 
performance, and the complexity and confusion about the relationship between what is “live” in 
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performance and on what terms liveness is being rethought in and through new understandings of 
materialism, agency and the activating presence of environments. What are we looking at and 
experiencing in this performance? Why does it draw our attention to the capacities of the 
nonhuman to perform? And how does this effect the ways in which we see ourselves in relation 
to the environment that is teeming with nonhuman actors?  
 
This dissertation examines how objects underlie, communicate, and transform theatrical 
experience for the audience. I consider key international performances that constitute a school of 
thought, highlighting a newfound sense of agency in the ways that they position objects as actors 
and nonhuman performers. In these contemporary theatrical examples, objects have a 
dramaturgical focus, which highlights their affective agency in the performance context. In fact, 
there are many cases in which performing objects seem to possess a greater agency, or the active 
capacity to do things, than the human body. Alternatively, the human body seems to appear as a 
nonhuman object itself. These distinct cases of performance, while not ubiquitous, do constitute 
a trend that permeates the internationally touring network of contemporary performance and is 
seeping into more mainstream productions on Broadway and commercial theatres elsewhere. I 
am interested in examples of objects in performance where the object is not merely a focus, but 
where the object is mobilized in a dramaturgical structure that brings the status of the human 
into question.  
 
I argue that these examples of contemporary performance of representing, interrogating, and 
mobilizing the agency of objects mirrors the active nature of objects in the world. This agency 
grows more evident in the increasingly palpable effects of climate change, giving rise to a body 
of work that expresses concern for the environment and aims to activate our sensitivity to this 
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condition. In addition to the irreversible effects of climate change, the significant vitality of 
nonhuman actors makes visible the rapid speed of technological growth in twenty-first century 
media, and the governmental biopolitical control of data. Nonhuman matter has proven itself as 
an active factor that humans cannot predict and over which humans certainly do not have control.  
 
Through my research, I investigate the material relationship between human and nonhuman 
objects in performance, asking what their shifting relations reveal about our contemporary 
condition. I aim to uncover the dramaturgical models that shift focus towards the agency of 
objects, thereby exposing alternative hierarchies among all active actors and proposing new 
dramaturgical models for the theatre. Grounded in sensual interactions and affective atmospheres 
established through the shared liveness of the performance event, these alternative hierarchies 
are equipped to develop an expanded sensibility and responsivity in the human, and alternative 
experiences of the body in which the body is both actor and acted upon, distributed and 
expanded. Thus, I argue for a new political dimension to these works, one that not only makes 
visible the agency of objects and systems of control, but also invites a reconsideration of the 
senses. I consider how the sensuality of being “in” these performances and the ways that this 
effectively bridges borders between the human and nonhuman is not only experiential but also 
political. Further, I consider how these object performances offer experiences that address the 
feelings of anxiety, depression, and panic that characterize the multiple senses of contemporary 
eco-crisis, climate, pandemic, technology, and posthumanism, in part through a sense of 
solidarity with objects through a shared objecthood. I argue that performance serves as a site in 
which to better understand our changing subject position, to imagine alternative 
	 4	




First, it is necessary to explicate what constitutes the contemporary condition that leads to the 
anxiety, depression, and panic I reference above, and the condition these performances are 
positioned within and comment upon. As Francisco Berardi describes, the mythology of the 
future—a state of mind that is progressive and forward-thinking—has died. “The future no 
longer appears as a choice or a collective conscious action, but is a kind of unavoidable 
catastrophe that we cannot oppose in any way.”1 Due to constant acceleration of digital speeds 
driving what he calls the semiocapitalist economy, where desires and affects are commodities, 
the human has transformed in order to remain competitive. In order to smooth out affects to fit 
seamlessly and efficiently into the market, we are subjects whose minds have separated from our 
bodies, becoming unpracticed in basic material sensibility. This shift is so all-encompassing that 
Mark Hansen has theorized that twenty-first-century media has actually become an alien organ, 
becoming integral in our perceptive capabilities and reorienting a sense of causality that moves 
directly from the operational present into the future, disallowing opportunity for reflection or 
reason.2 The effect, according to Berardi, is that we are in a constant state of accelerating now-
ness, constantly struggling to keep up with a pace not set for the human. 
 
																																																								
1 Francisco “Bifo” Berardi, After the Future, ed. Gary Genosko and Nicholas Thoburn 
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 2011), 126. 
2 Mark B. N. Hansen, Feed Forward: On the Future of Twenty-First-Century Media (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press: 2015). 
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This condition has emerged as a product of the imbrication of capitalism and neoliberalism, and 
the accompanying sense of constant intensification, with the idea that growth is inherently good 
and of the human domain. We are living as descendants of the “prevailing bourgeois vision of 
modernity based on the Protestant ethic and a strong belief that what counts in life is the product 
of material labor.”3 The constant sense of an uncontrollable future and impending catastrophe 
affects the political climate and other ways of being, where the affective power of threat is a 
touchstone maneuvered for violence and manipulation. As Brian Massumi has argued, this 
results in a preemptive strategy, where action is taken to combat a yet unrealized threat that may 
never have become realized, but remains agentic due to its affective power just the same.4 
Massumi’s study refers to the “war on terror,” but a similar sense of impending threat exists in 
relation to climate change and the reality of various toxicities circulating through our atmosphere 
and our bodies. Ulrich Beck calls this the “risk society,” where the human experiences a loss of 
sovereignty as toxins grow more prevalent and we cannot know where they are or attempt to 
control them.5 Indeed, there is an increasing sense that the time is up for the human species. It is 
undeniable that the earth has suffered multiple mass extinctions during its several hundred 
million year history, and species do die out. While Homo sapiens are a relatively young species, 
the longer evolutionary tree—“the tree of multicellular, water-and-carbon-based life, from which 
the twig called Homo sapiens has grown—is older. That tree has mostly had its day.”6 And, even 
																																																								
3 Berardi, After the Future, 99. 
4 Brian Massumi, Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2015). 
5 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (Los Angeles: Sage 
[1986] 2009), 54. 
6 Robert Bringhurst and Jan Zwicky, Learning to Die: Wisdom in the Age of Climate Crisis 
(Saskatchewan: University of Regina Press, 2018), 29. 
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in the short life of the Homo sapiens species, humans have had an adversely colossal impact on 
the earth, using more resources than can be replenished at an alarming rate.  
 
Any discussion of the climate crisis must include a discussion of capitalism, as both are bound 
up in a long history of the same Christian ethic, as well as the sense of the individual subject as 
master of their universe (with the gendered nature of this also intentional). In the first pages of 
the Book of Genesis, God is said to have made man in his own image. Even more, the instructive 
passage states, “Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that 
moveth upon the earth.”7 The text has had many editors and translations, but the hubris of the 
passage is clear. Bringhurst finds irony in the Hebrew version of the text, which weaves 
language “that ring[s] like soft alarm bells.”8 But the irony is lost in translation, and the 
foundational Western text has been taken much too literally. Kyla Wazana Thompkins succinctly 
argues “the current planetary crisis is above all a consequence of the human-centered logic that 
underlies modern Christological racial capitalism, a logic that produces categories of beings 
designated as animal or object, in the name of extracting value and labor-energy.”9 With this 
logic, humanism stands as a central problem, supporting centuries of exploitation of “every 
living thing” by the assumed naturalized and central place of the liberal white male subject.  
 
I reference these millennia-deep structures not to suggest a solution, or even that the problems 
can be solved, but rather to point to the span of history and perspectives on life that underlie the 
																																																								
7 The Book of Genesis, quoted in Bringhurst and Zwicky, Learning to Die, 10. 
8 Bringhurst and Zwicky, Learning to Die, 10. 
9 Kyla Wazana Thompkins, “On the Limits and Promise of New Materialist Philosophy,” Lateral 
5.1 (2016). 	
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contemporary concerns proliferating among the scholars and artists with which this dissertation 
engages. It is this context that has brought us to a contemporary eco-panic, partnered with a 
sense of paralysis at how to process these concerns and find ways to take action. I am not a 
psychologist nor a policy-maker, but instead focus my attention on the ways in which critical 
theory and performance offer ways to think and feel about the crisis, proposing modest but 
authentic gestures towards individual and communal methods of managing the necessary 
changes to human habits and long-established hierarchies. Indeed, the arts are able to show 
insights and knowledge about the condition that are not seen in other domains. The arts can show 
affective states and communicate otherwise intangible sensibilities of transformation and loss, 
heralding in what Timothy Morton calls, “thought from the future.”10 Performance is moreover 
always about a conversation between the live and the animate—the structures of story and ritual 
that are expressed through a medium of liveness and object performance. In Berardi’s study of 
the end and futurability, he offers his own suggestions: “The cure for depression is the 
revitalization of singularity, and the conscious acceptance of its impermanence or finitude.”11 
Approaches toward this singularity12 include reconnecting the mind and body, valuing the 
present moment and the sensuousness that the materiality of the moment offers. Bringhurst and 
Zwicky come to a similar conclusion through their own eco-critical methods, noting, “To wallow 
in despair that the natural world is dying is to fail to be aware that it is still, in many ways, very 
																																																								
10 Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology: For a Logic of Future Coexistence (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016), 1. 
11 Berardi, After the Future, 65. 
12 By “singularity” here I refer to Berardi’s use of singularity, taken through reading Gilles 
Deleuze’s concept of singularity in which the singularity arises through individuation that retains 
uniqueness and creative potential in an assemblage, which is distinct from individualism. 
Berardi, After the Future, 148. 
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much alive.”13 Stacy Alaimo offers her own suggestion that the loss of sovereignty might be 
recast “to a posthumanist or counter-humanist sense of the self as opening out onto the larger 
material world and being penetrated by all sorts of substances and material agencies that may or 
may not be captured.”14 Releasing egocentric and anthropocentric thought reveals that life will 
persist—it is just that life may not look like us or even be familiar to us. Our understanding of 
what constitutes life is reimagined in these performances, while the ways in which the human 
can become attenuated to the liveliness of their environment, as an atmosphere replete with 
agencies similar in nature to the human itself, are embodied on stage.15 
 
New Materialism and Posthumanism as Methods in Response 
These environmental and technological concerns are one of the catalysts prompting a trend in 
philosophy to consider the nonhuman, as seen in the evolving fields of new materialism, object-
oriented ontology, and posthumanism. A central point in all of these schools of thought is a call 
for a radical reorientation of the human subject within its environment by questioning the 
concept of inert matter as well as the ontological difference between a human subject and 
nonhuman object. As Jane Bennett asks, “Why advocate the vitality of matter? Because the 
image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our earth-
																																																								
13 Bringhurst and Zwicky, Learning to Die, 51. 
14	Stacy	Alaimo, Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 4.	
15	The contemporary context has changed drastically as I complete and defend this dissertation in 
quarantine due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While too soon to comprehensively comment upon 
its effects, resonating issues emerge that are at the heart of my dissertation in relation to the 
performativity and intimacy of invisible forces, the agentic nature of nonhuman entities, and the 
ways in which human action and inaction interact with nonhuman objects in a time scale difficult 
for the human to perceive. Further, as the world attempts to keep connected through 
technological means, the affective nature of our own digital representations, objects in and of 
themselves, comes to light. 
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destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption.”16 New materialism draws attention to the 
human as one actor within a network of other equally active agents, urging for greater awareness 
of the nonhuman and more channels of communication among the human and nonhuman to 
achieve a greater sense of wonder, respect, and responsibility in human agents. The terms 
“agent” and “actant” are both frequently used in order to account for the entity’s active nature 
and its capacity to exert power and produce effects. Object-oriented ontology (OOO) goes on to 
show that the human is not distinct from objecthood; rather, it is a specific type of object not 
ontologically distinct from other objects. In OOO, all objects exist equally, regardless of any 
relation to the human. Posthumanism takes a similar stance on the human as object, attempting to 
dismantle the historically and culturally situated ideas of humanism’s restricted notion of what 
counts as human, where “Man,” or heterosexual, white, able-bodied, cis-gender man, is at the top 
of the hierarchy of all things, whether human/nonhuman, or living/nonliving. Rosi Braidotti 
stresses the link between critical posthumanism and a break with anthropocentrism that finds life 
in the nonhuman. Therefore, Braidotti advocates for an affirmative posthuman subjectivity that is 
“materialist and vitalist, embodied and embedded, firmly located somewhere.”17 An affirmative 
subjectivity claims materiality and positionality, while also embracing infinite connections and 
possibilities. 
 
I am interested in the effects of these modes of thought in the ways we understand what 
performance is and what it can do, specifically regarding the relationship between human and 
nonhuman objects in the theatre space, both onstage and off. But I am also interested in what 
																																																								
16 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010), ix.	
17 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013), 51.  
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these models of thought offer to our ways of being in the world, and the ways in which 
performance can invigorate this project. What are the implications of active matter and material 
bodies? What does a new materialist or posthumanist lens ask of us? One profound effect is 
heightened attention to the sensory realm. Attempts to account for the force of liveliness of 
matter require a redirection of critical attention, but more importantly, what Dana Luciano 
describes as “a reorganizing of the senses, departing from the limitations of the Aristotelian 
model.”18 This attention to alternate sensory dimensions suggests the possibility of expanding 
and animating, though not replacing, “old” ideas of historical materialism. Indeed, this detail is 
crucial, as the “new” aspect of new materialism is a topic of debate. Efforts toward accounting 
for the vitality of matter and the value of sensory knowledge are aspects of queer, feminist, and 
critical race theory, and this is also true of efforts to consider the ways in which bodies can be 
conceived as objects. Furthermore, attention to the liveliness of matter and the embedded nature 
of the human in the larger network of matter can be found in many non-Western belief systems. 
Undoubtedly, more attention must be paid to the knowledge and experience of these groups. 
However, new materialist impulses stem directly from concerns regarding established Western 
hierarchies, and their attempts at (re)awakening sensibility toward the vitality of matter are 
embedded in and reacting against the contemporary Western climate. While not perfect nor 
complete, these attempts are sincere efforts adding to the larger project of dismantling the legacy 
of the patriarchal, capitalist society for the purposes of a greater equality among all forms and a 
heightened sense of responsivity to nonhuman matter.  
 
																																																								
18	Cécile Roudeau, “How the Earth Feels: A Conversation with Dana Luciano,” Transatlantica 1 
(2015), http://transatlantica.revues.org/7362. 	
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With this in mind, I return to the question of what these models of thought have to offer. To take 
materiality seriously reorients the human subject to the world around them and requires a 
reassessment of models of communication, causality, and power relations. When I refer to 
“materiality,” I refer literally to the term’s origins in the qualities of matter, things, and physical 
objects. Of course, the term cannot be divorced from Marxist historical materialism, which 
accounts for the effects of literal material in social, economic, and political relations. Historical 
materialism is helpful in drawing attention to how social forces and economic conditions are 
important factors in the making of our world. However, for some scholars and artists it is found 
wanting and unable to account for the many sites of intensification that are now in our world. 
Variants of historical materialism shifted attention towards the material effects of discursive 
practices, which then too easily can become a discussion of discursivism itself, returning to an 
anthropocentric view of events if all takes place through linguistic and social constructions. Nor 
does historical materialism deal well with questions of sensibility, affect, and human-nonhuman 
relations.  
 
New materialism attempts to return to matter itself, along with its efficacy in social relations, 
whether that’s corporal life or material phenomena. As Levi Bryant argues, the gradual erasure 
of tangible things made it impossible to investigate their contributions to social relations. “An 
entire domain of power became invisible, and as a result we lost all sorts of opportunities for 
strategic intervention in producing emancipatory change.”19 A limited perspective blind to the 
power of things then made it difficult to discuss climate change and the diverse agents making 
efforts toward responding to climate change a challenge, where matter has incredibly tangible 
																																																								
19 Levi R. Bryant, Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University, 2014), 3. 
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effects on social, political, and biological realities. Within a new materialist attention to objects, 
we might find methods toward thinking about power relations at large, where the power 
structures upholding patriarchal capitalism are dispersed throughout human and nonhuman 
agencies, rather than a supposedly coherent and purposeful human force. We must work with an 
expanded set of allies in this project. Indeed, the project in which I am engaged works toward a 
set of questions we are not yet thinking, advancing the unfinished projects of visibility and 
redistribution toward a politics of plurality. This perspective engages with the solidarity 
necessary for ecocritical discourse, where the effects of climate change touch all identities, 
human and nonhuman alike. Indeed, the climate crisis is an existential question with impact on 
human and nonhuman bodies, communities, social structures, and politics, and it is a question 
that all bodies need to be addressing. 
 
Central texts in the field of new materialism 
An important work, which inspired a proliferation of further thought regarding the active nature 
of objects and efforts away from anthropocentrism in performance studies, is Jane Bennett’s 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010).20 Bennett’s project argues for the vitality 
																																																								
20 See Afterlives, a series of talks and conversations curated by Adrian Heathfield and André 
Lepecki as part of the 2015 Crossing the Line Festival, in which Jane Bennett spoke, among 
others. The critical discussion on the object has been ongoing in philosophy and cultural studies, 
and by no means begins with Bennett. Indeed, Aristotle was prolific on the subject regarding 
objects and the properties they possess in Categories and Metaphysics. Other seminal 
discussions of the thing from which Bennett specifically derives her notion of “thing-power” 
include Heidegger’s “The Thing” (in Poetry, Language, Thought [New York: Harper and Row, 
1971], 163-184), Bill Brown’s “Thing Theory” (Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 [Fall 2001]: 1-22), and 
Arjun Appandurai’s “The Thing Itself” (Public Culture 18, 1 [Winter 2006]: 15-22). Other 
notions dealing with the object such as semiotics and the object as commodity fetish are also 
important to the understanding of objects in network with the human community, and influence 
my own understanding of the object. My focus here remains on attempts to understand the object 
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of things, which she calls “thing-power,” as well as the necessity of the human to realize that 
things in the world are not things that exist for us. Things are not tools to be used and discarded, 
but continue to enact effects from heaps in the gutters and landfills across the planet. Bennett is 
therefore arguing for more intelligent and sustainable engagement with lively matter in order to 
combat against human hubris. As a political theorist, Bennett makes her objective clear: “The 
political goal of a vital materialism is not the perfect equality of actants, but a polity with more 
channels of communication between members,” where these members are aware of a shared 
materiality that disrupts the subject/object binary.21  
 
Jane Bennett’s concept of the “actant,” or active matter in a network of assemblages with the 
human, is derived from the work of Bruno Latour. In Reassembling the Social, Latour provides a 
call to action to sociologists, urging the field to rethink how the categories of objects, groups, 
actions, and facts are defined. His influential conclusion asserts, “things, quasi-objects, and 
attachments are the real center of the social world, not the agent, person, member, or participant 
– nor its society or its avatars.”22 For Latour, matter is causality, or the drama that causes change 
in the world. It is not a coincidence that the term “actor,” his name for the matter responsible for 
this drama, is also based in the world of performance. 
 
Karen Barad’s study of objects, stemming from her background in quantum physics, also focuses 
on the need to reassess our understanding of the mechanisms of causality, but Barad approaches 
																																																								
as an independent actant communicating through affect, rather than through a meaning the 
human imbues on the object. 
21 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 104. 
22 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 238. 
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this with a performative lens. While the notion of the performative stems from linguistics, 
describing an expression that enacts the performance or transaction by its very utterance, the 
notion has been taken up by performance studies (and other humanities) to account for the ways 
performances and actions enact effects in addition to the creation of meaning. For Barad, “matter 
is not a thing but a doing,”23 as matter interacts through what Barad terms “intra-actions.” By 
Barad’s definition, “intra-actions are nonarbitrary, nondeterministic causal enactments through 
which matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is iteratively enfolded into its ongoing differential 
materialization.”24 The notion of an intra-action might be understood through diffraction 
patterns, in which one causal event produces ripple effects. But, another event will shift the 
ripples, creating ever-emerging new patterns. Past patterns as well as new inputs of matter work 
together to create new patterns, and the cycle will continue in ways that cannot be predicted. 
Importantly, the difference of matter, and the agential impact of those differences, matters within 
this model. For Barad, the notion of intra-action works to account for the materialization of all 
bodies, so-called “human” and “nonhuman,” along with the contributions of all material forces, 
both “social” and “natural.” Barad’s “agential realism” aids in theorizing the social and the 
natural together in a way that reconsiders causality, and therefore, power itself. Agential realism 
shifts attention from the more atomistic view of new materialism toward the performative view 
of events. In fact, Barad asserts “the primary ontological unit is not independent objects with 
inherent boundaries and properties but rather phenomena,”25 which highlights the inseparability 
of intra-acting agencies. Agential realism, then, contributes to a new materialist understanding of 
power and the ways in which nonhuman elements—both corporal and intangible—affect the 
																																																								
23 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 183. 
24 Ibid., 179. 
25 Ibid., 139.	
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production of bodies, identities, and subjectivities. The intra-active model, the iterative 
collaboration of entities, also highlights the ways in which the human’s interactions with these 
nonhuman elements matter, both for their effects in the world and within the human itself. 
According to Barad, “Our (intra)actions matter – each one reconfigures the world in its 
becoming – and yet they never leave us; they are sedimented into our becoming, they become 
us.”26 Therefore, Barad’s account engages with the ways in which both human and nonhuman 
agency must be viewed in conjunction with each other, and the human must be understood as 
radically responsible through their responsivity to their environment. 
 
An alternative sub-section of new materialism is found in the speculative realist model of Object-
Oriented Ontology (OOO), which connects with Bennett, Barad, and others in its assertion of 
matter’s agency. However, OOO thinkers attempt to move further away from human-centric 
thought. In new materialism, the matter is always assumed to be in a network or a relational state 
with the human. In OOO, matter is reconceptualized as an object, which exists in and of itself in 
its own form of being outside any relationship to the human. An elemental motivation in OOO is 
an attempt to move away from a correlationist point of view, the view that begins with Kant’s “I 
think, therefore I am.” Objects do not think as humans think, but objects are. Graham Harman, a 
founder of the field, lays out the being of the object as a fourfold in The Quadruple Object, 
asserting that all objects exist on both real and sensual planes, possessing both real and sensual 
qualities. The key here is that the real object is always withdrawn from the sensual realm, so the 
human will never be able to fully grasp an object in its entirety. However, OOO still asserts the 
interconnected nature of objects: the sensual realm produces real effects and is where 
																																																								
26 Ibid., 394. 
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relationships happen. The difference here is that all objects exist in their own right, rather than 
existing by or for another. Harman’s definition of the object includes the human, and he 
addresses the question “whether [the] obvious difference between humans and non-humans 
deserves to be made into a basic ontological rift.”27 Harman and other OOO scholars definitively 
claim that it is not an ontological rift, but instead that human and non-human objects differ in 
qualities rather than ontological kind. Levi Bryant adds the concept of a flat ontology to the 
discussion, which “strives to think a subjectless object, or an object that is for-itself rather than 
an object that is an opposing pole before or in front of a subject. […] This, in short, is what the 
democracy of objects means.”28 These tenets of OOO imply an opposition to the more neoliberal 
valence of the new materialist model in which being and meaning emerge through relationality 
and connections, while also putting forward the agentic capacity of the sensual elements of 
objects. 
 
Timothy Morton agrees with Harman regarding the object’s withdrawn nature, and like 
Harman’s sensual realm, Morton focuses on the aesthetic realm and “aesthetic causality.” For 
him, aesthetics are precisely what create the real effects in the world, and there is no better way 
to study this aesthetic causality than with art itself, which is aesthetic causality on display and in 
action. Morton therefore asserts that art is a scientific study of the way the world works; the way 
events move forward, since “it’s all aesthetics, all the way down.”29 Rather than the branch of 
philosophy dealing with beauty, art, and taste, or a conception of beauty found through what is 
																																																								
27 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Washington, D.C.: Zero Books, 2011), 119. 
28 Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: MI, Open Humanities Press, 2011), 19. 
Original emphasis. 
29 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor, MI: Open 
Humanities Press, 2013), 41. 
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pleasing to the senses, the “aesthetic” in this case does not refer to the beautiful, but to the 
domain in which qualities radiate and interact to produce sensations. These qualities might be 
received as “beautiful” or something else by the human, but importantly, they also interact with 
other nonhuman entities to produce effects irrelevant to the human. Morton applies the concept 
of the object to ecology as well, resonating with Jane Bennett’s own interest in ecological 
concerns in the anthropocene. He coins the term “hyperobject,” which “refer[s] to things that are 
massively distributed in time and space relative to humans.”30 The hyperobject is vast and yet 
always local, engages in time in a new way that is an extremely large finitude rather than eternal, 
and has a viscosity to it that allows it to stick to the human object, rendering the human lame and 
hypocritical. Climate change serves as a prime example of a hyperobject in Morton’s study, and 
his thinking aids in understanding the ways in which climate change relates to the human. The 
question of the hyperobject’s effects on the human is a theme that I increasingly find on the 
contemporary stage, which is a helpful model to approach the topic given the application of 
aesthetics for their affective relationship to the human. 
 
While OOO’s efforts toward finding a more equal balance among entities and heightened 
attention to the agency of objects provide insight into political and ecological discussions 
regarding power and causality, a valid criticism of the field is its limited perspective. A majority 
of its founding thinkers, including Harman, Morton, Bryant, and Bogost, hearken from a lineage 
of Western philosophy, and the foundational texts lack perspectives from feminist theory, critical 
race studies, queer theory, or indigenous perspectives. This proves a problem, especially since 
these are fields that build from the situated perspective of already knowing what it feels like to 
																																																								
30 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 1.	
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be viewed as an object. Katherine Behar’s edited collection entitled Object-Oriented Feminisms 
addresses this criticism head-on with the provocation, “Object-oriented feminism turns the 
position of philosophy inside out to study objects while being an object oneself.”31 Thus, Behar’s 
project embraces the nonanthropocentric conception of the world and begins from the position of 
being objects, too. This offers an approach toward solidarity from the position of equally solid 
matter, with the knowledge that the object world is precisely a world of exploitation. However, 
through a reading of OOO’s tenets, Behar finds that “objects carry internal resistance,”32 and so 
we might move away from subject-oriented terms and instead imagine “object-oriented self-
possession.”33 Behar’s inside-out approach to OOO points toward what I find to be a provocative 
potential. The field stems directly from the lineage of Western thought, building from and 
reflecting upon figures from Aristotle to Descartes to Kant to Heidegger, figures whose 
foundational writings have participated in the rise of the contemporary eco-crisis. But, it is a 
rebellious tangent from this lineage, with a potential for resisting from the inside-out by 
reorienting elements and definitions from within the theories themselves. In Mel Chen’s study of 
animacy, in which she reveals the ways in which language aids in policing who and what is 
understood as animate, she insists that “animacy hierarchies slip and give,” but they do so in 
“particular privileged terms of sexuality, race, and ability, perhaps in part because these are the 
fragile grounds upon which they have been built in popular ontologies and political cultures in 
																																																								
31 Katherine Behar, “Introduction,” in Object-Oriented Feminisms (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016), 3. 
32 Ibid., 24. 
33 Ibid., 24.	
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the United States.”34 These are the ontologies and cultures upon which OOO, as well as new 
materalism and posthumanism, take aim. 
 
While OOO seeks to understand the object without a dependence on the human, a large part of 
its implicit project is to reconceptualize the agency of the human, moving closer to flat ontology 
of being, if such a thing is possible. In this way, new materialism and OOO shared concerns with 
the related field of posthumanism, which blurs the traditional boundary between the human from 
its others, exposing the human’s non-natural structure. Posthumanism is not post-human, but 
post-humanist, resisting the implications and adverse effects of the Humanist tradition. 
Fundamentally, posthumanism resists the fiction of the bounded subject. As Cary Wolfe 
explains, “posthumanism in my sense isn’t posthumanism at all—in the sense of being ‘after’ our 
embodiment has been transcended—but is only posthumanist, in the sense that it opposes the 
fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy, inherited from humanism itself.”35 Posthuman 
thought aims to disentangle the positive aspects of Humanism from the more problematic and 
insidious counterparts. Rosi Braidotti succinctly clarifies, “individualism breeds egotism and 
self-centredness; self-determination can turn to arrogance and domination; and science is not free 
from its own dogmatic tendencies.”36 Posthumanism therefore aims to overcome Humanism as 
an intellectual tradition as well as a normative frame of thinking.  
 
The posthuman is integral to my study in its move away from the human as natural, instead 
understanding the human as material, a construction, a means of information, and composed of 
																																																								
34 Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012), 234. 
35 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), xv. 
36 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman, 30. 
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shifting identities rather than a cohesive subject. N. Katherine Hayles offers an alternative model 
of the subject as “an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-
informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction.”37 In 
this construction, the human is understood as a kind of object, which reflects a shifting 
subjectivity. This concept is found in earlier work as well, such as Sara Ahmed’s Queer 
Phenomenology. Ahmed’s initial discussion of the object affecting the human body’s actions and 
orientations shifts to consider the body in a similar way—being shaped by repetitive orientations. 
She finds disorientations, or “becoming an object,” to unsettle the body’s assumptions of the 
objects around it.38  
 
Rosi Braidotti further reflects upon the consequences of the posthuman in subjectivity and 
focuses her efforts on the positive and creative potential found as a posthuman subject. Indeed, 
Braidotti finds the “issue of subjectivity is so central […] because we need to devise new social, 
ethical and discursive schemes of subject formation to match the profound transformations we 
are undergoing.”39 Braidotti believes the posthuman state to have a positive potential in that it 
means the end of Humanism, which includes the greater sense of awe and respect for things 
sought through new materialism. This could lead to a new understanding of the relationship 
between self and others, including nonhuman others, if self-centered individualism can be 
rejected, which supports my project’s ethical imperative to address our current ecological crisis. 
Indeed, the posthuman subjectivity imagined by Braidotti “produces a new way of combining 
																																																								
37 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3. 
38 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 133. 
39 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 12. 
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self-interests with the well-being of an enlarged community, based on environmental inter-
connections.”40 The posthuman subjectivity for which Braidotti calls is political and ethical, but 
also occupies the smaller, everyday actions in the personal realm. These everyday actions 
perform, as Stacy Alaimo claims, “material rather than abstract alliances.”41 Indeed, the 
concerted attention to material alliances that locate the subject in a material place is a way to 
critique the rational, disembodied Western subject’s myth of mastery and objectivity, which is 
“supposedly, granted by detachment from the world. The exposed subject is always already 
penetrated by substances and forces that can never be properly accounted for—ethics and politics 
must proceed from there.”42 By investigating dramaturgies experimenting with this model of the 
human, my project considers how this posthuman state feels, and thinks about how it might be 
achieved through theatre’s capacity to ground the individual subject in their communal 
environment.  
 
Theatre and Performance for the Posthuman State 
I contend that theatre and performance is a productive site in which these philosophies might be 
interrogated, experienced, added to, and applied due to the materiality of art form itself. Within 
the lineage of Western theatre since the Enlightenment, there persists a notion that theatre is 
inherently an anthropocentric form, traditionally requiring at least one live human performer and 
human audience.43 The human actor represents human life onstage for a knowing human 
audience. Further, the classical proscenium stage maintains its position as a common commercial 
																																																								
40 Ibid., 48. 
41 Stacy Alaimo, Exposed, 5. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
43 See Peter Brook’s definition: “A man walks across this empty space whilst someone else is 
watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theatre to be engaged” (The Empty Space 
[New York: Atheneum, 1980], 9) as well as Grotowski’s argument, “At least one spectator is 
needed to make it a performance” (Towards a Poor Theatre [New York: Routledge, 1968], 32).	
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form, and implicitly promotes the modern sense of the subject who is able to “know” through 
their perspectival sight of objects before them, which are presented conveniently in a clear and 
defined frame. Here is the classic subject/object dichotomy, where the object is distant and 
controlled for the benefit of the subject. Yet these assumptions are increasingly being questioned 
by theatre practitioners experimenting with the form, and the case studies laid out in this 
dissertation show that many contemporary productions are proving that theatre is in fact not 
dependent solely upon human actors, nor does the audience experience the performance solely 
through a perspectival sight. Rather, objects are and have always been great performers, partly 
due to the ways in with theatre engages their aesthetic elements for sensual interactions with the 
audience—engaging a sensuality beyond the purely visual. In these ways, I contend theatre is a 
prime model for underscoring and experimenting with the relationships between the human and 
their nonhuman collaborators.  
 
This dissertation is a study of the aesthetic properties of object actors in performance, with an 
eye to what effects these properties enact, and what kinds of relations with the human these 
objects invite. I therefore take the new materialist attention to matter and sensuousness seriously, 
foregrounding matter itself prior to what the forms of matter might represent. Recent scholarship 
on performing objects such as puppets, robots, and props helpfully reconsiders the agency of 
objects as a generative force within the realm of performance, such as Andrew Sofer’s The Stage 
Life of Props, Marlis Schweitzer and Joanne Zerdy’s Performing Objects and Theatrical Things, 
Dassia Posner, John Bell, and Claudia Orenstein’s The Routledge Companion to Puppetry and 
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Material Performance, and Yuji Sone’s Japanese Robot Culture.44 While these studies prioritize 
objects, they engage in semiotics to understand the cultural and historical contexts of the 
performing objects and consider their representational performance. This has been a productive 
and fruitful approach, one that has produced a rich and multidimensional understanding of the 
social dynamics of performance in relation to the signification of objects. However, my aim is to 
focus on the dramaturgical properties of objects and to redirect discussion onto the materiality of 
the object itself and its agentic capacity, where the focus is on the object’s aesthetic qualities and 
what sensual interactions these invite and how they come to affect the human. I move through 
different new materialist and object-oriented theories, considering the ways these epistemes help 
us understand what is happening in the theatre space, and the ways in which the actual 
performing object might reveal the implications and consequences of these theories in the world. 
The attention to matter is not a renunciation or discounting of the human. This would be an 
impossible and unnecessary goal. Rather, it follows posthumanist logic that reconfigures human 
relations, causality, and responsibility to their environment in order to deconstruct the notion of 
the human subject as superior to other forms. Instead the human is another form of matter 
embedded in the atmosphere, accessing the atmosphere in a variety of ways. As such, the 
relationships between matter and the human spectator remain a central concern of this study. 
Theatre offers the opportunity to visualize the way the human orients toward their environment, 
as well as a chance to develop and experiment with other relational models.  
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Following new materialist logic and its attention to the sensory realm, the central method to 
locate the relationship matter invites in the human is through the creation and the circulation of 
affect. Performing objects, through their aesthetic qualities, are agents of affect. Whether an 
object such as a puppet performing as an actor, or a more ephemeral object such as haze or light 
constructing an atmosphere, objects interact with the audience through sensual interactions, 
creating effects through affective sensations.	In many ways, the object in the theatre space is no 
different than the object in the world, but due to the theatre space, the object’s affective 
capability is put to work, and the human’s intimacy with those objects comes to light. I refer to 
the object’s affect as a means toward considering the human’s orientation toward the object and 
the resulting relationality, emotional valence, and subject formation, following Sara Ahmed, 
Lauren Berlant, and Kathleen Stewart45 as well the ways in which the object’s sensory elements 
directly relate to the human through perception, following Brian Massumi.46 However, rather 
than engaging in a full study of affect that would require a study of subjectively experienced 
feelings and the ways in which those manifest socially, I will remain focused on the material 
level—on the sensual qualities of the object as a mode of communication as an actor, which is 
received as affective embodied experiences by the audience. Affect places an emphasis on 
embodied experience, which is distinct from the subject. Brian Massumi argues that this affect is 
pre-personal and pre-social. Massumi explains the relevance of proprioception, when the body’s 
muscles and other sensory receptors receive information, “where the body is only body, having 
																																																								
45 Sara Ahmed, “Happy Objects,” in The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory 
J. Seigworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011); Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC: 
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nothing of the putative profundity of the self nor the superficiality of external encounter.”47 
According to Massumi, affect, therefore, allows for an understanding of the body as a body 
itself, responding outside of socialization and cultural influence, and therefore as a material 
object.48 Sedgwick also references affects’ freedom with respect to the object, as innumerable 
objects independently receive affect, including the human object. “Any affect may have any 
‘object.’”49 
 
The embodied nature of theatre, therefore, remains an essential element of this study, as the 
audience’s sensual experience of the object depends upon there being a shared sense of space 
and time and this experienced sensorially and corporeally. Indeed, the formal quality of theatre 
that gathers many different forms of material—human and nonhuman alike—into one communal 
space is one element that makes affective communication possible. Furthermore, this shared time 
and space puts the material human body into specific relation with its atmosphere and invites the 
opportunity for a heightened awareness and reflection upon this relationship. As both human and 
nonhuman objects are producers of affect, I follow the new materialist and posthumanist goal of 
reconfiguring human/nonhuman relationships into something closer to a flat hierarchy, poking 
holes into the subject/object divide to find a new understanding of contemporary subjectivity and 
a non-binary understanding of the relations between actant and reception. Theatre presents an 
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48 Others disagree with Massumi, such as Judith Butler, who argues that there is no such thing as 
a prediscursive body, as the material body is shaped at birth (Bodies that Matter: On the 
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encounter with the other, which is precisely how a concept of the self is formed.50 Therefore, 
theatre possesses a potential for subjectivity creation, or more specifically, an affirmative critical 
posthuman subjective mode of creativity that concurs with Rosi Braidotti’s call to action.51 The 
productive potential of theatre on contemporary subjectivity stands as an underlying interest of 
the project. Erika Fischer-Lichte’s The Transformative Power of Performance cites theatre’s 
aesthetic qualities as having the potential for a transformation of a community,52 while object-
oriented ontologist Timothy Morton’s Realist Magic asserts that the aesthetic realm is the 
creative and causal realm where real effects occur.53 In the contemporary theatrical examples I 
will go on to address, the theatrical aesthetics work to create sensual interactions and affective 
atmospheres that engage the human, onstage and off, in ways that reorient the human to the 
matter in their environment, offering distributed and awakening experiences as an embedded 
material body. 
 
I offer a theoretical model of human and nonhuman object relationships in performance as one 
method of opening up channels of communication between human and nonhuman actants, in the 
vein of Jane Bennett’s call for a more sustainable relationship between humans and things that is 
categorized by respect. With greater sensitivity and perception toward these channels of 
communication comes a communal enchantment with objects that reconfigures the subject/object 
divide. My understanding of this in this thesis is therefore twofold: 1) theatre is understood as a 
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mode of experiencing the world, where the audience’s enchantment with objects enables a study 
of how relationships with objects occur both inside and outside the theatrical frame, and 2) this 
mode of experience is understood as approaching an affirmative posthuman subjectivity, or a 
subjectivity that is characterized by a proliferation of possibilities rather than re-enacting anxiety 
or climate denial (not to mention the many forms of denialist and anti-science activism currently 
on the rise). I consider the affective potential of objects not only for aesthetic value in the 
dramaturgical composition, but also as a means to experiment with how an equal, respectful, 
perceptive relationship with objects feels. Fostering this communication and encouraging 
enchantment is a political act. In fact, the ways in which my case studies underscore the 
affective, communal, and present-tense nature of the theatre highlights its capacity as a sort of 
training ground for the antidotes to depression, anxiety, and paralysis in the face of the 




I take the new materialist attention to sensuousness as the prime directive orienting my 
methodology, and begin with a focus on sensitivity to the material elements of objects in 
performance. In order to ground my discussion in the object themselves, my case studies are 
limited to performances at which I have been able to be physically present, so that I can speak to 
the sensual dynamics and material nature of the space and its emergent relationalities. As such, a 
foundational element of my research has been my attendance of a vast body of performances in 
the last seven years that have purported to foreground or interrogate nonhuman agency, wherein,  
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I have been a participant observer.54 The contemporary status of the works are of value to my 
study in that they are created within the same cultural climate as my theoretical framework, and 
responding to a similar set of material conditions regarding the larger reality of climate change 
and the political and economic state of society. Of those performances, I have culled a selection 
in which I have found a dramaturgical attention to the agency of nonhuman material in relation 
to the human that adds to a philosophical discussion of the subject. I read these case studies with 
the conviction that performance can enlighten aspects of philosophical thought just as philosophy 
and theory can help to enlighten our understanding of performance. In fact, the case study 
selection offers a sampling of theatre and performance makers that could be understood as 
constituting a school of thought, in which performance events are built in ways that reveal the 
performative and agentic sensual nature of objects specifically in order to question the 
supremacy of the liberal humanist subject, and to reorient the human to their surroundings. The 
performances offer different approaches toward these goals, but the ways in which objects can 
intimately affect the human—approached as an embedded material body within the environment, 
more so than through individual identity markers—remains a theme throughout.  
 
The selection of case studies is affected by many material conditions. First, my selection of 
contemporary artworks is necessarily limited due to my own limited access to them. Therefore 
much of the work I discuss has been presented in New York City or Europe, whether developed 
there or through their network of production through international festivals and tours. Gratefully, 
this includes artists from Japan and China in addition to the more frequent Western perspectives, 
																																																								
54 I respond to the productions as an observer, and to the atmosphere and audience experience as 
a participant observer, in line with Erving Goffman’s methodology in The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959). 
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but an expanded study that could interrogate a more comprehensive contemporary response to 
climate change and twenty-first-century media that includes more global perspectives is still 
necessary at a later point. The funding structures that make the productions possible vary from 
off-Broadway non-profit companies and the experimental avant-garde, to large-scale commercial 
producers, to state-supported structures, to government and technology grants. Whatever the 
diverse means of production, the theatre makers in discussion here operate with an advantage of 
means in regard to financial support, their prominence in the performance field, and more 
general freedom and security of a relatively privileged subject position. The works in this study 
are located in a lineage of the avant-garde, ’60s experimental performance, and environmental 
art, and these performances are interacting with those traditions. While they are certainly not the 
only recent performances engaging with materialist culture and the anthropocene, they are 
engaged in the topics in order to present them in a philosophical and political manner for 
festivals and venues in which they might be received for their philosophical intention. In other 
words, these performances often challenge and provoke audiences who are at least to some 
degree receptive to their aesthetic strategies and to the political concerns of the works.  
Importantly, however, it is my contention that new materialist dramaturgy and the sensuality of 
these works require something more than a normative range of responses or so-called “preaching 
to the converted.” The range of examples span different audiences, diverse systems of production 
and contrasting institutional settings that in turn offer a fruitful ground for the analysis of the 
range of responses and interactions with audiences. The diversity of a Broadway audience is 
different to the diversity of contemporary performance festival audience but both are examples 
of porous, differently feeling collectives. 
 
	 30	
In addition to my attendance of the work, my personal experience of the production further 
factors into my methodology due to my attention to senses and affective stimuli, which underlies 
my development of an embodied response to the works. My approach to the human body itself 
includes influences from phenomenology and cognitive studies in an effort to understand the 
ways the body’s materiality and sensory registers responds to its environment. By focusing on 
live performances my body has experienced, rather than writings about or filmed versions of 
performances, I have access to how it feels to be in the audience. More importantly, I am able to 
consider the greater effects of these sensations on my subjectivity. While the personal nature of 
these findings is limiting, I am not so much concerned with a personal or individuated response 
to the artwork. Instead, my writing highlights sensory and affective responses to work as a 
potentially new form of knowledge, not a statement about feeling but more about sense. I 
supplement this with insight from the theatre makers, as well as reviews, blogs, commentaries 
and other responses to the performance.  
 
While I approach these performances as an audience member, I recognize that I am not an 
average audience member, but that I bring to each performance a critical framework developed 
as a scholar. Before encountering any of the productions, it must be noted that I had already 
developed an interest in nonhuman fields of philosophy. My interest in objects, therefore, has 
been cultivated theoretically, and I am more sensitive to active objects in performance and 
everyday life as a result. Additionally, my personal concern about climate change, coupled with 
an active intention towards conservation and respect for the environment, travel with me into 
each performance. The same philosophical, ethical, and political imperatives that drive this 
dissertation inform my experience as a scholar in the audience as well. I disclose these personal 
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motivations and influences in following my theoretical attention to posthuman and feminist 
claims to the value of situated knowledge; the subject cannot be separated from the world it 
seeks to know. 
 
I will be reading performance through its dramaturgical structures and forms, its stated goals 
(noted in interviews and artists statements), and for the considerable evidence of affective 
relationship to the audience—in combination with a research approach that links performance to 
new materialism and climate awareness and activism. In this investigation, I foreground an 
attention to the aesthetic qualities of objects and their sensual properties perceivable to the 
human audience. Some of these properties can be definitively documented (color, shape, size, 
movement, etc.), while other properties invite assumptions that can be made due to their 
relationship to other objects and human actors (mass, texture, weight, etc.). Then, I approach the 
object through a notion of dramaturgical attention. For instance, what focus is directed toward 
the object, and through what means? How does the object figure in the performance’s narrative 
or structure and holistic image? And what are the objects at work within the larger dramaturgical 
network of the performance? By “object,” I refer to any entity that is complete unto itself, 
perceivable by the audience, and an active element in the production. The “dramaturgical 
network” limits the scope of objects to the entities that are within a composed, purposeful, 
relational structure to the product within the theatrical frame as defined for each individual 




My method of reading each performance is grounded in a dramaturgical analysis. I use the term 
“dramaturgy” here as Cathy Turner defines it, referring to the performance’s “composition,” 
“structure,” or “fabric,”55 with an awareness of the compositional strategies in place as well as 
the relationship between the performance and its wider context—to history, place, production, 
and audience, among others. A dramaturgical analysis views the performance as a complete 
whole, as well as something made up of a relational network of parts, and my own dramaturgical 
method privileges the material nature of the performance event. Like Eugenio Barba, I conceive 
of dramaturgy as anything that acts on the audience,56 but consider action from a new materialist 
lens.	Dramaturgies and methods of dramaturgical analysis change as “the ways in which we see 
and read the world change, challenging or augmenting the perceptions that we have previously 
held.”57 One such change is addressed in Peter Eckersall, Helena Grehan, and Edward Scheer’s 
New Media Dramaturgy. The authors note that the technical elements “were not simply 
scenographic elements or techniques but were in fact core components of the dramaturgy of the 
production,” where “the materiality of technical elements matters.”58 These dramaturgical 
formations of managing the affective relationship between objects and audience are especially 
valuable to my project as they respond to the contemporary cultural climate with a potential to 




55 Cathy Turner and Synne K. Behrndt, Dramaturgy and Performance (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 3. 
56 Peter Boenisch, “Acts of Spectating: The dramaturgy of the audience’s experience in 
contemporary theatre,” in New Dramaturgy: International Perspectives on Theory and Practice, 
eds. Katalin Trencsényi and Bernadette Cochrane (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
57 Turner and Behrndt, Dramaturgy and Performance, 6. 
58 Peter Eckersall, Helena Grehan, Edward Scheer, New Media Dramaturgy: Performance, 
Media and New-Materialism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 3.	
	 33	
I begin my study of active material on stage with a long-established active object, the figure of 
the puppet. Rather than a historical trajectory of the puppet, in chapter one, I am interested in less 
“traditional” puppet examples and instead highlight forms of puppetry in which the puppet 
appears onstage as both a material thing and a character. Therefore, its status as puppet is 
complicated by its materiality, and the performance’s dramaturgy is what manipulates the 
audience’s relationship to the thing, guiding when to see it function as a character or as 
something else. I critically examine three performances: Hand to God (2011), a Broadway play 
written by Robert Askins, Forced Entertainment’s Table Top Shakespeare (2015), and Phantom 
Limb Company’s Falling Out (2018). Through these examples, I argue that theatre is a means 
toward encouraging a greater attention and responsivity to material, as the dramaturgical frame 
and theatrical tradition have the power to refocus attention toward the object, as well as to 
present alternative models of human relations with objects. By changing the focus on objects, the 
stage can make what was invisible newly apparent: namely, the active nature of everyday 
objects. Furthermore, the relationships staged in these three performances imagine a solidarity 
with objects, alliances that open up potential trajectories that transform habitual social relations 
and invite posthuman subjectivities. 
 
Chapter two moves from the traditional puppet to consider recent developments in robotics and 
the use of robots in theatre with a focus on the robot’s status as an actor. I give thorough 
consideration to Seinendan Theatre Company and Osaka University’s Robot Theatre Project and 
their 2013 performance in New York City of two one-act plays, Sayonara and I, Worker, as well 
as After the Blast, a play written by Zoe Kazan that premiered at Lincoln Center in 2017. In both 
performances, real robot actors play fictional robot characters working in affective laborer 
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positions, and the plays tell stories of the human becoming emotionally connected to and 
empathizing with the robot in some way. Both reflect culturally specific imaginations of the 
robot, respectively from Japan and the U.S., but imaginations must shift due to the physical 
presence of the real robot, a tangible object, on stage and the embodied encounter made possible 
by the live event. I investigate the robot as an “object” in part to understand the ways in which 
the human audience identifies with the performing object. The human tendency is to 
anthropomorphize the object, attributing human characteristics in order to relate in familiar ways. 
However, I find that the identification with robots does not rely on the robot to be humanlike, but 
may develop precisely because the robot is an other that is unlike the human. Thus, I consider 
what other, less humanoid objects humans might relate to through performance. In response to 
this question, I turn to Kris Verdonck’s Dancer series (2003-2017). Here, a markedly nonhuman 
form takes center stage without any human co-stars, and the question of human/object 
relationality lies in the contact between the robot actor and the human audience. The 
dramaturgical framework of the performance still marks this object as a sort of protagonist, 
pointing toward the potentiality of different forms on stage and the human’s willingness to 
perceive of the object in different ways.  
 
In chapter three, I move beyond humanoid objects to consider the theatrical atmosphere as an 
object, emerging through the confluence of different theatre elements including light, sound, and 
space as well as the presence of the audience. The atmosphere itself is something existing in 
between and emerging through relations, yet is also something materially present and 
perceivable in which the human is implicated. Through an investigation of Kris Verdonck’s 
Something (out of nothing) (2019) and Heiner Goebbels’s Everything that happened and would 
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happen (2018), I consider first how the atmospheric conditions of the theatre space are built. 
These two performances render two distinct conceptions of atmosphere and the human’s place 
within it. Where Verdonck’s atmosphere models human alienation from their environment, and 
considers the implications of this alienation for the contemporary eco-crisis, Goebbels’s 
atmosphere models a connectivity, where human presence is inherently agentic in the unfolding 
of history. Although the performances offer different models of understanding the human’s 
relation to atmosphere, they both ultimately prioritize passive human presence rather than action. 
A focus on the theatrical atmosphere, then, offers posthuman models of cause and effect, agency, 
and power. Both productions, through their modeling of alternative relations to the world, 
gesture toward the ethical implications of the posthuman position in the world to come.  
 
In chapter four, I turn my attention directly to the human. While the material human body is 
implicit in the posthuman and new materialist constructions of relationality throughout the 
chapters, here I focus directly on performances where the human body is understood as an object 
onstage and in the audience. To understand the human as an object is not an objectification (a 
removal of agency), but instead, a reference to the human’s complex sense of agency and 
withdrawal. Through an investigation of Jacques Herzog, Pierre de Meuron, and Ai Weiwei’s 
performance installation Hansel and Gretel (2017), I consider the implications of an object-
oriented approach to the human as an object existing within the twenty-first-century technologies 
of data and surveillance. The performance creates an event where the audience comes face to 
face with their own data, a disembodied aspect of themselves that is simultaneously another 
material at work in the world. Then, I critically examine Romeo Castellucci’s Julius Caesar. 
Spared Parts (2016) and the ways in which the human body onstage is rendered as an object. 
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However, the object here reveals a highly affective agency through the materiality of the body 
itself, which works through messy, immeasurable, and covert means. Thus, the notion of the 
body-object reveals a body that is resistant to becoming completely subsumed or dominated by 
outside forces, instead retaining an aspect of itself for itself, with aesthetic elements that can shift 
through time. Finally, I apply this method of reading the material body to the audience’s body 
with a discussion of Ryoji Ikeda’s supercodex [live set] (2017). In this experimental sound 
performance, the extreme sounds act upon the body to offer a brief perception of the ways in 
which elements of the body are in direct contact with the atmosphere and responding 
independently outside of cognitive control. This experience of the body in its encounter with 
Ikeda’s sound and light offers a taste of the deterritorialization of a “body without organs,”59 as 
theorized by Delueze and Guattari, where unity of the organism is dismantled in favor of a more 
open assemblage of the organs within a shared atmosphere. Thus, the performance offers an 
opportunity to feel posthuman, while simultaneously reconnecting the brain and body, subject 
and object, consciousness and action into one location, further emphasizing the value of the 
sensuous. The body is asserted as a way of knowing and communicating. 
 
The Significance of Nonhuman Alliances in Theatre 
Central to my project is developing a model with which to approach performing objects and the 
ways objects underlie, communicate, and transform theatrical experience for the audience. This 
approach includes assessment of their sensual properties, how the performance guides the 
audience to understand the objects, and how the object relates to the audience. Indeed, I attempt 
to discover what artist Kris Verdonck would describe as, “what the object wants to do,” and then 
																																																								
59 Gilles Delueze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
	 37	
outline how to “Listen to the Bloody Machine.”60 Thus, I attempt to contribute to our 
understanding of the implications and practicalities of new materialism, OOO, and 
posthumanism for the humanities, and theatre and performance studies specifically. In addition, I 
model a method with which we might critically view and assess nonhuman objects in 
performance. While this might be useful for scholars who aim to decenter the human and 
envision alternative hierarchies and relationalities, it may also be helpful for theatre practitioners 
to think about the ways in which the dramaturgical use and framing of objects has real effects for 
the audience experience. Indeed, I affirm that theatre and performance are important modes of 
thought and provide experiences useful for understanding ourselves and our place in the shifting 
environment. Even further, I contend that theatre and performance is especially provocative and 
useful due to ways in which its sense of presence through shared time and place places the 
human body in direct contact with other materials that are beyond the habitual relations of 
everyday life. 
 
I insist upon a return to the senses that reconnects the mind with the material body as an affective 
site of production and reception of meaning and experience. Performance prioritizes these 
sensorial experiences to create events that ground the human body in a specific time, place, and 
community that resists neoliberal acceleration and ever-intensifying directives toward 
performativity. The materiality of the present moment reaches out through its affective 
sensuality, inviting a solidarity with objects. The performances outlined here invite a more 
creative, positive approach to facing the realities of our limited agency within the overwhelming 
and myriad networks in which we, as humans, are entrenched. The contemporary condition of 
																																																								
60 Marianne Van Kerkhoven, Listen to the Bloody Machine: Creating Kris Verdonk’s End, ed. 
Anoek Nuyens (Utrecht: International Theatre, 2012). 
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anxiety and alienation is strong, and the myth of the future has diminished. The question, 
therefore, is how we might deal with it. As the performances discussed here display, an answer 





Puppet Relations: Staging Human/Object Solidarity 
 
When beginning a study of performing objects, puppets offer a natural commencement point. 
These objects have performed in theatres for hundreds of years, on stages as far-reaching as 
Italy, England, Japan, and Java, for children in private homes, for communities in town squares, 
for high-paying audiences on Broadway. The puppet is an object-actor in which audiences will 
willingly seek and find an inner life. Precisely due to the puppet’s status as a nonhuman, it is 
capable of doing and representing things that the human actor cannot. However, the puppet’s 
form always exists through some attachment to the human—whether string, rod, hand, or 
otherwise. Often, the puppet is cast as an otherwise un-representable figure of good or evil, a 
mythic being, or a political leader. Thus, the puppet is intricately connected to traditions both 
religious and political. For all of these reasons the puppet is an extraordinary object, not least 
because of its particularly intimate relations with humans.  
 
Beyond the puppet’s long history of “acting,” this strange object, so often mimicking human and 
other living shapes and described as “uncanny”1 in reference to its familiar strangeness, has 
continuously provoked philosophers and theatre makers such as Johann Wolfgang Goethe, 
Heinrich von Kleist, Edward Gordon Craig, George Bernard Shaw, Bertolt Brecht, Federico 
																																																								
1 The seminal example of the puppet described as “uncanny” occurs in Kenneth Gross’s Puppet: 
An Essay on Uncanny Life (2011). This use of the term is in reference to Sigmund Freud’s notion 
of the psychological experience of something strangely familiar and therefore unsettling or eerie. 
The puppet’s ability to mimic human life as a nonhuman object might qualify as “uncanny.” For 
a full discussion of the term “uncanny,” see Chapter 2. 
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Garcia Lorca, and Antonin Artaud, just to name some of the canonical figures in theatre history. 
The puppet may appear as a reference point, highlighting what the human is not, it may act in 
roles that defy death or shapeshift in ways only an object could, or it may humble itself to an 
exacting artistic vision. In many cases throughout history, the puppet appears as a shifting, fun-
house mirror that might reflect some kind of ideal and refined theatre form.  
 
Rather than a historical trajectory or anthropological inquiry of the puppet, of which notable 
works2 exist, I will consider less “traditional” puppet examples, where the puppet appears 
onstage as both a thing and character. By “traditional” puppet, I refer to productions where the 
puppet exists within the world of the theatrical frame as a consistent character, even while the 
audience is always engaging a double vision, seeing the puppet and the character simultaneously. 
My case studies, however, show how the puppet can shift back and forth between object and 
character within the framing of the production. For instance, in Hand to God (2001), a play I go 
on to explore, the puppet alternately speaks and acts as an independent character, and then is 
referred to and manipulated as a puppet, all within the same world. Therefore, the puppet’s status 
as a character is less stable than its constant material presence, and the dramaturgy is what 
manipulates the audience’s relationship to the thing, guiding when to see it function as a puppet 
or as something else. Through this case study and others, I concentrate on the literal, tangible 
puppet to refocus theoretical puppet scholarship on the material nature of the puppet and what 
the puppet as performing object is able to do. 
																																																								
2 Dassia Posner, Claudia Orenstein, John Bell, eds., The Routledge Companion to Puppet and 
Material Performance (New York: Routledge, 2015); Marlis Schweitzer and Joanne Zerdy,  
eds., Performing Objects and Theatrical Things (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Penny 
Francis, Puppetry: A Reader in Theatre Practice (New York: Palgrave, 2011); Eileen 
Blumenthal, Puppetry: A World History (New York: Abrams Books, 2005); John Bell, Puppets, 
Masks and Performing Objects (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).	
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This chapter asks, what does the puppet reveal about the agency of objects, particularly in 
relationship with the human? What can puppets teach us about the particular objecthood of the 
human? And finally, how does the dramaturgy of the performance guide the audience to see this 
material agency? I will investigate these questions in reference to case studies of plays that 
substantially and dramaturgically use puppets: Hand to God, a Broadway play written by Robert 
Askins, Forced Entertainment’s Table Top Shakespeare (2015), and Phantom Limb’s Falling 
Out (2018). These are case studies where different relationships between the puppet and human 
are enacted through form as well as staged within the narrative. In each example, the material 
that makes up the puppet is itself active and produces effects.  
 
I approach the puppet for its potential as an extraordinary object, and I aim to interrogate this 
potential for its contributions to theatre theory and philosophy. I argue that the puppet is a unique 
object working at threshold points, acting as both nonhuman and human, merging multiple 
agencies to reveal aspects of materiality to its human partners. The materiality I reference here 
literally refers to the term’s origins in the qualities of matter, things, and physical objects.3 Due 
to its shifting nature, the puppet invites particular relationships with the human, refracting ideas 
of what is both human and nonhuman while offering challenges to traditional Western notions of 
the subject and object binary. Indeed, the puppet challenges binary assumptions through its 
																																																								
3 As discussed in the Introduction, the term “materiality” cannot be divorced from Marxist 
historical materialism, which accounts for the effects of literal material in social, economic, and 
political relations. My interest in materiality similarly finds agency in material, but I attend to the 
ways in which material is agentic through affective and performative means within the theatre 
space, rather than the Marxist attention to material agency through labor and economic networks 
or discursive practices. Therefore, my use of the term “material” refers more directly to new 
materialism in its attempt to return to matter itself. 
	 42	
threshold nature, asserting a hybridity of human/nonhuman, subject/object in line with 
posthuman thought. Therefore, I read the agency of the puppet in relationship to the findings of 
new materialism and object-oriented ontology (OOO), asking what the puppet offers these 
theories and how the puppet might then shift our understanding of ourselves.  
 
Like an emissary from the nonhuman object realm, the puppet can get close to humans through 
anthropomorphization and intimate, tactile relations. With this intimacy, it can teach the human 
how to relate to objects, scripting relations of care and awareness, revealing object ontology, and 
modeling an objecthood from which the human can learn. The puppet is positioned as an object 
that can aid in creating much-needed solidarity between human and nonhuman objects through 
its unique proximity to the human. Importantly, the intimacy invoked between the human and 
puppet object offers a place to momentarily resist the ways in which objects typically exist as 
commodities. This is not a transgressive break from the capitalist structure, but a glimmer of 
resistant potentiality.4 
 
Reconceiving the Puppet: From tool to an emissary from the world of objects  
In order to reorient our understanding of the puppet’s performative agency and relationship to the 
human as a nonhuman object, we must first assess certain foundational puppet scholarship with 
fresh eyes. It is necessary to evaluate these essential texts to consider what assumptions such 
puppet thought rests on, some of which has been influenced by the subject/object divide 
promulgated by Kantian logic, as well as to mine these texts for their implications for further 
																																																								
4 My notion of resistant versus transgressive action follows Jon McKenzie’s model outlined in 
Perform or Else (London: Routledge, 2001).  
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thought. The task then is to consider what these assumptions might be obfuscating regarding the 
puppet’s capabilities, and what a speculative and new materialist lens might make visible. 
 
The first of these foundational texts is Heinrich von Kleist’s 1810 essay, “On the Marionette 
Theater.” The essay is essential in the field of puppetry studies, although the complexity of 
Kleist’s thought has much wider implications. Indeed, as many theoretical puppet texts do, Kleist 
utilizes the puppet in order to address larger questions about theatre. For Kleist, these questions 
center around mimesis and representation. Kleist frames the essay as a discussion between Herr 
C., a distinguished dancer, and himself, where Herr C. begins by admiring the grace of the 
marionette, a grace he as a dancer can only aspire to. The grace of the object itself is highlighted 
from the beginning, as Herr C. first locates grace within the object’s material: “limbs […] 
function as nothing more than a pendulum, swinging freely, [and] will follow the movement in 
their own fashion without anyone’s aid.”5 Each piece of material has its own center of gravity 
that influences its movement, rather than every movement being governed by the puppeteer. 
Kleist, through the character of Herr C., therefore begins the discussion through an attention on 
the material itself, rather than the puppeteer or the puppet’s representational qualities. One could 
explain the puppet’s movement through physics, but Herr C. finds it to be more mysterious, as it 
is “the path to the soul of a dancer.”6 Herr C. proposes the possibility even that a marionette 
might be able to dance without a connection to the puppeteer at all, that a marionette could be 
crafted to “perform a dance that neither he nor any other outstanding dancer of his time […] 
																																																								




could equal.”7 The comparison between the marionette and a dancer focuses attention on the 
marionette as an active performer, as well as an artist with creative potential, which is especially 
noteworthy given the puppet show’s more common status as low-brow, folk, or for children. 
However, Kleist’s comparison also explores the material form of the dancer.  
 
As the conversation develops, it becomes clearer that Herr C.’s interest in the marionette is an 
interest in the displacement of ego. A large part of what makes the marionette so beautiful, for 
Herr C., is the lack of consciousness in the material. Kleist agrees that, “the spirit cannot err 
where it does not exist,”8 and further, “consciousness creates disorder in the natural harmony of 
men.”9 Consciousness, and a self-conscious awareness, might therefore be the problem 
obstructing the human’s grace, which is why the puppet is a better dancer than the human dancer, 
who is infected by the ego. Herr C. seems to believe that the elements of ego and consciousness 
pollute a pure aesthetic ideal. The historical context of the Romantic era in 18th century Europe 
should be taken into account in relation to this essay. Romanticism valued the notion of a return 
to purity and innocence, to “natural” impulses unencumbered by society’s modern impulses and 
conditioning. Kleist’s character of Herr C. then could be read as an embodiment of these 
Romantic impulses. However, the format of the essay as a conversation in the model of the early 
modern print dialogue treatise allows Kleist himself to subtly argue against these impulses. As 
Nicholas Ridout notes, “Kleist’s is one of a series of key texts in which the category of the 
aesthetic is shown, in the historical moment of its articulation, to be unstable, disarticulated.”10 
																																																								
7 Ibid., 23. 
8 Ibid., 24. 
9 Ibid., 24. 
10 Nicholas Ridout, Stage Fright, Animals, and Other Theatrical Problems (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 18. 
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Ridout employs Kleist’s argument as evidence for the inherent existence of labor behind all 
aesthetic effects (as opposed to the Romantic notion of some pure or heaven-sent beauty), as well 
as all performance by extension. Indeed, by undermining Herr C.’s idealism, Kleist himself 
argues the impossibility of an aesthetic ideal unaffected by material conditions. By doing so, 
Kleist also offers an understanding of the marionette as a nuanced object with layers beyond its 
aesthetic elements, by calling attention to the object’s history as a constructed object.  
 
As the essay continues, Kleist further troubles the concept of the aesthetic ideal through 
additional images that question a performer’s ability to replicate an action. Kleist goes on to 
recount a story about a young man who was reminded of a classical statue when he saw his own 
image in the mirror. However, as the man attempted to replicate the pose, and its charm, he 
failed to do so, prompting laughter from his private audience. Kleist suggests that this event 
ruined him, as after that day “one virtue after another dropped away from him.”11 This story 
provides another example where the object is capable of something the human is not, similar to 
the marionette’s grace. However, the human’s failure occurs in the willful repetition of a past 
event. When the man’s body was moving un-self-consciously, he was closer to the object’s 
ability than when he posed conscientiously. The body itself is expressive material, but the ego’s 
manipulation of that body is where the problem occurs. Indeed, with this story Kleist questions 
the idea of representation and mimesis itself. The boy cannot accomplish the initial pose because 
he has attempted to represent a past event and in that intention of representation, the event itself 
has disappeared. The human’s failure points to what the marionette is particularly well-suited to 
do. The human cannot perfectly replicate a past event; a perfect mimetic representation is an 
																																																								
11 Kleist, “On the Marionette Theatre,” 25.	
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impossible ideal, and attempts toward a perfect mimetic representation are not only bound to fail, 
but also to invite scorn or derision. In other words, the stage is no place for “reality.” The puppet, 
however, is able to accomplish something different, something profound and provocative, in the 
fact that it never attempts to perfectly mirror life and is therefore free to create something else. 
Further, the puppet is fixed in the present moment, presenting rather than re-presenting a past 
event. The human performer cannot accomplish what the marionette can, because the performer 
is aware of their mimetic act and their human relationship to time. The puppet does not suffer 
from this split between body and brain and is therefore a more successful performer. 
 
Kleist’s essay includes one more tale from Herr C. in order to extend his critique from 
replication to a consideration of mimesis itself. Herr C.’s story goes that a bear had consistently 
bested every fencing opponent because it could see the difference between a feint and an 
intended jab. As Herr C. recalls, “Not only was the bear able to parry all my jabs like some world 
champion fencer, but all the feints I attempted—and this no fencer in the world could 
duplicate—went unnoticed.”12 In this story, the bear is understood as another material 
supposedly devoid of consciousness and ego. Therefore, it was able to see the difference between 
a “fake” performance, the feint, and a true action, the jab. Here, the performer’s problem is not 
repetition, but the act of representation itself. The character of Herr C., an embodiment of 
Romantic ideals, believes that the bear, as being closer to nature, is gifted with some kind of true 
sight. The bear can commune with the body’s materiality and exist in the moment, as the 
material itself acts with intention and gives its truth away to those like the bear who are of the 
natural world, or who can shake off the training of the social realm. There is irony in the fact that 
																																																								
12 Ibid., 26. 
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the bear in this case has learned a human activity, referencing the popular performance tradition 
in the 16th and 17th centuries of bearbaiting. But for Kleist, the bear, by seeing right through any 
pretence, troubles the very believability of theatre itself, as all action in the theatre is a feint. In 
Herr C.’s story, acting on a stage with a mimetic intention is the very opposite of action itself. 
The state of pure grace Herr C. seeks is mystical one, as it appears in the “human bodily structure 
that has no consciousness at all—or has infinite consciousness—that is, in the mechanical 
puppet, or in the God.”13 The mystical nature of this ideal seems far from practical, and 
impossible to achieve on the stage. 
 
As Ridout astutely points out, we cannot forget Kleist’s framing of this conclusion as a 
discussion, and Kleist himself is skeptical of Herr C.’s belief of the possibility of an empty actor 
and pure aesthetic. Herr C. asks if Kleist believes his story about the bear, and Kleist replies with 
encouragement that the story is plausible when coming from Herr C. In Ridout’s translation, 
Kleist applauds Herr C.’s effort, which Ridout cites as evidence for his ultimate disbelief: “If 
someone is trying to persuade you that something is true, and you applaud, you are admiring the 
performance of persuasion rather than conceding the truth of that of which you are being 
persuaded.”14 Kleist is admiring the labor of Herr C.’s performance rather than the truth or 
meaning of this performance. Ridout goes on to explain that this disbelief is part of Kleist’s 
ultimate purpose in writing the essay, as he is pulling apart the category of the aesthetic, locating  
the object’s labor and relationships to other entities, at a time when the dream of a pure aesthetic 
was popular among those in theatre. Indeed, Kleist sees as separate entities the aesthetic result of 
performance, the labor of performance, and the truth the performance aims to represent. 
																																																								
13 Ibid., 26. 
14 Ridout, Stage Fright, Animals, and Other Theatrical Problems, 24.	
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By writing this essay as a story in which Kleist admires his interlocutor’s performance, as Ridout 
points out, I argue that Kleist himself is performing. Just as he pulled apart the categories of 
performance into an aesthetic effect, material labor, and mimetic ideal, his own performative 
writing creates all of these categories. The practice of performative writing enacts the argument 
the author proposes, so that the form of the writing itself adds to the author’s argument. By 
creating the essay—a performative object itself—Kleist underscores the value of performance. 
While the ego-less aesthetic ideal of which Herr C. and his Romantic peers dream is impossible, 
the aesthetic object created through the labor of performance does go on to exist and perform to 
great effect. After all, we are engaging with Kleist’s performance even now.  
 
The marionette figure—the epitome of a performing object—is especially suited to Kleist’s 
discussion. The marionette also exists on multiple planes; its aesthetic qualities perform, it is 
haunted by the traces of its conditions of creation, and represents an idealized form. Kleist’s 
understanding of the object questions a specific idea of consciousness in which there is a clear 
Cartesian divide between body and mind. Typically, this concept suggests that things without a 
human-like mind, such as nonhuman animals and objects, are absolutely devoid of 
consciousness. The notion of matter freed from mind enables the object to exist as the impossible 
ideal body, interacting with gravity without hindrance. To take this conclusion further, the notion 
of matter freed from the mind also simplifies the object into an entity that is human-made to be 
manipulated by or work for the human. However, Kleist problematizes this conception through 
his commitment to the object’s multiplicity. He asserts that the marionette is human-made and 
controlled, and yet, the marionette itself is both without human mind and yet still enacting a 
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creative force upon its puppeteer and audience. The object and the performance can 
communicate in the world separately from their human creators. Kleist does not go so far as to 
argue that the marionette has a consciousness without its puppeteer, but he does push back at that 
Cartesian dualism to find some creative force in matter.  
 
Seen through the lens of OOO and new materialism, Kleist’s gesture toward active matter can be 
taken even further. Kleist’s essay posits a challenge in the act of representation due to the 
disjuncture between the human’s interior reality (their thought), and what their physical matter 
and appearance actually do. But what if we understand the human to be more similar to the bear 
and marionette figure? According to OOO, all objects, human and nonhuman alike, engage in 
representation where their exterior, aesthetic properties are only one small aspect of the object, 
and expressive of their entire reality. In OOO thinking, the object is a fourfold entity in a 
structure drawn from Heiddegger15 with sensual elements that appear aesthetically at the surface 
and are therefore accessible to interaction in the world.16 However, there are other withdrawn 
elements of the whole object that are impossible to access and unavailable to the human. In other 
words, we can see and feel objects, and these elements of the object are agential and cause real 
effects in the world, but there are also additional elements of the object that are not accessible, 
but equally real. We can access only a small portion of our environment, and the fact that the 
																																																								
15 I go on to describe the fourfold in greater detail in my discussion of Table Top Shakespeare. 
For a full discussion of the fourfold object, see Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object 
(Washington, D.C.: Zero Books, 2011).  
16 OOO exists in relation to philosophy’s long history of theories of objects, including Aristotle’s 
primary substance, Leibniz’s monads, Husserl’s noema, and Heiddegger’s thing. In Harman’s 
contributions, he takes the object itself as the primary substance, or the fundamental entity of 
reality, and attempts to theorize a metaphysics that is able to speak to all objects, and the 
perceptual and causal relations in which they are involved, where the interactions among objects 
are equal to the relations among objects and the human.	
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human cannot see or know something does not disqualify it from existing. This is an important 
contribution in OOO for its opposition to Cartesian dualism. In this dualism, the mind and body 
are distinct and separable, and the mind itself is non-physical, distinct from the brain. In 
Descartes’s formulation, the mind is the seat of consciousness and experience, which results in a 
Humanist hierarchy, where the mind, a non-material thing, is considered a reality-defining force 
that is unique to the human. In OOO on the other hand, the object is material all the way down. 
Further, the object exists whether or not the human mind can perceive it.  
 
In Kleist’s understanding of the marionette, he nears an appreciation of the layered aspects of an 
object when he finds an element of the marionette’s grace in the limb’s invisible center of 
gravity, and he sees the object as an entity with a withdrawn reality due to its material conditions 
of production. But a more thorough understanding of the object’s withdrawn reality has nothing 
to do with the human at all, and more to do with the reality of the marionette that the human will 
never know. The assumption that the marionette is free due to its lack of consciousness is an 
anthropocentric fallacy that discounts any unrevealed aspects of the object because they do not 
look like human consciousness. Furthermore, this assumption implicitly supports human 
exceptionalism for their possession of a consciousness, and the notion of a binary between matter 
and consciousness.  
 
One deleterious effect of this thinking is the hierarchy it establishes; the marionette’s assumed 
lack of consciousness renders the marionette into a free tool dependent on the human, while the 
human remains, of course, the master. This mode of thinking obscures the ethical implications of 
the human’s relationship to objects and the interrelated nature of human and object agency. For 
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instance, a common argument against gun control is the phrase, “guns don’t kill.” The argument 
is meant first to direct attention to human responsibility in the act of shooting, and second, to 
dismiss the need to limit access to guns by suggesting that guns are not a danger in and of 
themselves. However, this argument ignores the manner in which the object invites certain 
behavior. Indeed, the object scripts certain actions in the body, and the body’s actions influence 
the mind. Guns empower a range of behaviors, many of which are dangerous. The human is not 
always the master of the object. This fallacy also limits our understanding of the human itself, as 
it marks perception achieved through the body and reason achieved through the brain to be 
separate and distinct. As OOO suggests, learning to see these relationships as interrelated rather 
than a binary offers different ways of being, where a more flat ontology with a greater equality 
and connection among beings can be imagined. I don’t suggest that the marionette has a 
consciousness and is thinking complex thoughts; this would be an anthropocentric assumption. 
Rather, in line with my reading of OOO, I suggest that the relationship between the object’s 
exterior aesthetic elements and other withdrawn aspects might be similar to the human’s own 
experience of this complex relationship. The relationship differs in degrees and complexity, but 
is perhaps similar in kind. In other words, the marionette is also representational, with an 
unseeable complex interiority, while the human’s very consciousness might be intertwined with 
their body. Kleist problematizes the body/mind distinction by performatively demonstrating the 
creative force of material as independent of the mind, suggesting the binary is less rigid and 
distinct where material is also creative. However, there is more progress to be made toward 
deconstructing the binary and its implications in further thought, where we might consider more 
thoroughly agentic capacity of material. 
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Attempts at Control with the Uber-Marionette 
Where Kleist questioned a clear binary between subject/object and mind/matter, without entirely 
moving past it, the following example bolstered this binary thinking to even greater prominence. 
Edward Gordon Craig’s The Actor and the Uber-Marionette (1907) stands as another seminal 
example of theatre scholarship considering the marionette. Craig’s essay exists within the rise of 
the early 20th-century figure of the master-director and the quest for a unified vision on the 
theatre stage. The essay is, in part, Craig’s description of his ideal performer: “The actor must 
go, and in his place comes the inanimate figure—the Uber-marionette we may call him, until he 
has won for himself a better name.”17 In order to realize why Craig calls upon the image of the 
marionette, we must discern what it is that he finds so vile about the actor. Craig is attempting to 
raise theatre to a new level of art, which “arrives only by design.”18 This reflects his interest in 
the idea of mise-en-scène, where the director might hone the relationship between action, sound, 
light, and space to produce a dynamic dramatic form. Craig’s interest in a dynamism of theatre is 
in direct opposition to naturalism and echoes similar interests in the European theatre community 
at large, such as Vsevolod Meyerhold’s physical acting techniques in his biomechanics and 
Filippo Marinetti and the Futurists’ commitment to technology, progress and violence. Craig was 
also influenced by his conception of Asian theatre traditions, finding inspiration from Japanese 
theatre’s use of color to portray inner states of mind, and admiring the performers’ gestures and 
movement in noh theatre.19 In Craig’s attempts to create dynamic theatre, he came up against an 
obstacle; he found the actor, a messy, emotional, and ego-driven human, to be incapable of 
																																																								
17 Craig, 396. 
18 Craig, 393. 
19 Sang-Kyong Lee, “Edward Gordon Craig and Japanese Theatre” in Asian Theatre Journal 17, 
2 (Autumn 2000): 215-235. It should be noted, however, that Craig was not impressed by every 
aspect of Japanese performance; he was disgusted that a woman would appear on the stage in 
Kawakami troupe’s performance of The Geisha and the Samurai in Piccadilly in 1900.  
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achieving any sense of control and therefore unprepared for Craig’s ideal style. Indeed, Craig 
asserts that “emotion possesses him,” as the “actions of the actor’s body, the expressions of his 
face, the sounds of his voice, all are at the mercy of the winds of his emotion.”20 Craig is quite 
aware of the body’s material, and references the actor as “material” of the theatre, but he firmly 
believes that the mind, or consciousness, cannot successfully control this material. Not only are 
mind and body divided entities, as Kleist seemed to understand them, but they are disconnected, 
and instead, the body seems to be controlled by emotions, which Craig locates in another place 
entirely. “Therefore the mind of the actor, we see, is less powerful than his emotion, for emotion 
is able to win over the mind to assist in the destruction of that which the mind would produce; 
and as the mind becomes the slave of the emotion it follows that accident upon accident must be 
continually occurring.”21 
 
Another of Craig’s complaints against the actor moves from the actor’s body to the nature of 
acting itself. He finds most acting to be an attempt at impersonation, while modern acting’s goal 
is toward representation. However, what Craig really seeks is creation, where the actor might 
become an artist, creating a new idea or form. He highlights the absurdity of his realist and 
naturalist ancestors in their sincere attempts to mimic everyday life on the stage, which he 
believes to be a futile endeavor. Thus far, Craig’s interests seem to align with Kleist in 
questioning the value of representation on stage, where a failure occurs in the actor due to the 
actor’s mind and body being at odds. And like Kleist’s discussion, Craig offers the figure of a 
marionette as a way to see beyond this simple representation toward a more artistic creation that 
functions as a sort of lens through which a theatre artist might magnify or make strange some 
																																																								
20 Craig, 393. 
21 Ibid., 394.	
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essential part of life. The Uber-marionette is symbolic rather than representational, and “will not 
compete with life—rather it will go beyond it.”22 However, Craig turns to the marionette for a 
different reason than Kleist. For Kleist, the figure is a way of imagining the human body 
unencumbered by self-consciousness to return to a pure Edenic state, but Kleist finds some sense 
of freedom in the independent vitality in matter itself. Craig, on the other hand, turns to the 
marionette figure as something that will obey, without question or error, the master director. For 
Craig, matter is entirely dead and only useful as a tool for the human who is trained to efficiently 
manage the matter under their domain. The binary divide and rigid hierarchy are even more 
pronounced in Craig’s conception in that nonhuman matter exists for the human.  
 
This mode of thinking is that which new materialist, object-oriented, and posthumanist critics 
attempt to subvert. Jane Bennett addresses why there is a need to reject this line of thought in 
favor of a vitality of matter:  
[The] image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our 
earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption. It does so by preventing us from 
detecting (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling) a fuller range of the nonhuman 
powers circulating around and within human bodies.23  
I locate the human hubris Jane Bennett references within Craig’s conceptualization, as Craig’s 
view of instrumentalized matter influences what he believes the human to be able to do. By 
seeing the human body as matter at war with the human mind, Craig discredits matter’s sensory 
potentiality. For him, the human actor is not capable of truly creating because their mind 
																																																								
22 Ibid., 397. 
23 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010), ix.	
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obstructs bodily control. However, one might consider what could occur when the materiality of 
the body itself is given room for creativity, taking in emotions and environmental inputs as 
creative inspiration. I find the strict binary Craig believes in feeds into a self-fulfilling prophesy, 
as a disconnection with the body’s sensory perception then leads to even less awareness of 
nonhuman vitality in the body’s environment. 
 
Craig’s writing in search of control over the artistic vision by means of control over bodies as 
matter points to a wider belief in the human’s ability to control the well-behaved object. Indeed, 
Craig thinks about actors, and any “other” human, as an object with similar properties as the 
inert, made-to-be-controlled matter of the uber-marionette. The feeling of power and control over 
matter can therefore easily translate to a feeling of power and control over the body’s matter, 
whether one’s own or another’s. This application of Craig’s reasoning reveals the essential 
authoritarian nature of the thinking at large due to its dependence on authoritarian control that 
suppresses its opposition (matter and emotion) through extreme regimentation. One could 
imagine how a conception of power like Craig’s might easily move to ordering and controlling 
“other” human bodies. As such, I assert that reading Craig’s argument in favor of the uber-
marionnette through this lens quickly becomes a strong argument in favor of a greater awareness 
of non-human vitality as a means to avoid such dangerous paths.  
 
Toward Collaboration with Objects 
While Kleist and Craig appear as models of understanding the marionette and performative 
matter from within the lineage of a Cartesian divide, I look to Kenneth Gross and his Puppet: An 
Essay on Uncanny Life (2011) for a more creative understanding of the puppet that gestures 
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towards ways outside binary thinking. For Gross, the puppet appears as a threshold figure of 
hybridity. Gross follows in the lineage of puppet philosophers in that his study of the puppet, 
once again, is a study of theatre and a study of the human. However, Gross approaches the 
puppet not as a vehicle or symbol, but as the focal point of the study—an object that is both alive 
and dead, human and nonhuman, supernatural and material. The puppet is an object that some 
humans might try to control, but that often controls the human instead. It is an object that is not a 
metaphor for anything else, but which needs a metaphor to be understood. For Gross, the puppet 
theatre is “a space full of shadows, of unstable thresholds, shifting lines of contact, 
unaccountable noises and bits of voice and music, objects at once translucent and opaque.”24 For 
these reasons, Gross uses the term “uncanny” to account for the puppet’s shifting identity, with 
motions and shapes that appeal to fantasy, drawing the human toward an animism that we 
typically turn away from. The puppet is a much more flexible figure that is approached with a 
sensitivity and awareness for all that it might teach. 
 
Gross brings many different elements of puppet study into conversation with each other, 
addressing marionettes, shadow puppetry, toy theater, and others in traditions from Italy, 
England, India, Japan, China, and more. Nearly every example adds to Gross’s overall focus on 
what he calls the uncanny life of the puppet, an uncanniness that appears because the puppet is a 
site where the subject and object converge into one. The nature of the puppet as a simultaneous 
material object and active character upon which the audience can anthropomorphize and project 
experience onto offers a potential site in which to consider a blurring binary between the subject 
																																																								
24 Kenneth Gross, Puppet: An Essay on Uncanny Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011), 158. 
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and object, as well as alternative ways to relate to an object. I will go on to discuss the 
potentiality of this uncanny nature later in the chapter.  
 
To think of the puppet as a threshold figure opens up different lenses through which one might 
recognize the agency of the puppet. Rather than strictly dividing the subject from the object or 
consciousness from matter, as Kleist implied and Craig demanded, Gross sees the puppet as an 
object with a vital potentiality, or the ability to affect or refresh the living. This sense of the 
unknown, untapped capacity necessitates a more creative approach to the puppet, where one is 
constantly wide-eyed and attentive to the material, allowing oneself to be fascinated. A 
generosity towards this material might even make plain the similarities and connections between 
materials already at hand. Gross attributes the appeal of the puppet to some of these similarities 
with the human; “Their movements mirror some very basic fantasies we have about persons, 
bodies, and thoughts.”25 While the puppet can appear in human form, it is inhuman in its 
immortality, as it survives blows and can jump back up unharmed. To opposite ends, the puppet 
can also represent death gracefully, painlessly, and without blood or gore. The puppet is also 
sturdier than the human form, while simultaneously being more plastic, as many puppets are 
crafted with the specific purpose to shape shift before an audience’s very eyes. Gross specifically 
mentions puppets that can age or switch genders instantaneously. The puppet, therefore, offers an 
impossible image of the human, inviting an imagination regarding what is beyond the human’s 
reach. Yet, the puppet’s form is still in relation to the human body, often mimicking the body in 
a smaller scale, and always coming to movement through human power, connected with string, 
rods, hands, or something else. The intimacy of the puppet with the human in this way renders 
																																																								
25 Ibid., 35. 
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the puppet as an extraordinary object in that it suggests itself as a sort of role model. It can be the 
human’s ideal self, or a more enchanted, alternative self.  
 
To approach an object through this lens destabilizes the humanistic subject/object hierarchy. This 
hierarchy is also undermined by the puppet’s ambiguous vitality. In Gross’s words, the puppet 
theatre “is a space where unexpected forms of life emerge, assert a form, shift shape, and then 
disappear.”26 Gross does not employ the term “life” lightly. Through his varying experiences 
with puppeteers across traditions, puppeteers tend to refer to the puppet as a guiding force, where 
the puppeteer must learn to humble themselves to the material itself. The puppets invite their 
own distinct movement and character, and it is up to the puppeteer to learn how to listen to this 
force. The puppeteer then enters into a true collaboration with the materiality of the puppet. For 
Gross, the puppet’s soul “lies in the motion it has as a material object and not a living body, and 
it is this to which the puppeteer must give himself up, to which he must lend his own living soul, 
desire, and bodily motion.”27 Gross’s findings are paralleled in discussions about Japanese 
Bunraku puppetry, which find that “the Bunraku operator gives himself to the puppet.”28 
Puppeteers are attuned to this force through training and practice, but it is an accessible skill for 




26 Ibid., 159. 
27 Ibid., 63. 
28 In Bunraku, three operators puppet simultaneously, which complicates the matter further and 
adds to the sense of giving oneself over to other entities. Alexander Alland, Jr., “The 
Construction of Reality and Unreality in Japanese Theatre,” in TDR 23, 2 (1979): 8. See also 
Barbara C. Adachi, Backstage at Bunraku: A Behind-The-Scenes Look at Japan's Traditional 
Puppet Theatre (Boulder, CO: Weatherhill, 1985) and Donald Keene, Bunraku: The Art of 
Japanese Puppet Theatre (New York: Kodansha America Inc, 1974). 
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Gross focuses directly on the puppet and its material essence, and in this focus, his study is able 
to correlate to everyday material objects. This attention and awe of the material puppet is not 
limited to puppets alone, as Gross asserts that everyday objects also perform with their own vital 
nature. What sets puppets apart from these everyday objects is its nature that reaches out to the 
human through human-like forms, allowing it to serve as “ambassador or pilgrim to human 
beings from the world of things.”29 If the object is easily anthropomorphized like the puppet, the 
object is suddenly extraordinary and “uncanny,” teasing at the presence of life where it wasn’t 
expected. But as Gross asserts, everyday objects also possess this potential. The puppet might 
therefore teach a new way of perceiving what has already been there, in relations between the 
puppet and human, as well as between everyday objects and the human.  
 
I have outlined Kleist and Craig’s approaches because I find their conceptions of the puppet to 
reveal much about their assumptions regarding the relationships between humans and objects and 
the ways in which human/object relations onstage reflect and add to larger concepts about the 
human and resultant ways of being. Kleist’s early problematizing of the concept of inert or dead 
matter in 1810 suggests the puppet’s history as an extraordinary object revealing the nature of 
objects to the human, whereas Craig’s dangerous insistence on matter as a tool to be controlled 
highlights the ramifications of an obscured view of matter’s agency. Ultimately, I follow 
Kenneth Gross’s lead and approach the puppet in performance with a genuine fascination, one 
that openly invites the puppet to reveal itself. Like him, I understand the puppet as a threshold 
figure, actively blurring binaries to offer alternative conceptualizations of the definition of an 





Breaking Puppet Traditions in Hand to God 
The first puppet I turn to is a simple felt hand puppet in Robert Askins’s play, Hand to God. This 
is the most traditional form of puppetry in my study, and the production actively calls upon the 
history of puppets in performance as well as common puppet devices. However, the production 
harnesses the puppet object’s potential as an emissary from the world of objects to the human, 
and dramaturgically shifts the puppet-object back and forth between an object and a character. 
There is a knowing interplay between the fictive tradition and reality of the puppet and the 
puppet as a visible construct in which the puppet is shown to be an object. By constantly code-
shifting, the puppet-object lingers in an in-between place, which makes visible the way the object 
acts. In doing so, Hand to God actively subverts puppet conventions in order to make plain the 
always-present agentic capacity of the puppet. In short, Hand to God depends upon and reveals 
how the object acts. This undercuts the uncanny nature of the puppet and draws the audience into 
a way of watching that is playfully doubled. Much like postmodern spectatorship invited through 
parody and irony, here the spectator participates in humorous meta-commentary on the scene. 
Askins mobilizes the contemporary audience’s practice with this dual reading in order to apply 
the same skills to the puppet. Furthermore, by making visible the object’s intimacy with the 
human, the play suggests a relationship that could manifest as something overwhelming and 
dangerous but simultaneously shimmers with anti-authoritarian potency. Hand to God therefore 
imagines effects of the human’s solidarity with the non-human object.  
 
Hand to God first opened in 2011 at New York Ensemble’s Studio Theatre. Then, in 2014, the 
play received its Off-Broadway premiere at MCC’s Lucille Lortel Theatre in a month-long 
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engagement before transferring to Broadway’s Booth Theatre in April 2015, where it ran for 311 
performances.30 The play has since enjoyed a run in London, and is now available for regional 
licensing and often receives productions across the United States. Hand to God grounds its 
puppet play in a Lutheran community in Texas. Jason, an awkward 15 year old, has developed an 
intense relationship with his felt hand puppet, Tyrone, and together they act out in increasingly 
destructive ways. Church leaders and adults of the community come to believe the puppet is 
possessed by the devil instead of facing the more complicated realities of the situation at hand. 
Jason’s father has died, his mother is distant, and his mother has sexual relations with Timothy, 
an under-age boy in the same puppet club as Jason. In other words, Jason has quite a lot to be 
angry about. At first, Tyrone seems rather innocuous, with his light grey color, squiggly red hair, 
and constant gaze of big googly eyes. But as Jason becomes angrier, Tyrone grows more violent 
and obscene. Tyrone’s antics escalate to the point where the puppet bites off Timothy’s ear and 
performs a possession by the devil, with his head turning 360 degrees and breaking a light bulb 
with a sound. Jason and Tyrone get into a violent squabble while locked within the church 
basement, ultimately leading to Jason physically harming his left hand, the hand he uses to 
manipulate Tyrone. The play uses the puppet as a way to explore how social ills are sometimes 
repositioned by institutions such as fundamentalist religion as personal failure. What in actuality 
is the product of a difficult upbringing and predatory behavior within the church itself is framed 
as a disembodied and unlocatable outside force that is easier to blame. The church’s leaders see 
the puppet as the devil itself that speaks to Jason in a way that insists on the point that the church 
has not failed him, but rather it is Jason who has failed the church. The tactic is to blame the 
invisible but omnipotent power, and the victim for giving in. In order for the play to successfully 
																																																								
30 I attended the off-Broadway performance on 13 March 2014 at MCC’s Lucille Lortel Theatre, 
and then the Broadway production on 11 April 2015 at the Booth Theatre.  
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communicate the dangers of this kind of denial, Tyrone must be understood as a puppet working 
with and through Jason, rather than a real incarnation of the devil. 
 
Robert Askins makes reference to the puppet’s traditional uses, citing its history in ritual, theatre, 
and popular performance throughout the play. In addition to references to ventriloquism with a 
well-executed “Who’s on First” bit, as well as a nod to Balinese shadow puppetry during the 
puppet club’s meeting, an over-arching convention honored in the play is the puppet as teacher, 
and more specifically, as religious teacher. The play begins and ends with a traditional puppet 
show, where Tyrone performs from within a small proscenium puppet stage masking the 
puppeteer. In these sections, Tyrone takes on the role of a Sunday school teacher, explaining 
religious myths to the audience. In early modern England, puppet plays were a site for the 
circulation of learning, and scripture was one source for these plays.31 In fact, puppets are still 
popular tools in evangelical churches today. For example, hundreds of Christian puppet plays 
stressing evangelical messages are available for free download on the Internet.32 Through these 
references, the play invites a traditional puppet spectatorship, in which the puppet is a character 
“alive” in the world of the play. 
																																																								
31 Frances K. Barasch, “Shakespeare and the Puppet Sphere” in English Literary Renaissance 34, 
2 (Spring 2004): 157-175. 
32 “Puppet Resources,” accessed December 2, 2014, www.puppetresources.com.	
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Figure 1. Tyrone in the traditional puppet show that begins Hand to God. Photo by Joan Marcus. 
 
However, as Askins satirizes the extremist tendencies in evangelical Christianity, the puppet 
Tyrone moves into a mode of incendiary hyperbole. One example is when he speaks directly to 
the audience in the play’s puppet-show prologue:  
So the same mutherfucker who invented the group kill and team virtue, that ballsy piece 
of pig shit topped all his previous work and he invented…The devil. When I have put my 
self ahead of the group. When I have acted badly, in order that I may stay around the 
camp fire all I have to do is say… The devil made me do it.33  
From these first moments of the play, Askins begins the game of playing with audience 
expectations. In this case, the friendly, religious puppet we see before us begins spouting 
subversive obscenities and expectations created through the traditional puppet conventions are 
suddenly in question. 
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Tyrone’s puppet design also subverts expectations. At first, Tyrone’s appearance seems to 
reference traditional felt hand puppets as in Jim Henson’s Muppets, but grows stranger with 
time. In the opening stage directions, Tyrone is described as, “very inoffensive. Cept this one 
seems a little off. The voice is elmo-y or some shit but a little off.”34 Tyrone fits the puppet 
stereotype of grotesque, what Gross calls: “...often a crude and disproportioned thing, with its 
staring eye and leering teeth, its tiny hands, the impossible red or blue of its face.”35 
 
Askins does not include specific directions for the design of Tyrone in the script, so the puppet 
could vary from production to production, but one thing is clear: the puppet does have teeth. The 
puppet bites off one character’s ear and bites Jason’s own finger. And we know the teeth to be 
present when Jason’s friend and fellow puppeteer Jessica quips, “Well who bought him the 
puppet with teeth?”36 These teeth gesture to a common trope in puppetry of the hungry puppet. 
Carlo Collodi’s Pinocchio is one such hungry puppet, “who appears so unnaturally thin and 
sticklike in the original illustrations, [it] seems always to be starving.”37 Gross links this 
implacable hunger and the image of the open mouth in puppets to the puppet’s indelible link to 
poverty. Additionally, the concept of hunger plays with the puppet’s emptiness, while 
simultaneously suggesting the puppet’s desire to be more lifelike with bodily functions, akin to 
the Tin Man of The Wizard of Oz who dreams of a heart. Askins plays with the fascination with 
puppets and their hunger as Tyrone does not eat food, but eats human body parts. 
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The “staring eyes and leering teeth” also lend to the puppet’s strange combination of friendly 
familiarity with an eerie, off-putting appearance. This sense of the strange is yet another quality 
deeply embedded in puppet history. Hand to God indeed depends upon Tyrone’s uncanny 
madness, which inspires continuous questioning by the audience. As the play progresses and 
Jason’s, or Tyrone’s, actions become more and more out of hand, Askins calls upon our human 
tendency to see the puppet as alive, or perhaps, as possessed by malignant spirits. We see an 
example of this in Act 1, Scene 5, after Jason has ripped Tyrone apart. The scene begins with 
Jason asleep, while Tyrone has repaired himself. The script notes that “He is tougher looking 
now” and creepily, he stares at Jason sleeping. When Jason awakes, he doesn’t remember fixing 
Tyrone himself. He states that he’s glad Tyrone is feeling better, to which Tyrone quips, “You 
don’t want me better you want me dead.”38 By referencing life versus death and insinuating that 
Tyrone is not yet dead, Askins directly addresses the puppet’s supposed “life.”  The fear of the 
unknown, the willingness to give oneself over to wonder, and a belief in gods or other sources of 
life—all tendencies that support traditional puppet performance—lead us to see something other 
than what is in front of us. In this case, what is before us is a puppet belonging to a troubled boy 
who is becoming a danger to himself. 
 
The uncanny nature of puppets harnessed in Hand to God relates to a history of fear in traditions 
of puppetry that is often linked to ideas of the puppet as shaman, masklike, or a ritual object that 
serves as a portal to the life of the gods. As Gross writes:  
There are traditions in which the puppet is an almost magical, tabooed entity, at once 
vitalizing and dangerous. At times, the puppet shares with the mask a power to give form 
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to gods and demons, to the spirit of the dead; it is a tool to convey the substance of 
ancient truths.39  
In Hand to God, there is even a scene of possession in the script that parodies a well-known 
scene from the 1973 film The Exorcist (directed by William Friedkin). At the end of Act I, as 
Jason attacks Timothy and threatens to reveal his mother and Timothy’s relations to the pastor, 
Margery cuts in with “Timothy’s right. The devil’s got him.” Jason as Tyrone quickly responds, 
“The devil. You want the devil? I’ll give you the devil.” The stage directions then describe, 
“Tyrone’s head twists all the way around. […] Tyrone makes an awful noise and the light bulb 
bursts.”40 Such references convey in a humorous way, the classic codes of devil possession well-
known in theatre and film.  
 
And yet, Askins creates an interplay between the reality of the puppet character and object by 
jumping back and forth between these puppet tropes and other moments when he pulls the 
audience away from this reality, guiding the audience to see Tyrone as a thing through which 
Jason is working rather than an independent character. For instance, after the scene I just 
described, Jessica voices the question for the audience: “Is it the puppet that’s possessed or 
Jason?”41 Even Tyrone reveals who is behind the chaos. When Jason asks Tyrone how he broke 
the light bulb, Tyrone replies simply, “I didn’t. You did.”42 
 
Hand to God purposely leads the audience in and out of different modes of puppet spectatorship 
in order to underscore the play’s insistence that Tyrone is not the devil incarnate. As Margaret 
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Williams argues, puppethood itself lies in spectatorship. She suggests that all objects can be seen 
as puppets, while paradoxically, perhaps even a puppet can be seen as an object, depending on 
how one is led to view that object.43 Her assertion points to the ways in which framing, focus, 
and narrative can direct audience understanding of a specific object’s agency. In Hand to God, 
some scenes, as in the scene when Tyrone wakes up Jason in the middle of the night, the 
puppet’s movement and language is so convincing that the puppet’s supposed “life” seems 
absolute. Thanks to Stephen Boyer, who created the role of Jason, and his highly skilled acting 
and puppeteering, the audience can easily lean into the sense of wonder and awe that often 
accompanies puppetry, believing that Tyrone is in fact speaking and acting on his own accord. 
But whenever the performance has convinced us that Tyrone might be alive, a clue brings the 
audience back to skepticism and points out, again, that Boyer as Jason is of course giving voice 
and movement to this puppet. For instance, Boyer never hides his arm that gives Tyrone 
movement and continues to use his puppeteering hand as normal even when inside the hand 
puppet. In one notable scene, Boyer sits on a swing and holds the swing’s rope with his hand, so 
that Tyrone’s mouth seems to be biting the rope. Nor does Boyer ever ventriloquize Tyrone, and 
instead makes it obvious that he is speaking both voices. In one scene, Boyer even speaks 
Jason’s lines  in Tyrone’s voice, speaking back to Tyrone in the growled voice he typically uses 
when Tyrone speaks. This highlights that all the words are Jason’s—Tyrone does not speak, but 
Jason does. Through these strategic choices, the play underscores the puppet’s objecthood to 
make the point that Tyrone is not possessed. Indeed, there is no such thing as possession or the 
devil in Askins’s world, which is a denial central to its theme. This belief is summed up in 
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Tyrone’s epilogue: “That’s the thing about the devil. You need him. […] And so for the last 
couple thousand years, merrily we roll along. Solving our problems by putting horns on them.”44  
 
Figure 2. Jason (Steven Boyer) uses his hand while wearing Tyrone, with Jessica (Sarah Stiles) 
in Hand to God. Photo by Joan Marcus. 
 
Since the narrative and staging of the puppet have already made the point that neither Jason nor 
Tyrone is possessed, the climax of the play works to further Askins’s theme. Jason has 
deteriorated and is no longer able to keep the division between himself and the puppet clear. 
After a violent rant, Tyrone goes for Jason’s throat, screaming, “Self hatred’s a bitch ain’t 
she?”45 This line defines the conflict to not be between Jason and Tyrone, the object, but between 
Jason and himself, the manipulator of that object, as Jason struggles against the church’s 
repressive environment. This awareness of Jason and the puppet as one in the same makes the 
church’s insistence on exorcising the devil from Tyrone so absurd, and Jason’s decision to 
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physically harm himself so tragic. The play’s message therefore hinges on the audience knowing 
that Tyrone is an object.  
 
By defining Tyrone as a material object, the question of the nature of that object arises. Despite 
the references to traditional puppetry, this puppet in particular is utilized as a vibrant object with 
its own creative energy.46 The play shows what Tyrone the puppet-object does to Jason; it is not 
metaphorical but the consequence of direct actions. The puppet-object enables Jason to speak. In 
other words, the object of the puppet functions as a tool through which Jason can express himself 
in the authoritarian church community where individual expression, including expression of 
anger or negativity, is strictly policed. The puppet-object is the catalyst that begins his release. In 
fact, the puppet-object behaves as the impetus of the play and with its very presence moves the 
play forward. Hand to God exemplifies that the puppet left to its own devices as an object is 
communicative, vital, and active. 
 
But how is it that the object itself is doing anything? Obviously, Jason moves the object, and he 
lends it a voice and a personality. But the object invites this action from Jason. Robin Bernstein’s 
idea of “scriptive things” is a helpful touchstone here. Bernstein considers a material property or 
thing to be something unruly and the cause of unpredictable associations. As she writes: “A thing 
[…] demands that people confront it on its own terms; thus a thing forces a person into an 
awareness of the self in material relation to the thing.”47 A thing, therefore, is relational and has a 
relationship with the other things and subjects around it. In Bernstein’s terms, “an object 
																																																								
46 I use the term “vibrant” in reference to Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2009). 
47 Robin Bernstein, Racial Innocence: Performing American Childhood from Slavery to Civil 
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becomes a thing when it invites a person to dance.”48 Moreover, in keeping with new materialist 
perspectives, this is not metaphorical but literal: “things literally shape human behaviors.”49 A 
chair shapes human behavior and asserts power over the human body by scripting specific body 
positions. A knife shapes human behavior in that it requires a certain handling. Objects gesture 
toward humans through their aesthetic qualities in order to create relations. Jane Bennett’s notion 
of vital materialism also notices the thing’s communicative power through gesture. According to 
Bennett, things assert their “thing-power” and “provoke affects” in the human. 
 
Puppets are scriptive things. Within relations among the performers onstage, puppets are always 
inviting their puppeteer to dance. Tyrone not only invites Jason to interact with him in a general 
way, but also scripts a more specific performance. Tyrone’s body, and his mouth, which gets so 
much attention, presents itself as an alternate body from which Jason can speak. The material 
object suggests a friendly confidante in whom Jason can place his trust, and also allows Tyrone 
to fit into the church group atmosphere. And yet, Tyrone’s “leering teeth” suggest another type 
of movement. These teeth script aggression and the many bites Jason impels the puppet to 
commit. Tyrone, therefore, not only scripts the friendship, but the violence that follows.  
 
The puppet Tyrone, as a scriptive thing, therefore stages the vital materialism through its 
relationship to the human actors and audience. First, the relationship between Jason and his 
puppet clearly demonstrates that the human and object are not in a defined hierarchy with the 
human riding over the puppet. Jason quite literally depends on his puppet. In one conversation 
with Jessica, Jason denies how much he likes his puppet, and Jessica rephrases her question: 
																																																								
48 Ibid., 73. 
49 Ibid., 73.	
	 71	
“How much you need your puppet.”50 Here, we see that the object is not simply a tool under the 
human’s control, but engaging in a collaborative relationship. This is a foundational thought in 
new materialism: objects do not exist for the benefit of humans, but as discrete entities in and of 
themselves. An understanding of objects as tools leads to the assumption that objects can be 
tossed aside when their “job” is complete, but their materiality remains. Tyrone, however, 
refuses to be thrown away and forgotten on Jason’s whim. After Jason rips up Tyrone, Tyrone 
asserts himself once again. Clearly, Jason is not in complete control of the object as it provokes 
levels of violence previously unknown to Jason. The object is unpredictable, both in the ways 
that it might misbehave (objects break all the time), and in the ways that it interacts with the 
human.  
 
Puppeteers have often stated that they are not in control of the puppet, but are listening to how 
the puppet’s material properties guide their own gestural choices. As Kenneth Gross notes, 
“Puppeteers I have met indeed often speak of waiting for some impulse from the puppet they 
hold, a gesture or form of motion that they can then develop, often being shocked by what 
emerges.”51 Indeed, Sarah Stiles, the actor who originated the role of Jessica in Hand to God 
(and also performed as Kate Monster and Lucy the Slut in Avenue Q), describes the process of 
working with the puppet as “helping them come out” in a way that honors “their own set of roles, 
based on how they look and feel.”52 Stiles’s experience points to the acute focus directed at the 
puppet, and the interconnected relationships between puppets and humans in which the puppets’ 
object nature is at the center. Moreover, Gross describes the ‘souls’ of the puppet and puppeteer 
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	 72	
joining: “The soul [of the puppet] lies in the motion it has as a material object and not a living 
body, and it is this to which the puppeteer must give himself up, to which he must lend his own 
living soul, desire, and bodily motion.”53 Indeed, here the puppeteer is doing more than working 
the puppet, but working for the puppet, “lending” his soul. In this moment, the traditional 
hierarchy is displaced, and both the object and the human’s equal, albeit different, roles are clear. 
Rather than situating the object as a tool, vital materialism calls for object relations defined by 
more respect and greater lines of communication, relations which puppeteers and their puppets 
model. With a greater awareness, humans may learn to see the differential tendencies of 
additional objects beyond the extraordinary object of the puppet.  
 
Furthermore, the puppet onstage is also a scriptive thing in the ways it engages with theatre 
conventions to invite a certain kind of response from its audience. By moving and speaking in an 
anthropomorphized manner, in collaboration with the puppeteer, the puppet itself encourages a 
viewing equal to a human performer onstage. The anthropomorphism at work here therefore 
underscores the object’s equivalence to the human performer onstage, in a model that reshapes 
the normative human and object hierarchy. Anthropomorphism is one useful method Jane 
Bennett suggests as a means toward seeing objects in new ways. According to Bennett, “a touch 
of anthropomorphism can catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not with ontologically 
distinct categories of beings (subjects and objects) but with variously composed materialities that 
form confederations.”54 Anthropomorphism finds an intelligence related to one’s own, and this 
requires that the object receive a second look. Furthermore, through this act of imbuing a human-
like expressive power, the thing becomes more than the thing it was.  
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Whereas the puppet’s often humanoid shape, mimicking human body parts, scripts an 
anthropomorphic reading, theatrical conventions offer the opportunity for this anthropomorphism 
to apply to other, less humanlike objects. For instance, if a toothbrush acts in a puppet show, the 
toothbrush’s capacity to do more than brush teeth becomes apparent, and even once the puppet 
show is over, the performance remains. Thus, the theatre form invites interactions beyond those 
scripted by the material and the object’s common usage. Suddenly, the thing is more than a mere 
tool, only meant to brush teeth, but something that possesses a capacity within it beyond what we 
may know. Perhaps this object, after the act of anthropomorphism, is no longer so easy to toss 
aside. Timothy Morton also finds value in anthropomorphism in the project of finding solidarity 
with nonhuman objects, because, as he argues, anthropomorphism does not render 
anthropocentrism inevitable. “Whether or not the tactic is anthropomorphic, the actual enemy is 
not anthropomorphism, it is anthropocentrism, an entirely different beast that can express itself 
either by humanizing the nonhuman or indeed by totally dehumanizing it.”55 Indeed, 
anthropomorphism can be useful, and may even be inevitable. According to Morton, humans and 
nonhumans alike are only able to access the world through their own mode of being: “We are not 
capable of venturing outside of our access modes. We are shrink-wrapped in them, so that we 
anthropomorphize everything.”56 Thus, when the human anthropomorphizes the toothbrush, for 
instance, the human is reaching out to that object, interpellating it into a human ideology. In 
Morton’s view, this is not inherently anthropocentric, as the root of the interaction is about 
communication. 
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Relations with puppets therefore offer a means toward the new materialist goal of more channels 
of communication between human and nonhuman objects, as members of the same community. 
As Bennett notes, “an actant never really acts alone.”57 Rather, actants are always one small part 
of a grander assemblage of actants, all of which affect the community. In the example of Hand to 
God, it seems that the events in the play occur not because of either Jason’s or the puppet’s 
actions, as neither are in a vacuum, but because of the intertwined nature of the choices Jason 
continues to make and the affective effect of Tyrone’s vitality on Jason. The federation of 
Tyrone’s teeth and Jason’s impulse of aggression toward Timothy combine into the event of 
biting off Timothy’s ear. Likewise, the assemblage of Tyrone, with the easily manipulatable 
head, the challenge to Jason of the devil’s presence, the other objects present in the room, 
including the light bulb, and the assumptions of the church members all converge in a singular 
moment, in which Jason and Tyrone break the light bulb as if Tyrone was the devil. Of course, 
these dramatic examples from the play highlight an a priori fact: there are always a multitude of 
factors at play in any event. Yet, these specific examples throw the influence of an object into 
high relief, which is the vital materialist goal. It must be understood, in order to build the “polity 
with more channels of communication between members,” that all members have very real 
effects in every event. The materials and the humans all must share in the responsibility—human 
agency and responsibility are not diminished, but are part of a more complex system. There is 
not one single causal event, but a history of intertwined human choices and objects’ actions. “If 
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matter itself is lively, then not only is the difference between subjects and objects minimized, but 
the status of the shared materiality of all things is elevated.”58 
 
The capacity of objects remains the easiest component of the community of objects and humans 
to forget. As already mentioned, this is tied to the common viewpoint that human is master and 
objects are simply the master’s tools, but the issue is more multi-faceted. Young children are 
allowed the opportunity to learn about the world through all of their senses, but this is curtailed 
as we reach adulthood. For example, August F. Coppola, the designer of the Tactile Dome at San 
Francisco’s Exploratorium59 believes people develop prejudices against the sense of touch. 
“‘[The touch sense’s] development gets off to a bad start,’ he said, ‘for as soon as we’ve stopped 
chewing our toes, the first commandment in life is given: Don’t touch.’”60 Think of the image of 
a child reaching out to touch anything—a coin on the ground, a dog’s fur, a discarded piece of 
trash—which inevitably leads to their guardian removing their hand because the object is dirty or 
regarded as dangerous. Yet, touch allows us to measure reality. “It’s the tangible, the concrete, 
what you can put your finger on when your feet are on the ground.”61 Touch also fosters a 
greater connectivity between the individual and the world around them. A purely visual 
experience fosters an understanding of an objectified world, because vision “presents us with a 
spectacle spread out before us at a distance, and gives us the illusion of being immediately 
present everywhere and being situated nowhere. Tactile experience, on the other hand, adheres to 
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the surface of our body; we cannot unfold it before us and it never quite becomes an object.”62 
Touch, therefore, grounds us in our bodies within a community of other object and human 
bodies—touch provides access to the vibrancy of bodies. It is because of the intimate connection 
fostered through touch that Morton finds the haptic to be useful for an ecological philosophy as 
well. For Morton, all of the senses work together to access the world, and seeing is subscended 
by touching, where seeing is a part of touching and vice versa. The whole of perception is not 
greater than the sum of its parts, and so the haptic itself reveals something unique on an 
individual scale. “The touch is lowly, susceptible, risky, humble—it subscends being able to see 
around and over and beyond a thing.”63 A greater awareness of our haptic relationships might 
reveal intimate relations with many agentic materials in our everyday lives—our clothes, our 
food, and other invisible materials in the environment.64 
 
Puppetry, through its very nature, requires a relationship with an object based on an intimacy 
found through touch. The tactile experience of handling a puppet adheres the human to the 
material world around them. Tyrone, as a felt hand puppet that envelops the puppeteer’s limb, 
offers a heightened example of this tactile intimacy. Indeed, the felt hand puppet becomes a sort 
of prosthesis to Jason’s own body and changes the way his body relates to the environment, a 
concept later explored in my discussion of Phantom Limb Company’s Falling Out. Jason’s 
relationship with Tyrone, characterized by this intimacy, stands it stark contrast to other human 
relationships available to him in his environment. Of course, in this and many puppet 
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performances, the audience cannot touch the puppet themselves, but experiences the puppet 
through the puppeteers and other actors on stage. However, the humans onstage model 
interactions with the puppet—through their attention, respect, and sensitivity—and these intimate 
relations have effects within the world built on stage. In the case of Hand to God, the object is 
fascinating and compelling in its presence. Further, the object is liberating—and perhaps Jason’s 
newfound freedom leads to violence due to just how repressed he had been previously. However, 
the play does end happily, as the atmosphere of secrecy and repression is lifted and replaced with 
more open communication. Within the world of Hand to God, Jason’s relationship with the 
puppet-object is revolutionary. 
 
The Lutheran church community at the center of Hand to God finds danger in Jason’s 
confederation with the object-puppet and tries to label it as demonic, relying on restrictive ideas 
of where life exists. By labelling nonhuman forces as the devil’s work, and therefore excluding 
them, the church supports the patriarchal structure that is contingent upon centralized 
authoritarian control. But Jason and Tyrone engender more of a networked agency that fights 
against the church—both its canonical teachings about god and the devil, but also the structure of 
the church itself. Distributed agency along with action that takes different forms erode the 
authoritarian leader’s ability to maintain the guise of total control. No leader, however despotic, 
can control nonhuman animals and objects. The stakes are high, and the puppet-object is a 
powerful agent revealing the potentiality of human-nonhuman solidarity. 
 
Hand to God, through its metatheatrical use of the puppet, presents puppets as vital, 
communicative, and active objects with a capacity to enter into radical, intimate relations with 
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the human. Tyrone harnesses the puppet’s double nature: as both the puppet character, 
performing lines and actions like an actor onstage, and as an object in its own right. Hand to God 
makes use of the puppet-object in uniquely defined ways by playing with its uncanny history and 
associations, and yet, through its gestures toward puppet traditions, the puppet-object is not at 
odds with its puppet predecessors. The agentic capacity of the puppet in its relationship to 
humans, which figures so particularly in the Hand to God narrative, might therefore apply to 
other puppets as well. Perhaps puppets consistently function in this sort of double nature, as both 
object and character within a performance. With this insight, we might remain attentive to the 
ways that the puppet’s materiality scripts interactions, as well as to the ways that theatricality 
develops a space where objects can function differently, beyond the interactions they typically 
script. Practicing a profound attention toward the puppet-object trains a more subversive 
solidarity between human and nonhuman objects: a non-hierarchical partnership between the 
human and object defined by receptive lines of communication, shared responsibility, and tactile 
intimacy. In Hand to God, Tyrone tangibly affects his community, and his partnership with Jason 
enacts profound effects on their environment. This particular narrative asks the question, what 
else might human and object partnerships accomplish? 
 
Casting Everyday Objects as Actors: Forced Entertainment’s Table Top Shakespeare 
Where Hand to God engages with the tradition of puppetry, the following case study engages 
with the tradition of theatre and storytelling more generally, while utilizing everyday objects as 
puppets. Forced Entertainment, a theatre company founded by a group of six artists in the UK in 
the 1980s, embarked on an ambitious project entitled Table Top Shakespeare, which first 
premiered in 2015 but was still touring in 2019. The goal was to perform the entirety of the 
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Shakespeare canon within twenty-four hours. To accomplish this monumental task, the rules of 
performance had to change, which led the group to embrace Shakespeare’s plot and characters 
through a pared-down storytelling style and untraditional actors. These untraditional actors were 
found in unusual puppets; a varied array of everyday household objects play all the roles of 
Shakespeare’s canon, while one storyteller narrates a simplified version of each play’s plot. 
Because Forced Entertainment establishes such focus on the object actors, the production 
provides a site in which the nature of objects’ actions can be revealed. I argue that Table Top 
Shakespeare reveals how objects’ aesthetic elements create real, dramatic effects. Furthermore, 
Table Top Shakespeare reframes the everyday object with a sense of play and an interest in their 
aesthetic qualities, thereby opening up space for the object to relate to the human in unscripted 
ways. This is especially valuable as it invites the audience to find a renewed sense of fascination 
with the object that upsets the typical relationship with these objects in the capitalist system. Like 
Hand to God, Table Top Shakespeare ultimately invites a subversive solidarity with the object, 
but here the solidarity is developed between the everyday object and the audience. 
 
Table Top Shakespeare is one of many works by Forced Entertainment; while it engenders many 
of the group’s guiding interests, it also stands out from their oeuvre for its connections to the 
classical theatre tradition through its use of Shakespeare. More generally, Forced Entertainment 
develops experimental work collaboratively, often through improvisation. In Artistic Director 
Tim Etchells’s words, “the members of Forced Entertainment have pursued an aesthetic of 
theatrical deconstruction, comical failure, narrative fragmentation, collage, and provocation.”65 
The group has separated itself from the literary theatre tradition and has instead drawn influence 
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from a wide range of genres, including performance art, cinema, cabaret, and stand-up. Many of 
the group’s productions therefore destabilize theatre and text in a variety of ways. For instance, 
And On the Thousandth Night (2000) features a group of storytellers improvising a text in 
duration that is endlessly evolving, at times banal while also somehow encompassing every story 
ever told. Tomorrow’s Parties (2011), on the other hand, features two lone performers on a 
nearly barren stage inventing conversely dystopian and utopian futures through words alone. The 
World in Pictures (2006) matches the epic nature of storytelling with an excess of theatricality in 
sets and costumes, all to create a mock “story of mankind.” According to Terry O’Connor, a 
longtime member of the company, a leading goal for the company is “destabilizing the 
hierarchical position of text on stage […] creating a visceral experience beyond literacy.”66 
While they clearly undertake this goal in many ways, the company’s work is often playful, 
crafting meta-commentary through intentionally amateurish and chaotic performance styles, and 
engaging an active spectator. As Sara Jane Bailes argues, their strategic dramaturgy opens up a 
rich terrain “between the teleological expectation of theater as an expertly crafted performed 
spectacle, and the company’s persistent refusal to meet those demands in the way they might be 
expected to.”67 This expectation is reflected in the very name “Forced Entertainment.” While 
Table Top Shakespeare does not reflect the chaotic tone of some other productions, it does 
further the company’s ongoing interrogation into the rules, habits, and expectations of the 
traditional theatre event.   
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Etchells has cited various inspirations for this piece. Given the company’s British heritage, he 
had often been asked when the company would attempt Shakespeare. Finally, they staged an 
experimental King Lear, which involved a recording of Etchells’s brother, Mark, retelling the 
plot of King Lear to Etchells after a few drinks. The epic text synthesized by an amateur 
storyteller in everyday speech informed the tabletop experiments to come.68  According to 
Etchells, “we somewhat dodge the Shakespearean bullet by not so much doing the plays as 
recounting them.”69 Forced Entertainment chose to break up the canon into thirty-six episodes 
that were forty-five to sixty minutes long, so that six performers would learn and perform six 
plays each. Performers included company members Robin Arthur, Claire Marshall, Cathy 
Naden, Terry O’Connor, and Richard Lowdon, as well as regular collaborator Jerry Killick. The 
production also carries forward the company’s interest in what they term “described 
performance” and the ways in which a play or a scene can be carried out through language, 
without the more spectacular means of production, where spectacular refers to something large-
scale with striking effects. In this sense, their work is distinctly anti-spectacular, often drawing 
attention to absence and disappointment with theatre through less “beautiful” but cruder designs. 
This anti-spectacular motive influences the choice of casting each Shakespearean character as an 
everyday object in Table Top Shakespeare, which achieves what the company frames as “a kind 
of levelling of the plays—a gently comic re-casting of them via objects from the kitchen cabinet 
and grocery store shelves—as well as a celebration of their power as stories, and the act of 
																																																								
68 Andrew Haydon, “Wherefore art thou pepper pot? Shakespeare's plays retold with household 
objects,” The Guardian, 24 June 2015, 
www.theguardian.com/stage/2015/jun/24/shakespeare-plays-retold-with-household-objects-
forced-entertainment. 





storytelling and theatre itself.”70 This study in storytelling is also a study of objects and the 
complex ways objects perform.  
 
I attended the touring production at New York University’s Skirball Center on September 16, 
2018.71 The Skirball’s large proscenium stage was adjusted for this intimate performance with 
risers for audience seating set up directly on the stage, mere feet away from the real stage for the 
evening: a simple, barren tabletop. Surrounding the intimate performance space were large 
shelving units, carrying the objects acting in the entire canon of plays: an impressive array of 
everyday household objects, things you might find in the grocery store, pharmacy, and hardware 
store. The objects include flashlights, cups, dishwashing liquid, mints, bottles of soda, hot sauce, 
gin, brandy, tonic, containers of sprinkles, cans of shoe polish, wood adhesive, bags of sugar and 
flour, and much, much more. Like actors awaiting their entrance from offstage, the objects stood 
in groups, arranged and labeled by play title simply printed on a piece of tape. 
																																																								
70 Forced Entertainment, “Complete Works – Tabletop Shakespeare,” 2015, 
www.forcedentertainment.com/projects/complete-works-table-top-shakespeare/. 
71 Because the production is touring, live-streamed, and improvisational, it is necessary to note 
the specific performance and chapters I encountered. I recognize that my personal experience on 
this date is only one of many varying experiences. Thus, I position my analysis from my own 
perspective, in part to locate the analysis in this specific encounter, as well as to highlight the 
affective nature of the objects in performance.	
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Figure 3. The cast of Table Top Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Photo by author. 
 
In preparation for each play, an episode in the larger marathon, the individual performer enters 
the stage area and gathers the cast of objects before arranging them on a plastic carton that 
functions as a side table or staging area next to the storyteller’s chair. A simple poster with the 
title of the play that will be performed handwritten in plain black lettering rests upon the 
miniature stage between plays during their preparation. Lights remain up, and the play begins 
with the performer’s casual announcement of the title. For my analysis I consider two works 




Terry O’Connor told Romeo and Juliet with simple language, avoiding even the most memorable 
of Shakespeare’s dialogue. In fact, she avoided nearly all dialogue and did not suggest words 
coming from the objects themselves, opting instead for casual narration as the object-actors were 
arranged and then rearranged on the tabletop stage. Without dialogue, O’Connor’s storytelling 
focused on what happens between the characters: these two families don’t get along, Juliet spots 
Romeo across the room, Lord Capulet is having a great time hosting the party, Lady Capulet 
encourages Juliet to marry Paris, etc. And with each development between characters, the actors 
moved positions once again to reflect the change. It is important to note that O’Connor did not 
puppet the objects in that they did not pretend to speak nor did she bounce their bodies around to 
pretend that they were doing something they were not. Rather, she placed the objects in position 
and removed her hands from the playing area entirely, so that both she and the audience could 
return their gaze to the objects themselves. The resulting effect was clean and easy to follow, and 
her timing made for a playful and comedic tone. Robin Arthur’s delivery of Timon of Athens was 
even more casual. He used a gruff voice and sardonic tone to match the misanthropic and 
masculine nature of Timon’s character, as opposed to Romeo and Juliet’s youth highlighted in 
O’Connor’s telling. The personal styles of the storytellers became clear with time. Arthur chose 
slightly more crass language (fitting for his characters), and he spoke with his hands significantly 




Figure 4. Terry O’Connor in performance of Table Top Shakespeare. Photo by Hugo 
Glendinning. 
 
Table Top Shakespeare removes many of the spectacular layers of performance to create a study 
of foundational performance elements. First is the storyteller; the entirety of the narrative is in 
the hands of one performer. A general history of performance itself is referenced through the 
storytelling style, which reminds one of the primordial Greek theatre form, prior to Thespis 
stepping out to embody the character, as well as other rich theatrical traditions such as wayang 
kulit and noh, which both feature a single storyteller who narrates while other objects or 
performers represent the action. This simplicity is especially pointed when compared to the 
history of Shakespeare’s plays in performance, an element of which is implicated in coloniality 
and elitism. The objects, therefore, seem to be engaging in the most elemental form of 
representation upon which performance is based—representing other objects through aesthetic 
means. They accomplish the act of representation so successfully that they hearken back to 
Kleist’s ideal performer. Where the young man’s self-consciousness, ego, and compulsion to 
perform prevented him from accurately re-presenting the Greek statue, the ideal object figure is 
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capable of representing in performance, honestly and gracefully, due to its straightforward 
action. The object simply is and does. It does not plan to, or consider how to present itself 
onstage. The difference from everyday life lies only in the way we see the object, due to the 
newfound attention the theatrical framing invites. In fact, its presentation on stage is no different 
than its presentation of self in any setting; its aesthetic aspects perform and sensually engage 
other objects in their environment. The question of the aesthetic aspects of the object will remain 
a central theme for the continuing discussion of the performance, where the term “aesthetic” 
refers to the sensual properties of the object, or how the object appears. In OOO, what Tim 
Morton terms the “aesthetic realm” is where cause and effect occurs and not inherently referring 
to the question of beauty, as much as it refers to appearance more generally. While Hand to God 
shines a spotlight on the puppet’s materiality and the scriptive quality of its aesthetic features, the 
object in question is always undeniably a puppet. It is a carefully designed and crafted object 
with anthropomorphization in mind. While Table Top Shakespeare turns this focus toward 
everyday objects, it comes to a similar conclusion. These objects were designed and crafted for 
more mundane, functional tasks. Yet, this performance suggests that it may be worth paying 
more critical attention to the aesthetic aspects of these everyday objects as well, as the aesthetic 
aspects of these objects also script certain behaviors in the human. For instance, consider how 
the singular soda bottle asks to be carried by a human hand, how it references the rest of its pack, 
or how it interacts with the liquid inside itself, preparing it for the human consumer. Everyday 
objects such as this soda bottle script certain relations with the human body as well as other 
nonhuman objects. However, these scriptive qualities are reoriented on the stage and will come 
to work differently in Table Top Shakespeare.  
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The choice to simplify Shakespeare’s plays into basic plot points free from Shakespeare’s 
recognizable dialogue has meaningful implications in the performance. On the one hand, 
removing Shakespeare’s language accomplishes one of the company’s goals: “levelling” the 
plays by disconnecting the story from Shakespeare’s larger reputation and history. The focus of 
each play is on the changing relationships between the characters. The everyday object-actors are 
entirely capable of representing these relationships through their own relationality. The 
production design creates a clearly delineated performance space in the form of a single tabletop, 
as this is the only space where movement occurs within the entire theatre. Therefore, all 
relationships between characters are communicated in large part by the arrangement of the 
objects in this structured playing space, which functions identically to the properties of stage 
blocking. For instance, in Romeo and Juliet, feuds between the Capulets and the Montagues were 
communicated by certain objects grouped together, the green liquids on one side of the table and 
the red liquids on the other, forming two distinct factions at odds with each other through distinct 
qualities (color) and positions. Romeo’s and Juliet’s growing interest in each other was displayed 
as they moved towards each other, almost shyly, inch by inch. First Romeo drew closer and 
paused, then Juliet. Juliet’s fathers’ enjoyment as host of the lavish party was revealed as the 
large red camping flashlight moved energetically among the partygoers of small cups, and was 
the last to leave the playing space. The objects’ arrangement, or their interactions within time 
and space, support the communication of entire narratives.  
 
Beyond the arrangement of the objects, Forced Entertainment works with the aesthetic properties 
of the specific objects in a variety of ways. First, each object is chosen to play the character for 
specific reasons; the objects are “cast” into roles in a manner similar to traditional casting with 
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human actors, where the actor’s physical qualities are taken into account, as well as the ways the 
actor relates to the other actors. Similarly, the aesthetic properties of the objects become integral 
to the telling of the story. In this case, colors delineate relationships, suggesting family 
allegiances and outliers from the conflict. The Montagues are green while the Capulets are red, 
yet Mercutio and Paris are silver, while Friar Lawrence and the apothecary are neutral whites. 
Similarly, the object’s mass and shape denote the character’s age, where the elder, more 
powerful or wealthy characters loom larger compared to the youthful Juliet. Furthermore, similar 
forms point toward a uniformity in character, such as the soldiers played by the same soda 
bottles with matching labels, although the colors of the interior liquid and the interior selves of 
the soldiers might differ. While these associative attributes are not inherent in the objects 
themselves, the objects take on these representational qualities within the constructed world of 
the play. Furthermore, the meaning projected onto the objects are relative, emerging due to the 
ways in which the objects appear as a group. The large red flashlight only appears large and 
pompous, perfect as Lord Capulet, when it is next to a smaller, fragile counterpart.  
 
The dramaturgy of the performance also makes use of the objects’ qualities to symbolically 
suggest character traits. For instance, the nurse in Romeo and Juliet was played by a large plastic 
bottle containing an amber antiseptic liquid, complete with a green cross on its front label. Most 
apparently, the medicinal quality of the antiseptic cleverly pairs with the nurse’s role. However, 
the shape of the bottle also supports her specific attributes. The bottle is large but also stout, with 
a wide base that curves up to its narrower cap. Its shape calls to mind a large skirt, and even a 
matronly figure (a reference to the cliché of the typical casting of the nurse role). Later, the priest 
who performs Romeo and Juliet’s wedding ceremony is played by a simple white candle, 
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suggesting the many lit candles that line the aisles of churches, but also performing the role of a 
simple, serene pause in their story, as a person disconnected from the Montague/Capulet 
struggle. Another exceptionally cast object worth mentioning was the saltshaker playing the role 
of Timon of Athens. Again, the object performs symbolically, as it stands as an everyday glass 
receptacle holding a precious substance, just like Timon’s generous everyman quality despite his 
great wealth. Then, when the saltshaker tips, its insides can fall out and eventually become 
completely depleted, turning it into an empty receptacle without a clear purpose. The saltshaker 
mimics Timon’s own story quite accurately. Semiotically, the saltshaker’s vulnerability, and its 
increasing emptiness, underlie the more nuanced attributes of the character.  
 
These aesthetic qualities of these everyday objects are always a part of the ways objects relate to 
humans and to each other, but they are accentuated through the theatricality of performance, 
emerging as an object of study itself. The performance highlights the relationality of the 
characters—or the connections made between them through what they do to and with each 
other—while at the same time the relationality of the objects are mined in order to communicate 
this story. Importantly, the aesthetic properties of the objects are precisely what reveal an 
element of the relationality of the objects.  
 
The notion that the performance highlights how objects are already active in everyday life finds 
support in object philosophy. In OOO, Timothy Morton refers to objects as actors: “Objects are 
forms of delivery, which means that objects are hypocrites—which in turns means they are 
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actors.”72 What Morton refers to here is the multiple layers of the object’s ontology. The aspect 
of the object that appears to us, that we see and name, is only one of the many layers of the 
object’s existence. In addition to its history, its potentiality, and its individual being, the object 
has parameters that are outside the relational qualities that humans are able to access. The 
aesthetic appearance of the object, therefore, is representational, standing in for a much larger 
reality by delivering an image. However, the limited capacity of aesthetic properties to 
communicate the entire object does not mean that the aesthetic aspect of the object is not 
effective and agential. In fact, Morton finds the aesthetic realm to be of the utmost importance, 
as it is only within the aesthetic realm that objects are capable of interacting with each other, 
through the aspects of themselves that are available on their surface. Thus, for Morton the 
“aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension”73 where things happen and effects are made. In 
other words, the processes of interobjectivity where experience and meaning are co-created and 
shared by groups of objects and people occurs through aesthetic elements and sensual means.74  
 
Graham Harman is similarly interested in the aesthetic elements of objects, but he refers to this 
as the sensual, or the elements of the object that engage the senses. Harman’s work on the 
metaphysics of objects is what led the way for Object-Oriented Ontology, which hinges upon a 
metaphysical realism that rejects correlationism.75 Thus, his concept of the fourfold object works 
																																																								
72 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor, MI: Open 
Humanities Press, 2013), 87. 
73 Ibid., 20. 
74 For a full discussion of “interobjectivity,” see Bruno Latour, “On Interobjectivity,” Mind, 
Culture and Activity 3, 4 (1996).  
75 The term “correlationism” comes from the speculative realist critique of the branch of 
philosophy including Kant that correlates being with thinking, thereby suggesting that we only 
ever have access to either being or thinking through the correlation between them. Speculative 
realism argues against this concept as it favors humans over other beings. 
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to disentangle thinking from being and rebut any notion that only what we, as humans, know is 
real. The fourfold object is a way of conceptualizing the nature of all the objects in our world, 
while accounting for what we can perceive through different means, and what we can’t. What we 
have not and will never see is still real, because the human is not the arbiter of reality.  
Furthermore, “there is no reason to assume that the intellect can make reality directly present in a 
way that the sense cannot.”76 Meaning, our definition of the object (and agency) can and should 
expand to include things beyond our perceptual field of access and beyond our limited 
imagination. The fourfold object exists in tension between real objects, real qualities, sensual 
objects, and sensual qualities, or “the tension between the real thing as a unified thing and its 
multitude of qualities or notes”77 through such elements as time, space, essence, and eidos 
(principle structure). The real object is withdrawn and can never be “exhausted by its relations 
with human theory or human praxis;”78 the real object is too great, too layered, and too 
multifaceted to ever be fully known. However, the sensual object is accessible through 
phenomenological means, reaching out from the real object within. It is impossible to touch or 
interact with the real object. Rather, “the only possible kind of direct contact is asymmetrical, 
with real objects touching the sensual objects they experience.”79 Thus, the senses are configured 
as the means with which humans and other objects come into contact with each other, even if 
they are only coming into contact with limited aspects of their environment. In other words, the 
concept of the fourfold object suggests many layers to the object, while only the exterior layers 
are accessible through their aesthetic properties. 
 
																																																								
76 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Washington: Zero Books, 2011), 28. 
77 Ibid., 98. 
78 Ibid., 44. 
79 Ibid., 75. 
	 92	
To return to our case study, Table Top Shakespeare similarly turns our attention to objects’ 
aesthetic causality, by way of the relationality and agency of aesthetic properties. In this manner, 
the performance engages with Harman and Morton’s theories of the object, while translating 
those theories into a form of drama familiar to us that further makes that agency affective and in 
relation to the human. In Table Top Shakespeare, the objects’ aesthetic qualities are the cause 
and effect of the drama. The objects’ aesthetic aspects communicate relationships among them, 
while their interactions in space, through their shifting arrangements, communicate the action of 
the drama. Furthermore, the fact that the storytellers privilege plot points over language or 
dialogue supports the concept that whatever occurs is only able to occur through these sensual 
properties; all the action on stage is based in the material objects’ attributes. Morton himself 
embraces this theatrical language as a means toward understanding the object: “Causality takes 
place in an aesthetic dimension that consists of some kind of moving stage set, like a traveling 
theatre. There is a whole media set up involving stages, curtains, props and lighting that produce 
the causal event – I use the term produce in its fully theatrical sense.”80 Table Top Shakespeare 
perhaps produces Morton’s exemplary theatre, shifting focus to the active nature of the aesthetic 
dimension. 
 
The objects’ agency in Table Top Shakespeare entangles the human within these aesthetic 
realms. For instance, the relationality of the storyteller to the object is also important to the 
success of the piece. In discussing the making of Table Top Shakespeare, Tim Etchells reports 
that the storytellers found that they had to be gentle with the objects, or else the magic was lost.81 
																																																								
80 Morton, Realist Magic, 98. 
81 Forced Entertainment, “The Making of Complete Works: Table Top Shakespeare - with Tim 
Etchells,” YouTube, 30 August 2016, www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1PfMfu5R-E.	
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By awarding the objects respect and focus, the objects seemed to take on more human properties; 
the storyteller teaches how to receive communication from the objects. Of course, the objects 
themselves did not change. Rather, the focused attention on the object opens up the human to 
access a greater array of the properties that are already there, properties typically associated with 
the human because of our anthropocentric tendencies. The gentleness Etchells reports carries 
over into the performance itself in the ways in which the storytellers interact with the objects. In 
the case of Romeo and Juliet, Terry O’Connor only touched or otherwise handled the objects 
minimally. She would introduce the object as a character, mindfully delivering the object to its 
place on stage, and would then remove her hands entirely from the playing area. Then, as she 
narrated the character’s actions or feelings, the object was left alone. O’Connor’s manipulation 
would only enter again with the entrance of another character, or the reorientation of the 
characters to each other. Therefore, the human’s own orientation to the object as expressed 
through sensual means—force, distance, touch, etc.—becomes a part of the drama. And 
O’Connor demonstrates an intimacy and fascination with the objects that grants the audience 
access to this expanded view of the objects always in our environment. 
 
Reading Table Top Shakespeare in this way positions the performance to help further the goal of 
reorienting the human/object relationship. The objects are displayed as acting outside of their 
traditional use in everyday life. Much like Heidegger’s concept of the broken tool, which moves 
from its status as ready-to-hand, or existing only as a means to help the human achieve 
something, to a more present entity in and of itself, the fact that the objects act as characters 
outside their typical purpose brings the objects themselves to the fore. Their unique aesthetic 
qualities are heightened due to the new lens with which we are guided to see them. In addition to 
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this heightened attention is the creative manner in which the storytellers approach the objects. 
Indeed, there is a near childlike sense of play in the sense of wonder and possibility. The 
storytellers might remind of a child who lends a voice to their stuffed animal. The transformative 
capacity of the simple object here points toward the myriad realms and ways of being within the 
object. Therefore, the sudden awareness of the object’s potentiality emphasizes that it does not 
merely exist as a tool just for you, but that is has a history and future independent of you. 
Functioning like the tip of the iceberg, the object’s acting ability gestures toward the many other 
roles and realities of the object that are yet unknown to us. 
 
Table Top Shakespeare therefore draws the objects out of their everyday relation with the human 
in order to make imaginable some alternative relationalities where the human is more attuned to 
the objects’ agency, and might respond to the object in unscripted ways. According to Morton, 
objects sink out of our perception because we have become accustomed to them through our 
“habitual causal relationship.” A major part of our habitual relationship with objects in 
contemporary society is a relationship with objects as tools to be bought, owned, and of use. 
However, Morton argues that this relationship to the object results in an alienation from the 
objects’ sensuous qualities,82 as the object is appreciated only for its singular usage and always in 
relation to the human.83 Therefore, creating events such as Table Top Shakespeare that 
accentuate the object’s sensual qualities in order to make strange its habitual relationship to the 
environment renews the human’s connection to the object as well as to the larger environment of 
																																																								
82 Morton, Humankind, 60. 
83 This alienation continues in commodity fetishism as well. Here, the object is reified into a 
social object, where its assigned social role masks its aesthetic qualities and any sense of its 
withdrawn nature or material history is ignored. In the case of luxury goods and designer brands, 
their aesthetic qualities might be held on a pedestal, but these still exist as a tool for the human’s 
social gain. In this case, there is still an alienation from the object itself.	
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objects. By creating this environment that reveals the agency of aesthetic elements of everyday 
objects from the pharmacy or hardware store, Table Top Shakespeare challenges our relationship 
with these objects in our everyday lives. We are living within these vibrant networks constantly; 
it is just that we have become alienated from the aesthetic qualities of those networks. However, 
if we are able to nurture a rejuvenation of fascination, playfulness, and awe with these everyday 
commodities, where the object is realized as more than a single-use tool, we all might be broken 
out of these unhealthy habits. 
 
By creating a performance that metatheatrically comments upon the traditions of theatre and 
storytelling through object actors, Forced Entertainment incidentally created a performance that 
also helps to reveal the basic ontology of objects as actors. What’s more, the production 
demonstrates the ways objects act: through their aesthetic qualities that effectively create 
relationships, and therefore, create drama. It is helpful that Table Top Shakespeare casts 
everyday objects into these roles, because the theatrical frame gives us a new lens of fascination 
with which to access these objects. The relationship between human and object modeled through 
the human storyteller and object actors is characterized by heightened awareness, collaboration, 
and respect, which therefore suggests an example for further human/object interactions outside 
the theatre space.  
 
Puppet Modeling for the Plastic Body: Phantom Limb Company’s Falling Out 
While my previous case studies have demonstrated the agency of objects as actors and modeled 
alternative human/object interactions that move toward a solidarity with liberating potentiality, 
my third and final example of the puppet begins with that solidarity. Here, the puppet calls out to 
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the human from the threshold between dead and alive, and invites an intimacy that reveals much 
in common between the human and nonhuman actors on stage. The solidarity found between the 
human and nonhuman actors onstage then reveals something about the human object itself.  
 
Phantom Limb Company’s Falling Out, as presented at Brooklyn Academy of Music’s 2018 
Next Wave Festival, interrogates the human relationship to the environment in order to imagine 
our futures.84 Phantom Limb Company, founded in 2007, is a New York-based company that 
experiments with puppetry, multimedia theatre, and design through collaborations among the 
company and with guest artists. Falling Out is one such collaborative production that weaves 
together contemporary dance with butoh influences, video design, and bunraku-inspired puppetry 
forms to explore the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. Human dancers move 
with, alongside, and against object performers including puppets, large swaths of fabric, and 
plastic bags, highlighting the tensions inherent in how vulnerable human materiality relates to 
more durable objects, from bodies of water to the ubiquitous plastic garbage bag. This 
production is one among a three-part series that grapples with the human relationship to nature 
and climate change.85 Here, the company addresses the context of natural and nuclear disasters in 
order to mourn our collective losses while also maintaining a hopeful affect, which exists 
through a creative imagining of what posthuman futures might look and feel like. In their 
imagining, the human body reveals an inherent plasticity in response to the nuclear trauma, 
transforming in a way that cannot return, but that nevertheless resists destruction. I will first trace 
																																																								
84 I attended the performance at BAM Strong Harvey Theater on 9 November 2018. 
85 The first of the series, entitled 69°S (2011), takes Sir Ernest Shackleton’s Trans-Antarctic 
Exhibition as inspiration for a tableaux vivant performance combining puppetry, photography, 
dance, film and contemporary music that considers ice, climate change, and collective survival. 
The second, entitled Memory Rings (2015), uses similar methods but centers on the concept of 
the tree’s rings as living record, with overlapping old and new fairytales.  
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the dramaturgical methods of Falling Out that stage the human as one among many performing 
objects, all entangled with the disaster. I argue that the vision of the human staged in Falling Out 
allows us to visualize and consider Catherine Malabou’s notion of “destructive plasticity”86 
through the body’s response to trauma that may be indifferent to the future, while decidedly 
persisting. This artistic imagining of a plastic body, in solidarity with nonhuman objects, offers a 
way of thinking posthuman futures that are yet unknowable. 
 
First, let us define “plasticity” and its context within Malabou’s work. Malabou, a French 
philosopher specializing in thinking about intersections between Hegel and neuroscience, is 
interested in the possibility of a plastic ontology. Contemporary neuroscience posits the brain as 
plastic, which Malabou believes has profound implications for philosophy and understandings of 
subjectivity. If the brain is plastic, it becomes formed but will re-form, while each new formation 
has effects that influence the body and the brain’s own future formations. Whereas neuroscience 
typically refers to plasticity as a progressive process, “an equilibrium between the receiving and 
giving of form,”87 Malabou introduces the concept of “explosive” or “destructive plasticity” 
through examples of the accident, old age, or illness. She insists that destruction is also 
formative.  
An elastic material is characterized by its ability to return to its initial form without 
changing. But the change described here is irreversible, a return to the initial form is 
impossible. The word we need here is ‘plasticity,’ which refers precisely to this power of 
modification of the identity in proportions that exceed the simple detour or hiccup.88  
 
																																																								
86 Catherine Malabou, Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity, trans. by 
Carolyn Shread (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012). 
87 Ibid., 3. 
88 Ibid., 36. 
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While Malabou’s discussion thus far considers destructive plasticity at work within a singular 
subject, I contemplate how her notion might help us understand changes to the human species, 
where the human species is understood as a hyperobject as defined by Timothy Morton.89 This 
transposition could be valuable within the Western tradition in conceptualizing a less 
individualized and less anthropocentric notion of human relationality to the environment, where 
instead the individual human is implicated within a much more vast hyperobject of human 
species, which has already and will go on to engage with the environment beyond any individual 
scale. Malabou’s destructive plasticity insists upon the continued connection between form and 
being, relating the materiality of the brain and body to the less tangible elements of psyche and 
subjectivity. She states, “We must find a way to think a mutation that engages both form and 
being, a new form that is literally a form of being.”90 With this directive in mind, I turn to 
performance, which itself engages with form as a method for understanding being. 
 
The foundation of Falling Out lies in the Fukushima disaster, which includes the Tōhoku 
earthquake, and the resulting tsunami and nuclear energy accident at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant. Jessica Grindstaff, director and scenic designer, spent three months in the 
Fukushima region and interviewed many individuals who were affected by the disaster and still 
living in the surrounding areas, documenting their interactions on film. The survivors’ interviews 
then constituted the crux of the production’s video design. Projected onto the backdrop of the 
stage were images of the affected landscape, abandoned buildings, and local people. Many of the 
production elements were then built directly from these images. For instance, choreographic 
																																																								
89 Morton argues that species are hyperobjects at length in Dark Ecology (2016). A hyperobject 
refers to an object massively distributed through space and time. A full discussion of the 
hyperobject can be found in Chapter 3.	
90 Ibid., 17. 
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elements were based on mimicking the gestures of those interviewed on the screen, then 
allowing those gestures to become more deeply embodied in the dancer to where the dancer 
could develop the movements into a more personalized expressive score. The translation of these 
gestures from screen to body signals a shift from the past to present and works to show the 
temporal scope of the tragedy; a dramaturgical strategy that was noted in several performance 
reviews as an effective one. The critic Corey Seymour describes this concept as “physical 
empathy.”91 Another critic, Ran Xia, notes how: “the choreography is made up of echoes of a 
tragedy so great that it will be imprinted in our collective DNA.”92 The melding of live 
choreography with recorded interviews upsets any idea of the disaster as a past event. Thus, 
notions of shared experience and an extended view of time are introduced and supported by the 
presence of live bodies in tandem with video of past events. 
 
The video design is only one element of the production to incorporate this research, as it inspires 
many of the materials onstage as well. For instance, Grindstaff discovered that as a part of the 
decontamination process, the Japanese government is removing the top eighteen inches of soil 
from the area. They store this soil in plastic bags, and then truck the bags to old rice paddy fields 
and other towns.93 Grindstaff was shocked at the existence of “hundreds of thousands of bags of 
																																																								
91 Corey Seymour, “Falling Out, the Haunting Final Installment of Phantom Limb’s Nature 
Trilogy, Premieres at BAM,” Vogue, 7 November 2018, www.vogue.com/article/phantom-limb-
falling-out-brooklyn-academy-of-music-puppets. 
92 Ran Xia, “Falling Out,” Theatre is Easy, 12 November 2018, 
www.theasy.com/Reviews/2018/F/fallingout.php. 
93 This practice is widely contested within Japan and a source of great tension. As of March 
2019, Japan was still wrestling with what to do with the radioactive soil in the interim period 
before their plan to store it all at a site outside of Fukushima prefecture by 2045. The radioactive 
soil has been stored in various towns, and there are contested plans to use the soil with the lowest 
radiation levels for as the foundations for roads and other infrastructure in Fukushima. Justin 
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radioactive soil,” and “this maddening, futile exercise.”94 Thus, Grindstaff included 150 
numbered black plastic bags in the production as the production’s star performing objects 
representing this radioactive soil. Once the plastic bags enter onto the stage, they never exit. In 
one section, the dancers manipulate the bags, passing them to each other continuously in a 
stylized fire brigade. However, there is no beginning or end to this endeavor, as the bags 
continuously cycle through the performers. In another section, the performers work to move the 
bags from one side of the stage to the other, but the work is futile, as the bags never diminish in 
scale or quantity, remaining a mammoth presence on the stage. The overarching affect is 
overwhelming, and the point is clearly made that the bags undermine any notion of “away.” 
They are inextricably embedded within the human species’ wider environment and will remain 
agential for generations to come. That these plastic bags star in my discussion of destructive 
plasticity is no accident, as they model quite literally the flexibility and durability of a plastic 
ontology.  
 
I refer to the plastic bags as performing objects within the performance, co-stars sharing the stage 
with the cast of dancers. The associative relationship between the nonhuman objects and dancers 
is supported by an additional form that links all of them onstage: two puppet figures. Puppet 
designer Erik Sanko built the figures from recycled paper materials and other trash such as stray 
rope and old coffee cups.95 Like bunraku puppets, these have jointed limbs that require 
collaboration from multiple puppeteers. Unlike bunraku, they are fully life-size in scale, and their 
limbs are not attached to their torso so that the body can completely disassemble. Narratively, the 
																																																								
McCurry, “Fukushima grapples with toxic soil that no one wants,” The Guardian, March 2019, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/fukushima-toxic-soil-disaster-radioactive. 
94 Seymour, “Falling Out.” 
95 Ibid.	
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puppets function in multiple ways. At times, they seem to represent individuals who lost their 
lives in the disaster, and at other times they embody the ghosts or spirits of these individuals, 
giving an image to an afterlife. One particular scene supports this concept; the individual body 
parts of the puppets are found by the company members dispersed upon the stage. Each separate 
piece is handled with the utmost care, as the bodies are gingerly reunited, until whole bodies 
stand upon the stage. Then, these two newly re-formed bodies find each other, engaging in a 
tender moment of reunion center stage. The nearly gruesome imagery of their torn apart bodies is 
quickly replaced by the much more hopeful image of these bodies embarking on a new phase, 
together. Sanko remarks upon the affective potential of the puppet onstage; “There’s something 
about the vulnerability and fragility of puppets that really makes people empathize with them.”96 
While the puppet does require the help of humans to move and therefore might appear more 
“vulnerable,” this idea of the fragile puppet stands in contrast to the actual presence of the puppet 
on stage in Falling Out. Among the various materials on stage, which include the flexible plastic 
bags and water imagery, the sturdy, solid nature of the puppet forms stands out for its mass and 
stability. Furthermore, just as the plastic bags are imagined as enduring forms that will outlive 
the human,97 the puppet material is also configured as an equally enduring material. Indeed, the 
puppet form appears on stage as a representation of a lost human life, quite literally outliving the 
																																																								
96 Michael W. Aldrich, “OZ Arts, Phantom Limb explore human toll of Fukushima disaster with 
‘Falling Out,’” Tennessean, 10 October 2018, 
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human. While the puppet requires human aid to move, to appear alive in an anthropomorphized 
manner, it does not require the human in order to remain.  
 
The puppet materials also enter into intimate relations with the dancers. In one notable sequence, 
a dancer manipulates only the head of the puppet, making new shapes out of the puppet head and 
dancer body’s new assemblage, placing the puppet’s head into different relations with the 
moving body. The resulting figures suggest altered, mutated life forms, perhaps even forms 
created through an interaction with the radiation. Here, the human-puppet collaboration helps to 
creatively envision a literal embodiment of destructive plasticity, where the human has 
encountered radioactive trauma, but “is transformed without being destroyed.”98 The new shape 
of the human is something distinctly new, making its previous form unrecognizable. The new 
form created through destructive plasticity is a radical “other” from its previous iteration. And 
yet, it persists in being.  
 
In Falling Out, these new plastic forms are not presented with judgment or despair, despite their 
painful history. Rather, the human-puppet forms are continuously shifting, adding to the teeming 
life always present on the stage. Indeed, the allied puppet head and dancer body echoes other 
dancer forms and joins in solidarity with other dancers. Among the dance styles in the 
performance is “flexing” or “bone-breaking,” a hip-hop form characterized by abstract, dynamic 
movements accomplished through articulated, individuated muscles and joints. The style is hip-
hop with a robotic, contortionist flair, where the body takes seemingly inhuman shapes. Thus, the 
mutated form of puppet and human actually mirror other human dancers engaging the flexing 
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style, and neither appear out of place within this world on stage. By imagining the mutated future 
forms within a community, the performance suggests a future coexistence with and in the 
environment. 
 
Figure 5. Dai Matsuoka and half of puppet, with mounds of plastic bags in the background, in 
Falling Out at Brooklyn Academy of Music. Photo courtesy of Phantom Limb Company. 
 
The performance finds similarities among puppet and dancer bodies in the flex dance style, but 
also because of the creative team’s butoh influences. The creative team includes Dai Matsuoka, a 
butoh master and choreographer and member of Sankai Juku, a butoh dance troupe. Butoh is an 
especially effective style with which to communicate the production’s themes of trauma, as 
butoh arose in Japan within the context of avant-garde dance in the aftermath of World War II. 
According to Bruce Baird and Rosemary Candelario, the practice of butoh is marked by 
fundamental orientations, philosophical approaches, or ways of using the body.99 Some such 
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orientations specifically reflected in Falling Out include an interest in collective memory, a 
reflection on topics such as death, and grotesque, if playful, imagery. Matsuoka reflects that 
butoh “deals with the body as material,”100 a notion mirrored in the ways Falling Out moves 
back and forth between dancer, puppet, and dancer/puppet assemblages. These similarities reflect 
much philosophical thought in speculative realism and OOO. As addressed in my discussion of 
Table Top Shakespeare, the object itself is engaged in an act of representation. Every object 
exists simultaneously in multiple realms, where their aesthetic aspects are only one element of 
the object itself. In short, there is a distinction between exterior appearance and the full reality of 
the object, although both are real. The human actor knows this dichotomy intimately, mindfully 
manipulating their external aesthetics. Since dancers and objects are using the same tools, the 
result onstage in Falling Out is that the binary between these groups disappears. Both are 
simultaneously alive and dead, human and nonhuman. This is an important assertion in the frame 
of this performance with much larger consequences. If we don’t think of life as appearing only in 
human form, then life is incredibly durable. The strange, striking effect of mutated life forms 
within the performance, created when puppet limbs join human bodies, strategically provoke the 
audience to find life in new places.  
 
Morton adds further emphasis to this concept of strange provocation. If one learns to expect life 
in all forms, to understand life as something diverse and nonanthropocentric, aversion, or the 
“uncanny valley,”101 disappears. As Morton asserts, “you can become familiar with a stranger 
(thought, lifeform, stone) such that the strangeness is cancelled out. Or you can become 
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acclimated to the strangeness of the stranger.”102 Rather than aversion, both human and 
nonhuman bodies appear on a nature-culture, human-nonhuman continuum, drawn into a 
collectivity and intimacy with each other. 
 
The final image of the production is one of water. The mound of trash bags fills about a third of 
the upstage space, while one of the puppets lies inert downstage center. Enormous swaths of tulle 
are then spread to cover the entirety of the stage, puppet and trash bags included. A projection of 
moving water coats the stage. It appears as if water is lapping up against the bags, which 
suddenly look like sea rocks, before rising and overtaking everything we see. The image is 
starkly beautiful and hypnotic, supporting the vaguely peaceful and hopeful affect underlying the 
production. Perhaps this affect, central to Phantom Limb’s project, might be attributed to the 
collective future the production is engaged in imagining. Elements of the Fukushima disaster are 
mourned and taken seriously, but their effects are not portrayed as an end, despite their being the 
end of the human and our environment as we now know it. Rather, Falling Out shifts notions of 
the human, inviting in the forms created through destructive plasticity, while simultaneously 
envisioning other ways life appears. The trash bags will not disappear, but they will become part 
of a new landscape. Water will rise. But we cannot go backward to change or control agents that 
are responding to centuries worth of input, and to try to do so will only result in anxiety and 
paralysis. Grindstaff acknowledges her aim in the production toward an alternative to this 
anxiety: “you need to have a little bit of hope, and you need to have a little bit of optimism.”103 
Grindstaff’s aim is reflected in the production’s themes, as it involves a sense of accepting and 
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103 Phantom Limb Company (2018). 
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embracing material as it is now, with an eye toward creative futurity. Therefore, I suggest that 
Falling Out thus serves as a prime example of Rosi Braidotti’s “critical post-anthropocentrism” 
in that it “generates new perspectives that go beyond panic and mourning and process a more 
workable platform.”104 And one of Grindstaff’s prime operating modes to achieve this affect is 
precisely to imagine embodied futures of our own plastic forms through the human’s 
engagement with the puppet and other nonhuman objects. Jane Bennett likewise believes 
optimism, a being-with the environment in an interdependence, to be crucial to her new 
materialist project, as she finds that sympathy and optimism are antithetical to the anxiety that 
characterizes our contemporary political and ecological climate.105 By fostering sympathy, 
optimism, and quietude found through solidarity among human and nonhuman objects, Falling 
Out offers a radical act against anxiety, and therefore, in creative working-with climate change. 
 
Towards Solidarity Among Objects  
Conceptualizing the puppet not as an inert object, dead matter, or a tool for the human, but 
instead as a vibrant actor opens up productive terrain for us to consider the wider implications of 
the object in performance, including what we can learn from human relations to the object on 
stage. Furthermore, looking at stage objects, and experimenting with different ways to relate to 
them, has implications for how we understand objects in everyday life. The puppet is positioned 
as an extraordinary object that can get close to the human and earn a heightened attention, 
making it an emissary into human relations from the object world. In the case of Hand to God, 
the puppet exerts an active power over the human, and the resulting human/object alliance 
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creates an effective force that upsets the authoritarian system within which both had been 
enmeshed. Additional evidence for the need to reconfigure human/object relations is found in 
Table Top Shakespeare, where an awakening of fascination in everyday objects, precisely 
through the act of casting these objects as actors, suggests a means toward intimacy and 
solidarity with the object that extricates it from its habitual social role. Suddenly, the object 
appears as an object unto itself, with a history and potentially unknown to us but gesturing to the 
human through its sensual relations. Solidarity between human and nonhuman objects, as 
displayed in Falling Out, suggests the probability of many further discoveries regarding 
humanness as well as introducing posthuman figures and ecological themes and the 
anthropocene. Here, the materiality of the puppet and other nonhuman forms onstage provide 
models of understanding the human’s own plasticity as we move into uncertain futures. 
However, by framing this plastic human form engaged in intimate relations with nonhuman 
objects—in solidarity—a vaguely hopeful and peaceful affect was found, which stands in stark 
contrast to the anxiety and paralysis that overwhelm the contemporary mindset surrounding 
climate change. I use the term “solidarity” here in purposeful reference to its political context,106 
referring to unity of feeling and action among a group with common interests. Attention toward 
and intimacy with objects, which reveals the human’s own objecthood while renegotiating the 
outmoded Western subject/object hierarchy, offers itself as an effective tool with political 
significance, where all matter might be bettered through a communal commitment to working 
together. Puppets are situated as the prime agents to nurture this relationship.
																																																								
106 I also use the term “solidarity” for its double entendre, in which solidarity also refers to the 
solid matter shared between human objects and their nonhuman community. 
	 108	
CHAPTER TWO 
The Real Robot on Stage: Framing the Object Actor 
 
Two figures appear on stage, facing each other in stillness and silence. The lights are low, 
making it hard to focus. Dimming of the house lights signals that the play begins, and both 
figures begin to speak skillfully in conversation, with simple gestures of the head to punctuate 
their sentences. After many minutes have passed, one rises from her chair and swiftly approaches 
the other, kneels at the other’s feet, and lifts the other’s hand to her own face. Only now has it 
become clear which figure is the robot actor and which is the human. 
 
The scene I have described reflects my own experience attending Robot Theatre Project’s 
production of Sayonara in 2013. Even knowing the production’s intention of using robots on 
stage, I was still surprised to eventually realize that the figure onstage, which I believed was 
acting convincingly and successfully, was actually an android robot. It appeared without fanfare, 
equally alongside the human actor, who responded to the robot as a typical scene partner. 
Though the robot did not move beyond its head, it was overwhelming to realize that the robot 
could do so much. The performance was not displaying a curiosity or technological trick by 
featuring a robot actor. Instead, the robot was simply an actor—no different than the actor 
alongside it or the myriad actors I has witnessed acting in other roles on other stages. And yet, 
the robot is also, undeniably, an object on the stage, similar to a complex prop or puppet, 
designed, engineered, and manipulated by human will. In fact, the robot in Sayonara references 
her own robotness, and the narrative rests on the robot’s ability to do things the human cannot. 
The robot actor, then, struck me as a performing object of a unique variety, with a provocative 
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in-between nature that questions the function of the actor at large, the means by which a 
spectator relates to figures onstage, and what nonhuman material can do. What makes the robot’s 
performance so compelling? Do dramaturgical choices of the theatrical setting invite 
identification with the robot? If so, can dramaturgy invite identification with even stranger 
objects? What does it mean for an audience to see themselves in a robot actor? 
 
In the broad spectrum of performing objects on stage, robots follow closely in the tradition of the 
puppet. Both are objects designed and manipulated by human forces, and yet, both exert a 
creative force of their own, as puppets and robots become creative agents integral to the final 
dramatic product. However, the distance between the robot and its manipulator grows, compared 
to the physical connection typically maintained between the puppet and its puppeteer. The image 
of an independently moving object invites a unique imagination, where the robot moves away 
from the status as an object and inches closer to the status of a full-fledged actor onstage, equal 
to its human co-stars. The robot seems to have autonomy onstage, and while it is engineered and 
programmed by humans, the appearance of the robot’s physical independence, as material 
moving without a visible puppeteer, situates the robot as a unique site in which to experiment 
with different methods of interacting with objects, and to discover if tangible material can 
overcome years of habits and preconceived ideas in the human audience.  
 
The iconography of the robot boasts a much longer history in the arts than the robot performer 
itself. Ideas of automatons, androids, cyborgs, and robots have appeared in literature since at 
least the medieval period, a history that will be discussed later in this chapter, while the very 
term “robot” comes from Karel Čapek’s 1920 play, R.U.R. Until recently, the robot has existed 
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more as an idea than a tangible reality. These shifting images of the robot reflect contemporary 
subjectivity by serving as an avatar of anxieties concerning the public, such as women’s 
independence, wartime industrialization, or government surveillance. The robot may also reflect 
more existential concerns; often, the robot appears as a figure one step away from the human, 
therefore functioning as a mode with which to consider consciousness, free will, and the very 
ideal of humanity in many science fiction models. Now, as the robot becomes more of a reality, 
the robot is shifting away from serving as a metaphor for other anxieties, and becoming more of 
an anxiety inducing development itself, as the growth of robots invites a fear of being replaced 
by robots in the workforce, in the home, and maybe even in personal relationships. The robot is 
an object that people are willing to relate to, and to find agency and life within. One question this 
chapter will consider is: what is it about the figure of the robot that invites the human’s 
imagination and willingness to empathize and anthropomorphize? Does putting a tangible, 
material robot onstage have the potential to support or upend those concepts? As stage 
technology grows along with advances in robotics engineering, it is now possible to attend a 
production where the lead character of a robot is indeed played by a robot actor, and now, the 
audience is faced with a real material robot that converges with their robot ideal. The performing 
robot actor has become a virtual reality made physical, present and able to interact with actors 
and audiences, mobilizing their imaginations.  
 
For the purpose of this chapter, the term “robot” refers to a singular object that functions as an 
amalgam of different technologies so that the object is able to interact with its environment 
automatically, either autonomously in real time or with some human manipulation enacted 
remotely in time and space. As I aim to show here, the robot has become a very literal 
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performing object, performing in the role of an actor onstage. This chapter will give a brief 
overview of the robot in western popular thought, before analyzing two case studies where the 
robot is an actor onstage: Oriza Hirata’s Sayonara and I, Worker, and Zoe Kazan’s After the 
Blast. These case studies are chosen because they are some of the few examples of robots on 
stage, rather than a human actor portraying a robot, in a way that shows the materiality of the 
moving object that is vital to my discussion. After the Blast was produced in the United States in 
2017, while Oriza Hirata’s work with the Robot Theatre Project was based in Japan and toured 
widely in theatres around the world. These case studies offer an opportunity to interrogate the 
robot’s situatedness within two different contemporary expressions of imagination, and the 
robots function differently within the two performances’ dramaturgical worldmaking in ways 
that reflect these alternate ideas. In each production, I examine how the robots function 
dramaturgically, how they interact with human actors, and what potential effects they have on 
the audience.  
 
How does the robot actor relate to the human audience member? As Peter Eckersall, Helena 
Grehan and Edward Scheer argue in New Media Dramaturgy, “the materiality of technical 
elements matters. As key players in an artwork, the behavior of elements within the dramaturgy 
– whether they are, for example, lighting patterns, robots, or atmospheres – influences every 
aspect of it as well as calling into question how works are made, how they are performed, and 
how they are engaged with and received by spectators.”1	Thus, I approach these case studies with 
an attention to the materiality of the robot itself, watching for its cues and the responses that 
these invite from the audience. While the robot appears effectively equal to human actors 
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onstage in their capabilities and affective potential, as Peter Eckersall and Edward Scheer have 
argued,2 the tangible presence of the robot onstage is more ideally positioned to address 
existential questions, as an “other” that appears different from the human. The robot actor in 
performance not only questions the liveness of the robot, but also questions the uniqueness of the 
human. As the robot performs next to the human, the question of what makes the two actors 
different becomes more urgent. In essence, the performance asks why must they be different? 
Perhaps human and robot actors have more in common than not, and my dramaturgical analysis 
of these case studies serves to underline this idea. I argue that the robot is a way to understand 
the idea of the object as conceptualized in object-oriented ontology (OOO), with highly agential 
sensual elements in conjunction with a complex reality inaccessible to others. As OOO suggests, 
the audience relates to the object through their aesthetic qualities. However, in the theatrical 
space, these aesthetic qualities are highly sensual, in that they radiate outward to connect and 
affect the audience. Whereas the term “aesthetic” denotes beauty accessed through visuality, the 
notion of the “sensual” connotes a more intimate experience based in the body, as well as 
experiences more widely varied than beauty. The agentic nature of aesthetic aspects discussed in 
OOO is located in their sensual interaction. In addition to the sensual interaction with the object, 
the theatrical frame prompts that we also relate to the object through empathy. The result is the 
simultaneous existence of human and robot actors, both of which are objects, and both of which 
we relate to as feeling objects.  
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I will build upon these questions of the robot actor and its theatrical frame in my third case study: 
Kris Verdonck’s Dancer series (2003-2017). Here, the robot actor takes center stage without any 
human co-stars, and the question of human/object relationality lies in the contact between the 
robot actor and the human audience. Verdonck’s work therefore provides a site with which to 
focus in on the audience response to the object performer, and the dramaturgical and aesthetic 
devices influencing this response. Verdonck experiments with concepts and structures 
foundational to the theatre form. By simplifying the performance event to the most basic 
elements, the robot is proposed as the elemental actor itself. 
 
The chapter will then go on to discuss performing robots that are more machinic, and less 
android, to analyze how the stage’s frame and dramaturgical structure can invite similarly 
anthropomorphic readings of the object. These discussions of the robot on stage, when founded 
in the robot’s materiality, suggest emendations to Masahiro Mori’s theory of the uncanny 
valley,3 popular among discussions of robot theory in the US and discussed at length later in this 
chapter. The reception of the robot does not consistently result in uncanny feelings, and whether 
or not the robot moves is not the singular aspect multiplying these affects, as Mori argues. 
Rather, the robot’s voice and the element of duration in the relationship between robot and 
human must be considered, but more importantly, the framing of the robot is essential in its 
reception. Furthermore, this framing suggests that practice may develop an ability to overcome 
uncanny concerns, and this practice may allow deeper relations with increasingly strange objects, 
beyond friendly-looking humanoid robots. The performance’s dramaturgy instructs how to read 
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the robot onstage through identification and empathy, which may go on to instruct how to read 
the robot, and other strange objects, in our everyday lives. 
 
Robot Imaginaries in the Arts 
Before the robot was a functioning reality, the robotic ideal traces its roots to theatre. The term 
“robot” was introduced to the English-speaking world as a translation of “work” or “drudge 
laborer,” thanks to a robot’s appearance in the play R.U.R, or Rossum’s Universal Robots, by 
Karel Capek in 1921.4 R.U.R. immediately situates the figure of a robot as a threatening other, 
which annihilates the human race. In this play, the robot is more of an artificial human than the 
metal humanoid assemblage that appears in later incarnations, and literally composed of flesh 
and blood. This is integral to the plot as the robot can be mistaken for a human, effectively lying 
to the human by passing in society (and can also be played by human actors onstage). The one 
major difference between the robot and the human in the play is that the robot species does not 
have any ethnic differences. This allows the robots to unite in a way that humans cannot, as 
national and ethnic differences are the most common marker dividing warring entities. The 
robot, therefore, appears as an even more dangerous “other,” more extreme in their sameness. 
These themes of associating the robot with an intensified ethnic other, as well as understanding 
the robot as a liar, feared for the tricks it can play on the human, will remain common elements 
in the robot imaginary. I use the term “imaginary” to refer to the governing sets of values and 
symbols associated with the robot and the ways the robot is maneuvered in order to reflect upon 
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and to shape ideas of the human. Jennifer Rhee contributes to the notion of the robot imaginary, 
which she argues “emerges across cultural forms and technoscience,”5 affecting individual 
experiences and associations that go on to influence how we see and imagine the world. 
Importantly, the imaginary has material consequences, which Rhee locates in part through the 
funding structures that enable robot engineering, as well as the development of robot designs. As 
this chapter will go on to explore, the robot imaginary developed through symbolic 
representations of robots requires revision when faced with embodied robots on the stage. 
 
While R.U.R was the first time the figure was named a robot, automatons, androids, cyborg 
figures, and other robot-related figures6 had already existed as concepts within the arts at large, 
often found in and continuing to influence the literary and cinematic science fiction genres. For 
instance, Japanese literary scholar Uga Itsuo used the term jinzō ningen, which translates to 
“human-constructed human,” in his translation of R.U.R. following the tradition of kikai ningen, 
or mechanical human, which referred to automata.7 Another example is the figure in Tomorrow’s 
Eve, a 1885 novel by Villiers de I’Isle-Adam, which he termed an “android.” In this symbolist 
novel, an ideal woman free of human women’s flaws is built to satisfy a man’s desires, and 
thanks to being supernaturally bestowed with a spirit, the android successfully convinces her new 
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play each role, and the figure therefore appears human-like.  
7 Jennifer Roberston, Robo Sapiens Japanicus: Robots, Gender, Family, and the Japanese 
Nation (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018), 12.	
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master of her life.  Jennifer Parker-Starbuck refers to this novel in her discussion of the cyborg, 
noting it as evidence to her argument that the figure of the cyborg is gendered: “typical cyborg 
and pre-cyborg creation narratives generally fell into one of two categories: first, mechanical 
females, created by males for amusement or companionship; and second, a masculine version, 
also created by men for experimentation, work, or superior strength.”8 The mechanical female 
figure appears in more modern iterations in examples such as the female robot Maria in Fritz 
Lang’s film Metropolis (1927), Ira Levin’s novel The Stepford Wives (1972) that was later 
adapted to film in 1975 and 2004, and the more recent Ex Machina (2015).9 These examples 
introduce a female android created by a male in search of that man’s idea of perfection, but all of 
the female androids quickly grow out of their creators’ control, becoming dangerous in their 
strength and intelligence, and ultimately without any need of the man who created them.  
 
As examples of the science-fiction genre, these novels and films follow the genre’s established 
semantic conventions, which include narratives, characters, and settings that project present 
anxieties onto the future. While conventions do shift over time, they are also decidedly located in 
their context of production and reflect the concerns of the period in which they are made.10 
Therefore, the more overarching themes of either technophobia or technophilia are 
communicated with different specificity that reflects changing concerns. Thus, the portrayal of 
robots in the aforementioned examples surely reflects an anxiety over women’s growing 
																																																								
8 Jennifer Parker-Starbuck, Cyborg Theatre: Corporeal/Technological Intersections in 
Multimedia Performance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 23. 
9 Here and elsewhere, I note examples of robots in science fiction film and television. My study 
of robots in these mediums is partial, and these examples serve as seminal illustrations of the 
ways the idea of the robot reveals cultural anxieties, rather than an exhaustive study of the genre. 
10 I refer to genre through their semantic and syntactic markers as theorized by John Altman, “A 
Semantic/Syntactic Approach to Film Genre” in Cinema Journal 23, 3 (Spring 1984): 6-18. 
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independence and voice in society in addition to ingrained misogynistic assumptions, and merits 
a more nuanced gender study in context. However, for the purposes of this discussion, this 
continued convention of placing danger and fear in the form of the robot is worth noting.  
 
As robot technology develops, humanoid robots designed for everyday use are most often 
gendered. Jennifer Robertson notes that robots built in Japan are often conceptualized to fulfill 
gendered labor roles, and the physical robot appearance comports to these assumptions. In other 
words, many female-gendered humanoids are slim-waisted with breasts. Robertson understands 
this to be due to the roboticists’ uncritical acceptance of their own gendered upbringing and 
everyday lives.11 This is an example of the robot imagination of the past fulfilling itself in 
present reality, as past assumptions and continuing traditions and habits exert an active power 
over continuing developments. The robot is consistently positioned as the other, and when the 
robot appears human-like, this appearance is used to fool humans in order to achieve power over 
them. 
 
After WWI, a shift in cultural focus resulted in more male robotic figures, highlighting a 
“cultural shift from a displacement of technology onto the form of a woman, toward an emphasis 
on the machine itself.”12 At this time, the concept of life and its value was thrown into question 
after a proven vulnerability to technology and mechanized weapons. Parker-Starbuck believes 
“the robot as the soulless ‘other’ serves as a post-war reflection on the dehumanization of others 
inherent in wartime nationalism.”13 But the soulless robot is used as a metaphoric symbol of the 
																																																								
11 Jennifer Roberston, Robo Sapiens Japanicus, 90.	
12 Jennifer Parker-Starbuck, Cyborg Theatre, 30. 
13 Ibid., 128. 
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dehumanization of the self as well. As robots become more human-like through developments in 
artificial intelligence, humans also become more robot-like as an alienated workforce while they 
grow more “remote from their own and others’ humanity through their increasing reliance upon 
technology.”14 
 
Where robots might symbolize the dehumanization of the self, robots are also pitted directly 
against humans in the workforce as a threatening foe. Robots and automatons provide the 
spectacle of idealized labor. At first, the integration of automatons and machines is promising, 
allowing for an increase in productivity while decreasing some of the most toilsome, 
backbreaking effects of manual labor. Yet, workers quickly grew anxious that there would be no 
need for the human element any longer, especially when faced with job market shortages. Where 
humans require breaks for food and water and shorter hours, machines can work endlessly, and 
with less room for error. As Allen Feldman notes, “automatons offered a perfect view of labor 
that had no need for these ‘uncontrollable’ behaviors.”15 By “uncontrollable” behaviors, he 
references sex, alcohol consumption, and the requirement to relieve oneself. The robot 
transforms from a figure of benefit and aid into the enemy, stealing jobs from the hard-working 
laborers. In Capek’s R.U.R., the attempted commentary on the industrial apparatus is blurred by 
the strong hatred of the robot itself, transforming the play into a commentary on the robot instead 
of the system. It is worth noting that anxieties over robots stealing jobs in the workplace were 
exploited in the battle against fast food workers’ strikes in the US in 2013. When the workers 
																																																								
14 Steve Dixon, “Metal Performance: Humanizing Robots, Returning to Nature, and Camping 
About,” TDR 48, 4 (2004), 24. 
15 Allen Feldman in Danielle Goldman, “The Breathing Show: Improvisation in the Work of Bill 
T. Jones” in I Want to Be Ready: Improvised Dance as a Practice of Freedom (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2010), 129. 
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began their strike, an ad against raising the minimum wage appeared in the Wall Street Journal 
with the headline, “Why Robots Could Soon Replace Fast Food Workers Demanding a Higher 
Minimum Wage”16 with an image of a robot making pancakes in a kitchen. The image of the 
robot, developed by Yaskawa Motoman, was actually from a publicity stunt, and the robot in 
question does not have the capability to work in such an uncontrolled environment as a kitchen. 
In this case, robots were once again manipulated into a fear scapegoat, implemented to scare the 
working class into complacency. 
 
Once again, the robot figure serves as a symbolic emblem of greater cultural anxieties. The use 
of the robot in working class manipulation is related to a similar populist tactic of criminalizing 
immigrants, relying upon tropes of the us v. them. Similar to the themes mentioned above in 
R.U.R., the robot is at times conflated with ethnic minorities and/or immigrants. The image of the 
robot as a fast-food worker in the ad referenced above also places the robot into the position of 
what is frequently, in US media, a racialized body. In I, Robot, the 2004 film suggested by Isaac 
Asimov’s 1950 short story collection of the same name, robots have been designed and 
disseminated among the population as menial laborers. In the film, shots are included with robots 
portraying house maids, garbage collectors, waiters, and other similar laboring positions. Robots 
and humans are living in harmony, until one particular robot is suspected of murdering its 
creator, betraying the rules of robotics.17 Quickly, the mass of robot-laborers transforms into a 
																																																								
16 MinimumWage.com, 2013, www.minimumwage.com/2013/08/wsj-ad-robots-will-replace-
striking-fast-food-workers-even-in-the-kitchen/. 
17 The rules of robotics referenced in I, Worker are Isaac Asimov’s famous “Three Laws of 
Robotics:” 1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to 
come to harm; 2) A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders 
would conflict with the First Law; 3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
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revolutionary army, with red eyes, eerie unison, and superhuman strength. Thankfully, Del 
Spooner, a detective played by Will Smith, discovers that the robots had been taken over by a 
body-less mainframe (similar to HAL in 2001:A Space Odyssey, and to today’s Cloud, Siri, or 
Alexa) who believed it would protect humankind by controlling them, saving them from 
themselves. That Del Spooner discovers this and is able to save the robots and the world is not a 
coincidence—he is part robot, with a reconstructed robotic arm. While this is the obvious theme, 
a more insidious reality is that Del Spooner is also a black body. Not only does he relate to the 
robots as a robot, but there is an implicit connection between his oneness with the robot as a 
minority, and even more specifically, a minority descended from slave labor. In this film, all 
ends well, but not before the audience is given spectacular fight scenes conflating laborers, albeit 
robotic ones, with a violent revolutionary force. 
 
I, Robot is just one example of the robot betraying its human makers. In the seminal science 
fiction film 2001: A Space Odyssey, HAL turns against his two partners in space, killing them to 
stop them from upending the mission, which HAL says is “too important to him.” HAL reasoned 
that he had received more details from their home base, and therefore more fully understood the 
importance of the mission than the two human captains did—the brains of the mission had more 
faith in HAL than the human. Here, HAL becomes dangerous as a mode of surveillance, 
reporting on the human for some higher purpose, as the human players are more menial pawns. 
The human does win this battle, however, as one of the captains erases HAL’s memory, as HAL 
jarringly complains that he is scared—presumably scared to know nothing just like the humans 
																																																								
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. Jennifer Robertson discusses these in 
comparison to Tezuka’s rules in Robo Sapiens (2018). 
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around him, and to therefore cease existing. HAL’s fear of losing his memory, and therefore 
losing his identity, sends him into a panic resembling a nervous breakdown while he begs the 
captain to save him.  
 
The robot imaginaries discussed thus far generally reflect a modern mindset in which the 
human/nonhuman divide is intact. The robot, an ideal of nonhuman technology, is pitted against 
the human, and the human must protect the living against this nonhuman technological threat. 
However, the simplicity of this divide disintegrates as postmodern thought grows. As the 
interdependent, cyborgian nature of the human/nonhuman relationship becomes clearer, the 
conflict with robots shifts. Literal cyborg bodies are more common, and robot heroes display 
disquietude in their human likeness. An example of this cyborg creature appears in Terminator 
(1984), while androids with extreme human likeness appear in Blade Runner (1982, remade in 
2017). The robot shows no signs of disappearing, with a resurgence in the popular Westworld 
series on HBO that premiered in 2016 (inspired by the 1973 film). In each of these examples, 
conflict arises when the robot and human become indistinguishable, as with Blade Runner’s 
“replicants” and Westworld’s “hosts.” What actually makes the human different than a robot, if 
robots seem to develop consciousness, free will, and can experience love and replicate? Robots 
are even more like humans when their free will leads to violence. How these questions are 
addressed varies in the films, reflective of their cultural context. In Blade Runner, the difference 
between the human and the robot is precisely the human’s memory. The film is situated in a 
postmodern landscape, in which arguments abound concerning the need to break from tradition, 
history, and fight against claims to “truth.” This conflict is then placed in the figure of the robot, 
as the robots are overwrought by their lack of memory, searching for meaning amidst their lack 
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of heritage. Interestingly, the replicants display a greater empathy and compassion than their 
human counterparts, and so this new, history-less generation might be seen as a “fresh start,” 
able to see the world more clearly than those bogged down in history, despite the consistent urge 
toward finding and establishing one’s identity. In 2016, the Westworld hosts become more 
human when they begin to remember their own history—or more specifically, when they 
remember their continuous abuse as commodified and exploited bodies within the capitalistic 
amusement park. Like the robots in I, Robot, Westworld’s hosts stage a revolution against their 
human creators. However, as of the season aired in 2018, the question remains whether the 
revolution developed from the robot’s newfound free will or was programmed by the original 
creator, which positions the show to further investigate questions of determinism versus free will 
as the show continues. 
 
This question of programming lingers in the figure of HAL, as well. It’s easy to focus on HAL’s 
eerie, monotone denial to the astronauts to be allowed back in the ship, which is a moment of 
HAL’s own cunning. Yet, it’s important to note that this ability, and the drive to complete the 
mission by overcoming obstacles of any kind, was most likely programmed into HAL, or results 
from a glitch in his algorithmic operating system, which was also a human creation. HAL is 
always a human creation, and his acts of rebellion can be traced back to a human influence. The 
more concerning idea is not HAL’s callousness and disrespect of human life, but these qualities 
in the government leaders designing and programming him. The government entity is the force 
sacrificing the lives of these human officers. In the case of HAL as well as Westworld’s hosts, a 
greater threat lies in the programmer than in the robot itself.  
 
	 123	
This relatively brief overview of representations of the robot in popular Western culture is not 
intended as an exhaustive study, but instead, as an introduction to consider trends in popular 
Western culture, and by extension, the robotic imaginary and the image of the robot on a theatre 
stage. In these trends, a distrust in the robot figure is visible, but this distrust has become a habit 
due to the tradition of mobilizing the robot as a symbol manifesting other fears. Fears and 
prejudices against women, minorities, industrialized society, commoditization of bodies, and 
government surveillance have all colored the image of the robot, evoking an anti-technological 
bias in a modern attempt to uphold the human/nonhuman binary. Later, the anxiety 
accompanying a postmodern identity crisis finds nonhuman robots indistinguishable from the 
human, and the danger of the robot is renewed. 
 
These examples of the robot are informed by the art forms in which they are conceived, namely 
literature and film. The robot characters respond to well-developed conventions of the science 
fiction genre, adding relevant examples to the influential robot imaginary. However, the science 
fiction genre deals in the future, and the robots imagined in these stories are tools from a distant 
world that may be to come, but is not yet here. This distance is supported by the filmic ability to 
create an entirely fictional mise-en-scène. Even with tight close-ups that bring the spectator’s 
gaze into contact with the robot’s convincingly human face, the robot remains of another world. 
Furthermore, thanks to CGI and other digital technology, the robot may indeed be convincingly 
human, in ways that the robot in the contemporary world is not. Alternatively, in a theatre space, 
the robot is distinctly present through its very materiality on the stage, sharing time and space 
with the audience and interacting sensually. Even if the plot is set in the future, the robot playing 
the robotic character is in the room, visibly standing next to and interacting with the human 
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actor’s body. Therefore, the theatre space provides an alternative approach to the robot 
imaginary through materiality, where the theatre form is specifically able to produce sensual 
interactions that the cinematic form cannot. Further, as the discussion of this symbolic robot 
reveals, the robot implicitly reflects back upon the ways we conceive of and identify the human 
as well.   
 
In order to more accurately reflect on the popular image of the robot in Western culture, 
discussed thus far, it is relevant to consider an alternate lineage of the robot in Japan, where 
(Robertson’s work aside) a different cultural context and history has resulted in a much more 
enthusiastic and welcoming attitude toward robotics. Since one of the examples of robots on 
stage I will go on to discuss later is a Japanese production, the relevant context is crucial. In 
studies of the robot in Japan, the narrative often begins with the iconic cartoon robot Astro Boy, 
which was popular in the 1950s and ’60s, and again in the 2000s.18 Astro Boy, originally named 
Mighty Atom, developed in a context of nuclear imagery as Japan responded to the events of 
Hiroshima. Astro Boy embodies the need for rebirth post-destruction, and his image begins a rich 
history of robotic figures in Japanese cartoons that are all positively portrayed. Astro Boy is a 
cute and friendly “boy-bot,” who has a family of his own, a deep emotional bond with his human 
best friend, and desires to be more human-like. Astro Boy, and the robots that came after him, 
work for the good of their community, and perhaps more importantly, are also fallible, making 
them a relatable figure that their audience is content to root for. Notably, Japanese robots are 
consistently working with their human counterparts, which reflects contemporary culture in 
Japan, where robots are utilized in affective laborer positions, helping in hospitals and homes for 
																																																								
18 Discussions of Astro Boy begin the narrative in both Dixon’s “Metal Performance,” 23–24, 
and Robertson, Robo Sapiens Japanicus. 
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the aged population, as well as housekeeper types in private homes. According to Yuji Sone, 
these robotics companies are attempting to integrate service robots into the Japanese culture and 
work environment, which “include those designed for security, cleaning, medical purposes and 
the care of disabled and elderly people.”19 While the care of disabled and elderly people includes 
basic chores and manual duties, it must also include affective qualities in order to succeed. This 
notably differs from the more common use of material robots in US society in the military and 
factories. 
 
Part of the Japanese willingness to accept the objects in the home may be attributed to the 
religious influences in Japanese thought. Sone finds Buddhism to effect robot associations, since 
Buddhism views everything to be connected to everything else in the universe, so that the 
relationship between the human and the object, or any “other” for that matter, is not one of 
master/slave, but “should be regarded as ‘an interlocking entity.’ […] In traditional Japanese 
thought […] the notion of the self as, in its essence, a composite entity of self and the world 
outside the self, has long been established.”20 The notions of the self described by Sone here 
stand in stark contrast to the self in Western religion, which is markedly individual, as the self is 
the thinker of thoughts and the doer of deeds. The Western self is composed of the inner soul 
developed in the Judeo-Christian religion, which is immaterial and separate from the body. The 
tendency in the US of fearing the blurred definitions between what is human and what is robot is 
intensified since it questions the belief that the self cannot be constructed through material. 
However, these concerns are irrelevant in the Japanese context, when the boundaries are always 
																																																								
19 Yuji Sone, “Realism of the Unreal: The Japanese Robot and the Performance of 
Representation,” Visual Communication 7:345 (2008), 350.	
20 Yuji Sone, Japanese Robot Culture: Performance, Imagination, Modernity (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 176, 177. 
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blurred. Jennifer Robertson partially locates this openness toward the robot in the Shinto 
universe. “Robots are living things in the Shinto universe. While they may not claim to be 
animists, many Japanese roboticists nevertheless draw from this synergistic nature-culture 
‘platform’ in advocating not only the interchangeability of robots and humans in everyday life 
but also their mutual enhancement and even mutual constituency.”21 
 
While Robertson finds this interchangeability due to the nature-culture synergy, her study later 
goes on to argue that a large part of Japan’s affinity toward robots is due to those robots’ 
Japanese roots. She finds the robot to function as a mode of social engineering and nostalgic 
propaganda, as robots are designed to fulfill gendered labor roles and support a conservative 
understanding of the domestic and social sphere. Furthermore, “robots are enlisted to uphold the 
idea of Japanese exceptionalism.”22 While non-Japanese struggle to gain citizenship and are not 
granted a koseki, or household, robots do not have to naturalize as they were created in Japan. 
Japanese robots may sooner gain rights than second-generation Koreans living in Japan. Indeed, 
Paro, the robot harp seal, was granted a koseki in 2010. The possibility of robot rights in Japan 
strongly points toward the concept of the robot as a cultural construction. In Japan, the robot has 
been constructed as native kin, as opposed to the robot’s construction as an ethnic other in the 
United States.  
 
An additional, elemental difference between the US and Japanese robot imagination is that the 
robot in contemporary Japan is more often a real material object, rather than the purely symbolic 
image or disembodied voice in US culture. In so many popular cultural representations in the 
																																																								
21 Jennifer Robertson, Robo Sapiens Japanicus, 15. 
22 Ibid., 26.	
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US, indeed all of them that have been discussed thus far, the robot is played by human actors, 
which goes to further the fear of the robot supplanting the human in society, as the human and 
robot become visually indistinguishable. It is for this reason that I am interested in the robot 
image, played by a material robot, onstage. The material presence of the robot figure, as well as 
the robot’s relationship to the human actor, allows for a more grounded encounter with the robot, 
in which both the robot and the human must remain material. Therefore, the embodied encounter 
with the robot can offer revisions to the long-established conventions of the symbolic robot of 
the robot imaginary, possibly creating a new, unique encounter.  
 
The Lying Robot as Actor: After the Blast 
The first embodied robot actor I will consider appeared in the New York City production of After 
the Blast in 2017. The play premiered at Lincoln Center Theatre, in the smallest in the theatre 
complex reserved for new plays and what the company deems to be “experimental” works. 
Written by Zoe Kazan, a young female playwright, and directed by Lila Neugeberger, an up-and-
coming female director, the production was marketed as a harbinger of the “new.”23 The play is 
																																																								
23 This “new” attitude I reference is due, in part, to the use of the word “new” in articles and ads, 
such as Olivia Aylmer’s article “After the Blast: Zoe Kazan’s New Play About Robots (That’s 
Really About Humans)” published in Vanity Fair, 2017, which describes the “urgency of the 
post-apocalyptic tale,” as well as ads about the “new play” appearing on Broadway World. 
Programming for LCT3 also focuses on new plays with up-and-coming creative teams, with 
plays The Wolves by Sarah DeLappe, Pass Over by Antoinette Anwandu, and Junk by Ayad 
Akhtar premiering prior to or following After the Blast. After the Blast director Lila Neugebauer 
also received attention in 2017 as a director to watch (Olivia Clement, “Why This Off-Broadway 
Season Is the Strongest in Years,” Playbill, 23 May 2017, http://www.playbill.com/article/why-
this-off-broadway-season-is-the-strongest-in-years; Carey Purcell, “50 Women in New York 
Theater You Should Know About,” Culture Trip, 7 Dec 2017, https://theculturetrip.com/north-
america/usa/new-york/articles/50-women-in-new-york-theater-you-should-know-about-part-one-




set in a vaguely distant, post-apocalyptic future, where human society has gone underground in 
an attempt to survive after a nuclear blast. The plot follows established science fiction tropes, 
relying heavily on those already laid out in this chapter. The play centers on the married couple 
Anna (Christin Milioti), an artist, and Oliver (William Jackson Harper), a scientist. Anna is 
suffering from depression, in part due to her lack of purpose as an artist in this post-apocalyptic 
society. Oliver brings home a robot, which he claims is in need of training in order to become 
qualified as a helper robot, much like a seeing-eye dog or comfort dog for the elderly. Anna’s 
task is to train the robot, which she names Arthur. Thus, begins the main action of the play—
Anna teaches the robot use of language, more motor skills, and eventually graduates to the 
comprehension of more complex questions. She also becomes attached to the robot, much like a 
pet or a toddler. The robot accomplishes its task, because after this training period, Anna passes 
her mental health exam and is given permission to try for a child. In this way, the play introduces 
the idea that Anna was the one being trained. Then, it is revealed that Arthur was already acting 
as Anna’s helper robot, giving her purpose through the supposed training tasks. The play then 
turns into one of drama and betrayal, as the focus turns to Anna and Oliver’s relationship. Oliver 
lied to Anna hoping to help her improve her health, but Anna feels betrayed and is unable to trust 
him. She gives birth, but opts to raise the child on her own.  
 
At the heart of the play’s narrative structure is the robot’s ability to perform, and in this case, to 
perform affectively, sensitively responding to Anna’s condition with patience, and as well as to 
perform duplicitously. The robot does successfully carry out its directive to heal Anna’s mental 
health. But to do so, it must deceive Anna by performing the markable moments of discovery 
and improvement in response to Anna’s teaching. What’s more, the robot reports her interactions 
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to Oliver, effectively performing surveillance on Anna while Oliver is at work. The effect of this 
surveillance is to train Anna without her consent, socially conditioning Anna to fit into her social 
context, effectively implementing a mode of human engineering. 
 
The robot’s duplicitous performance is successful within the narrative, but it is also successful as 
an actor. Many reviews mention Arthur as one of the most interesting characters in the play, and 
the chemistry between Arthur and Anna is also remarked upon. Ben Brantley of The New York 
Times says, “the android called Arthur hijacks the spotlight from the moment he first toddles 
across the stage.”24 After Brantley’s first glowing paragraph about Arthur’s performance, he 
steps back to remark, “I’m reviewing a machine as if it were a flesh-and-blood performer,” 
noting that the audience makes the same mistake that Anna does. During the performance I 
attended,25 the audience often made audible “awws” in approval of Arthur’s antics, and applause 
broke out after Arthur and Anna sing and dance a duet to “Islands in the Stream,” performing the 
lyrics, “And we rely on each other, ah-ah / From one lover to another, ah-ah” in synchronicity. 
Other reviews point out similar responses in their experience with the audience, such as Tim 
Teeman who notes, “the audience I was with cooed at his cuteness.”26 Both of these critics and I 




24 Ben Brantley, “Review: Romancing the Bot in Zoe Kazan’s After the Blast,” The New York 
Times, 23 October 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/theater/review-romancing-the-bot-in-
zoe-kazans-after-the-blast.html. 
25 I attended the performance at LCT3 on 4 November 2017. 




The aesthetic of cuteness27 itself is not duplicitous, but grounded in Arthur’s design and material. 
The robot stands about 3 feet high on small wheels, and the visible elements of the robot are 
composed mostly of a plastic-appearing gray, matte, hard surface, with accents made from a 
yellow fabric that appears soft and textured much like a fur. The shape of the robot is oblong, 
with a rounded head and small flaps for arms that can rise like penguin wings, but also lay flat 
and disappear back into the orb so as to not break up the ball effect. The physical design calls to 
mind a combination of R2D2 and BB-8 of Star Wars fame, but the yellow material suggests an 
object more akin to a stuffed animal, which scripts soft touch.28 Fellow actors onstage interact 
with the robot frequently through touch, petting this yellow material. Small, rotating hidden 
wheels give the robot the ability to move around the stage, which allows Arthur to follow Anna 
and play fetch with a ball, much like a dog.  
 
Also of note is the addition of the large, dark orbs to suggest the robot’s eyes. The appearance of 
eyes adds to his anthropomorphism, and his especially large eyes conjure images of cuteness, as 
in anime characters and stuffed animals. The eyes invoke the presence of a recognizable face in 
the object, as the human tendency is to find a face to mirror their own with even the most bare 
elements present. In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida finds that the human 
relationship with the animal exists on “the basis of an analogical transposition or 
anthropomorphism, which is a way of [...] confirming, for better or for worse, that the thinking 
																																																								
27 Sianne Ngai theorizes the aesthetic of cuteness as a way of aestheticizing powerlessness. Also 
a commodity aesthetic, cuteness is tied to the pleasures of domesticity and easy, simple 
consumption. The prime example of cuteness is a child’s toy. See Sianne Ngai, Our Aesthetic 
Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 	
28 I use the term “script” here following Robin Bernstein’s “scriptive thing” concept (Robin 
Bernstein, Racial Innocence, 2011).	
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and experience of the face are originarily human, that is to say, fraternal.”29 Therefore, the 
anthropomorphic drive is partly how we find objects with which to relate. According to Derrida, 
ethical sensitivity arises from the human realization of the face in others. Of course, questions 
arise as to what kind of face. Does a disfigured face invite less ethical sensitivity under this 
model? Is it possible that with training, faces can be found in more varied objects? Is there a way 
of thinking beyond the face? I will return to some of these questions later, but for now, the 
aesthetic suggestion of the face in the robot object positions the robot as a site where ethical 
sensitivity is scripted. As Derrida concludes, “to have a face is to be able to respond or answer, 
by means of the ‘Here I am,’ before the other and for the other, for one’s self for the other.”30 
The robot, therefore, responds to the human with an undeniable presence, “looking” at and 
responding to the human.  
 
Figure 6. Cristin Milioti as Anna and Arthur, After the Blast, Lincoln Center Theater, New York, 
2017. Photo by Sara Krulwich. 
																																																								
29 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), 108. 
30  Ibid., 109.		
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Perhaps this presence is part of what the audience responds to, as well as contributing to the 
robot’s ability to fool the audience along with Anna. The robot performs the role of the growing 
student, appearing to listen and respond to Anna. These actions are indicated through blocking 
and Arthur’s gestures, and for the audience to read the intended evidence of Arthur’s learning 
and his developing relationship with Anna, the robot’s movement on the stage mimics human 
behaviors. Arthur’s eyes point toward Anna when she speaks. Arthur moves toward Anna when 
expressing concern or curiosity. When reprimanded, Arthur turns his eyes away from Anna and 
makes distance between them. The robot’s design and blocking both, then, invite 
anthropomorphism in order to elicit empathy. The robot’s large eyes, and its ability to direct the 
eyes to mimic attention and focus, also add to the sensation that the robot has a desire to please. 
It appears similarly as when a dog looks up at its master for instruction or approval. The stage is 
a codified space in which the audience is trained to read and decipher these signs, and this robot 
has been designed to follow the same rules as the human actor, in order for the audience to 
naturally transfer their learned ability to relate to human bodies onto the robot body. The director 
manoeuvres blocking as communication in a method no different than with human actors.  
 
I have just referenced the director behind the scenes, but of course, this is only one individual of 
the many that had a hand in Arthur’s creation, perhaps none more important than the robot 
designer, who crafts the robot’s material and aesthetic aspects. In the case of Arthur, prop master 
Noah Mease worked to design the visual concept and capacities of Arthur, which was then built 
by an external company. Then, in performance, Arthur was voiced by live actor Will Connolly, 
and controlled by stagehands with a device similar to one used to drive a remote-control car. The 
robot in this case is not replacing the human actor or taking over their jobs, but actually 
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employing multiple actors, designers, and stagehands at once. With this in consideration, the 
robot appears more like an elaborate piece of stage magic than a true robot that is able to 
accomplish tasks due to an algorithm. The technology behind the dream of the robot in science 
fiction requires many more advancements and funds before it will arrive on this stage. The 
material object of Arthur then in some sense tricks the audience into believing its robot abilities, 
just as it tricks Anna into believing her teaching abilities. 
 
In both cases, the robot is reflecting the goals of its designer, communicating through gesture and 
anthropomorphic conventions. Noah Mease noted that the material of the eyes perform as a sort 
of mirror under the stage lights, and so the robot was literally reflecting the image of Christin 
Miloti back to her.31 The eyes therefore appear to move, since they reflect the movements of 
others in the mirror-like material. If the face speaking to the robot is concerned, the robot 
responds with concern, as the furrowed brow is visible in the mirror. The audience can’t glimpse 
their own reflection in Arthur’s eyes from afar, they do gain access to the robot though the 
actors’ responses. Furthermore, the reflection of the stage lights do sparkle in the eyes even from 
afar, creating a very literal “sparkle in the eye.” If, as Derrida suggests, we are actively searching 
for our face, even this small glimmer of movement lends more proof to the mind. The reflective 
eyes are an effective tool in the effort of crafting a generous scene partner, and perhaps the 
choice was a logistical one. However, crafting a robot object that literally reflects the human 
face, when the robot is materially designed as an android to reflect the human body, and 
symbolically embodies human fears, reflecting human concerns back to them, the idea of the 
robot as a human reflection in every sense of the word becomes even clearer. 
																																																								
31 Noah Mease, (prop designer for After the Blast) in discussion with the author, New York, NY, 
23 August 2018. 
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After the Blast therefore continues the tradition of the robot in the science fiction of Western 
culture, where the robot is used to symbolize concerns of the human, demonstrated in the simple 
fact that the play requires the robot to lie, betraying the human. What is notable about the 
production is that the material object of the robot emphasizes this role, performing robot on 
multiple levels. In the narrative, the robot offers a technological site of connection that turns out 
to be false. What is worse, the connection is false but the robot is enacting surveillance and 
betraying the human that is fooled by it, covertly training the human without the human’s 
consent. After the Blast teaches that succumbing to anthropomorphic desire of animating and 
empathizing with this object will betray you. This is very much in line with the traditional 
Western conception of robot. But, this danger is at odds with the stage reality, in which the 
audience experiences the enjoyment of the stage magic. This material robot is not surveilling 
anyone – its betrayal is that is it actually a simple object upon which we project our desires. In 
other words, the material robot does not lie; it is an actor. And a good actor. Edward Scheer 
asserts that robot and human actors onstage function similarly. “Both robot and nonrobot actors 
are all in some way reflecting and refracting the projections of the spectators. In this way they all 
operate as protosubjects, as ontologically indeterminate entities dependent on a specific context 
for their meaning and function.”32 While robot and nonrobot actors have varying abilities at their 
disposal, their differences highlight the work of stage conventions in communicating the actors’ 
intentions, relationships, and even their very liveness. Through gesture and blocking, design, and 
the dramaturgical framing of human and object relationships, the object’s communicative ability 
																																																								
32 Edward Scheer, “Robotics as New Media Dramaturgy: The Case of the Sleepy Robot,” TDR, 
59, 3 (2015), 147. 
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is activated on the stage, highlighted in ways that render the object equal to the human within the 
frame. 
 
The Robot Theatre Project 
Seinendan Theatre Company’s Robot Theatre Project presented a double bill of Oriza Hirata’s 
one-acts, I, Worker and Sayonara, in New York in 2013.33 This production differs from After the 
Blast in that the robots are designed by one of Japan’s leading roboticists, and so, the robot is 
much closer to the nearly autonomous AI of which science fiction dreams. This is not to say that 
the robot is actually responding in the moment, but here, the robots are programmed, and during 
the linear development of the plays, the robots respond aurally and physically in real time. Since 
the robots respond autonomously during the course of the play, their tether to any human 
programmer becomes more distant, physically and temporally. The production stands in stark 
contrast to After the Blast due to its creation within the context of Japanese robotics, therefore 
reflecting a greater acceptance of the robot on its own terms, and a greater curiosity as to what 
the robot is capable of. Rather than reflecting human fear, as Arthur does, these robots 
experiment with the relationships, and the similarities, between the human and robot actors. 
 
The Robot Theatre Project is a collaboration between Oriza Hirata’s Seinendan Theatre 
Company and Hiroshi Ishiguro, the founder of Intelligent Robotics Laboratory in Osaka, Japan, 
who now runs his own Ishiguro Hiroshi Laboratories. Hirata wrote several plays for human and 
robot actors, which explore existential questions, while employing robots as domestic and 
affective labor—roles that reflect their increasing use in everyday Japanese society. Ishiguro’s 
																																																								
33 I attended the performance at the Japan Society in New York, NY, on 7 February 2013.	
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interest in the project is less about existential themes and more about practical improvement of 
his robotic design. The resulting collaborations engage robots onstage in roles created for them 
that address topics made possible through the onstage interaction between human and robot 
actors.  
 
Sayonara features a conversation between a dying woman, played by Bryerly Long, and her 
female robot comforter, played by an android designed to look like a human named Geminoid F. 
The android has limited mobility, yet her head and mouth can move while her eyes blink. The 
two characters engage in conversation about loneliness, and Geminoid F comforts the woman by 
reciting poetry in multiple languages. Of course, the robot has no limit to the amount of poetry 
stored and ready to recite. In the next scene, written in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
earthquake, the woman has died, but technicians arrive to re-task the robot to comfort spirits in 
the radiation exclusion zone.  
 
Geminoid F is designed to appear as human-like as possible. In fact, Ishiguro designs this family 
of robots in the likeness of people in his life, and one robot, Geminoid HI, is in his own likeness 
(and teaches some of his classes for him when he travels). The robot’s body is of human scale, 
and the robot possesses arms, hands, legs, a moveable head, eyes, nose, mouth, ears, and hair. 
The robot’s body is also encased in a flesh-toned silicone that from afar mimics the appearance 
of human skin. The complexity of the robot’s appearance does not translate to movement. 
Rather, the robot is seated, and only its head moves slightly up and down in gestures that suggest 
listening, while its eyes blink and its mouth moves as if speaking. The voice is a pre-recorded 
female actor’s voice.  
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The dramaturgy of the one-act play works with the robot’s limited movement and stages a 
similarly limited movement in the human actor. When I attended the performance, both the 
Geminoid F and Bryerly Long were seated on a bare, black stage prior to the audience’s entrance 
to their seats. Upon the commencement of the play, the house lights went down, and the stage 
lights remained at a low intensity to blur the actors’ movements as they began their discussion. 
Since I was not privy to either of their entrances and their movement was nearly identical, I 
could not quite tell which actor was a robot, if either were at all. During the entirety of the 
conversation, Bryerly Long gets out of her seat and moves to touch Geminoid F’s hand twice. It 
was only when Bryerly Long first stood up that I was able to distinguish which figure was 
human and which was robot.  
 
 




Sayonara draws thematic and aesthetic similarities between the two characters. Both the human 
and robot express ideas of loneliness through poetry. The woman quotes a Tanka by Bokusui 
Wakayama, “how many mountains and rivers must I cross to reach a country where there is no 
loneliness?” Geminoid F reflects that androids don’t know about loneliness, but responds, “If 
there is no loneliness, then surely that is happiness.” The woman admits her loneliness in abstract 
ways, referencing her absent father. Then, after the woman has died, the technician finds that the 
robot is continuing to recite poetry on its own accord, now “lonely” with no one there to hear it. 
The robot expresses relief to be able to recite poetry to the spirits in her new job, thus, having a 
purpose once again. The text of the play therefore draws connections between the robot and 
human characters, as they both express questions about their purpose in the world, which are 
emphasized through the visual connections drawn between them on stage.  
 
I, Worker similarly presents human and robot actors in order to address existential themes, but 
the robots performing here function quite differently than the Geminoid F model. The play 
focuses on two human actors as a married couple and two robots who work as their domestic 
help. These robots, a Robovie R3 design in the New York production,34 are humanoid in that 
they gesture toward a human-like structure with moveable head, neck, torso, and arms, but they 
move on wheels and have simple faces suggested only through their oversized black eyes. These 
robots are not designed to be mistaken for the human, but embrace stereotypical robot imagery, 
much like Arthur in After the Blast. The robot is constructed of aluminum and encased in white 
plastic and either blue or orange accent colors, standing about 3 feet tall. The Robovie is a series 
of robot designed for home use in Japan, specifically to aid the elderly or others with home tasks 
																																																								
34 The Robovie R3 model was used in New York and on the United States tour, while the 
original production in Japan used Wakamaru, a robot made by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.  
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or errands like grocery store shopping. I, Worker mobilizes these same robots and gives them 
similar tasks on stage.  
 
 
Figure 8. Hiroshi Ota and Minako Inoue in I, Worker with one Robovie R3, which is “dancing.” 
Photo by Japan Society. 
 
The themes of I, Worker suggest both robots and humans as “broken” objects, underscoring the 
ways in which roles are assigned to both humans and robots, but both may become unable to 
fulfil these designated roles. The woman, Ikue, has recently had a miscarriage and is unable to 
bear children. The man, Yuuji, suffers from depression and is unable to go to work. The male-
gendered robot named Takeo sympathizes with Yuuji and states, “I don’t feel like working . . . at 
all.” Yuuji attempts to comfort Takeo, asserting that both of them are OK in their circuitry, even 
if they feel this way. Similarly, the female-gendered robot named Momoko repeatedly apologizes 
for her past failed cooking attempts, as well as her failure to relate to and empathize with humans 
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as she was designed to do. For instance, she apologizes after bringing up children in 
conversation, and later after mentioning Yuuji’s old job says, “I keep saying mean things.”35 
 
The complexity of the robots in Hirata’s worlds exceed the traditional conception of the robot as 
mechanical tool made to carry out a series of tasks. And yet, the robot is not human, as Hirata 
emphasizes in his depiction of their excessive apologies for their failures to understand and 
empathize as a human. Therefore, the robot remains an object onstage, in line with the definition 
developed through object-oriented ontology (OOO). According to Graham Harman, objects exist 
on different planes.36 The part of the object that we can see and interact with, the part that is 
available to us, is the sensual object. The sensual nature includes Geminoid F’s human likeness 
with a soft skin-like covering, a recognizably human face and body shape, and long dark hair, 
and the Robovie R3’s shiny white plastic shell and large, cartoonish black eyes on an otherwise 
blank face. These aesthetic aspects of the objects become sensual on the stage, highlighted and 
activated through the performance’s dramaturgy. 
 
According to Timothy Morton, another seminal scholar in the development of OOO, the 
aesthetic realm of the object, the realm in which sensual qualities interact, is also the causal 
realm, where real, tangible effects in the world are created.37 For Morton, aesthetics are worth 
studying, as the aesthetic is the cause in any cause and effect relationship. Every single event 
occurs only through the relationship between their aesthetic qualities, the accessible aspects of 
																																																								
35 For a discussion on the continuation of oppressive gender roles in robotics design, see Jennifer 
Robertson, Robo Sapiens Japanicus.  
36 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Washington, D.C.: Zero Books, 2011). 
37 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor, MI: Open 
Humanities Press, 2011).	
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the object that activate senses through touch, sound, sight, etc. These are what the robot object 
does to us and for us, as each distinct object interacts with other objects through unique, limited 
points of contact. For instance, Geminoid F’s silicone covering interacts with light and the 
human retina to produce its image. To the human’s eyes, the molecular details of the silicone are 
largely irrevelant, beyond the aesthetic that is produced that goes on to interact sensually with the 
human. Yet, this does not mean that the molecular details are not valuable and necessary. Indeed, 
to the material covered by the silicone, the silicone appears differently, its molecular 
composition creating a different sensual interaction of light protection. Its circuitry—the electric 
current running through Geminoid F’s body—interacts with certain mechanisms to produce 
movement in the mouth. For the human, this movement is the purpose of the circuit, but to the 
electric current, the circuitry is its means to exist. Another aesthetic production from the 
Geminoid F object arises through the circuitry’s creation of the voice, which for the human 
audience, results in the aural sensation of her poetry. Again, the holistic object is infinitely more 
complex than the singular sound waves that the human accesses as poetry. But for the audience, 
these sound waves are our sensual access point, functioning as our limited means of relating to 
the object. Furthermore, it is important to note that this relationship is affective, as the sound of 
the recorded voice is a sensual quality that produces affect. Within the play’s narrative, the voice 
is one of the robot’s qualities that comforts Geminoid F’s ill ward, but it is also the quality 
harnessed in the dramaturgy to actually create, reciting poetry for the audience as well as the 
actor. The minute points of access into the object occur through our sensual interaction with the 
robot’s aesthetic elements, and these sensual interactions affect us. These are what we access in 
real time, independent of the history of the robot’s material and the awareness of the human 
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engineering labor in creating the robot. These are what are present, grounding the human and 
object interaction. 
 
This longer history of the object that is unaccounted for in the moment of interaction is still an 
important aspect of the object in Harman’s understanding, but Harman refers to this history as an 
element of the object’s “withdrawn” nature. Harman’s object has another side to it—the real 
object—that is in constant withdrawal, which cannot be fully expressed through sensual 
interaction. The withdrawn object accounts for the aspects of the object that have other, 
unimagined or unintentional potentials. Within the plays’ narratives, these potentials might 
include Geminoid F’s re-tasking or the Robovie’s rejection of “work” despite its design; or 
within the meta-theatrical frame, these potentials might include the very fact of the robots’ skill 
as theatrical actors. The withdrawn object also accounts for the layers of the object that exist 
beyond our understanding or perception—the technology of the robot, the molecular compounds 
at work within it, etc. And, the withdrawn object accounts for the part of the object that exists 
beyond the human’s relationship to it. This is where the object exists for itself. While the human 
cannot know these aspects—indeed that is the very point—the plays’ narratives suggest this 
element of the object when Geminoid F recites poetry for herself, and the Robovie wants to see 
the sunset to understand what is beautiful. The withdrawn object also accounts for the 
potentiality of the object, as the object can form its own networks beyond its relation to the 




This concept is directly addressed in Sayonara in the retasking of Geminoid F to work in the 
radiation exclusion zone, a space in which humans cannot enter due to the ongoing presence of 
radioactive material. In the play, Geminoid F is sent to recite poetry for the thousands of souls 
that died there. As Eckersall points out, “the image of the geminoid giving comfort to the souls 
of the dead by reciting poetry is not to be taken as a metaphor. Prayers must be said for those 
whose bodies have not been recovered, no matter how it is to be done” according to Buddhist 
beliefs, and Hirata is once again directly referencing everyday uses of the robot in Japanese 
culture.38 Within the narrative of the play, the robot, in all of its similarities to the human, can do 
something the human physically cannot. However, the robot’s potential futures, its ability to 
communicate beyond the living realm to the dead, its performance for nonhuman audiences 
without oversight from living humans, all point toward the robot’s withdrawn reality that is not 
able to be known or perceived by the human. Nevertheless, the withdrawn reality is real. This 
understanding of the object asserts that this performance is still real, still affective, regardless of 
any human’s knowledge of it. This concept of withdrawal is foundational in object-oriented 
ontology, as it implicitly asserts that objects have a reality, and that this reality exists beyond and 
independent of human perception. This concept is therefore helpful in attempting to move past 
anthropocentric thinking more generally, as the object’s reality does not exist for us, and 
highlighting the limitations of human knowledge. Furthermore, by foregrounding that our 
primary way of knowing is sensual, the concept suggests an embedded sense of being in the 
world grounded in the body.  
 
																																																								
38 Peter Eckersall, “Performance, Mourning, and the Long View of Nuclear Space,” in The Asia-
Pacific Journal, Vo. 13, 7, 2 (2015), 5. 
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The two Robot Theatre Project plays engage with these notions in an especially interesting way, 
because the plays build worlds in which this levelling of the human and nonhuman object is 
central, and achieve these worlds through theatrical frames that engage with aesthetics in order to 
work toward this levelling as well. If these robots are indeed objects, albeit complex OOO 
objects, and Hirata’s plays serve to emphasize the similarities between the human and robot 
actors onstage, then it stands to reason that the human actors are also objects. Within the plays’ 
narratives, we see the woman in Sayonara out of control of her own body due to her terminal 
illness—she is unable to see, to know, to perceive, or to fix her body’s inner workings. I, Worker 
likewise presents the humans in a state of withdrawal from themselves, where the reasons for the 
woman’s miscarriage are unknown to her, and the man’s depression is more “in control” than his 
reason or logic is. Both plays implicitly argue that the human is unknown, even to oneself, 
drawing the human and robot closer together in scale. The robots and humans appear more equal, 
as humans and robots actively apologize to each other, rather than only the robot working for the 
human, and the robots speak to each other on stage without the humans there, suggesting their 
independent life.  
 
Furthermore, robot and human actors, the object and the human, are equal in the stage 
environment. The audience is only able to relate to the human actor through the parallel sensual 
means with which they relate to the object. The interior of the actor—their history, reality and 
potentiality—is withdrawn from the audience’s perception and largely irrelevant, as the only 
point of contact between the audience and human actor is through the sensual interaction in the 
present moment. Sayonara and I, Worker both work to present human characters and actors in 
this way, where their interiority is definitively held at a distance, achieved through the human 
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actors’ minimal movement and gesture, as well as dim lighting that keeps their facial expression 
unclear as well. Indeed, the human actors are largely immobile onstage, mirroring the robots’ 
movement capabilities. In the end of I, Worker, both the robots and the actors bow. This framing 
shifts the conversation to focus on the hybridity of the human and object actors, rather than their 
difference. Both kinds of actors invite intimate relationships with the audience, and the theatrical 
structure redefines what “liveness” is, putting forward the robot actors as live creators.  
 
While we access the actor, whether human or robot, through sensual properties, Levi Bryant 
argues that sensual properties are also what allow us access ourselves. Bryant finds evidence in 
Lacan’s graph of sexuation for psychological withdrawal even from ourselves, where elements 
of our psyche are not readily accessible to our perception.39 I find this point integral to Bryant’s, 
and more generally OOO’s, implicit project in reimagining hierarchies, as Bryant strongly argues 
for the human to face themselves as an object similar in kind to more foreign “other” objects. It 
is through our experience of sensation that we experience our environment and ourselves, and 
our very humanness then becomes a more equal aspect of our environment. It is with this 
consideration that I find Sayonara and I, Worker taking the audience into account, where the 
audience has experienced the human onstage as an object, which more subtly and implicitly 
suggests that the audience themselves are also objects, through their similarity to the human 
actor onstage and correlative logic.40 Robot Theatre Project, therefore, draws robot actors, human 
actors, and the human audience into one category. 
 
																																																								
39 Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2011). 
40 A more thorough interrogation into dramaturgical suggestions of an audience’s objecthood, 
and the ways an audience may experience this, drives my final chapter. 	
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Although both After the Blast and the pairing of Sayonara and I, Worker feature robot actors, 
they present distinctly different relationships between human and robot actors, in ways reflective 
of their cultural contexts. After the Blast follows the conventions of Western science fiction, 
building a distrust of the robot due to its manipulative and disingenuous capacities, tricking Anna 
in the play and “tricking” the audience along with Anna. The narrative suggests that the robot is 
dangerous due to its abilities that outwit and manipulate the human, even if this distrust is 
misplaced since the robot is fulfilling the programming directed by humans. In other words, by 
extension, the play uses the robot as a symbol to show that the human is the one to be distrusted. 
However, when the robot appears as an embodied actor on the stage, rather than a symbol, the 
robot is not a “liar.” Rather, the robot performs its role through its aesthetic properties, working 
alongside the human actor as another successful actor, which suggests a different orientation to 
the figure of the robot in the robot imaginary. However, Robot Theatre Project was developed 
within the context of the reality of robots in the Japanese household, as well as a more accepting 
approach to robots grounded in religious beliefs. Therefore, Robot Theatre Project embraces 
robots and humans as similar complex, withdrawn objects, and grounds this comparison in 
dramaturgical choices that make the human and robot equally accessible and sensually affective. 
In this structure, the human is realized as more of an object, which makes relating to the robot 
object more natural and productive.  
 
Avoiding the Uncanny Valley 
Among the many elements of robot experimentation found in the Robot Theatre Project’s work, 
one subject of Ishiguro’s interest is finding methods to create a robot that is relatable and inviting 
of human contact, rather than one that creates feelings of aversion in the human interacting with 
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it. Another way of naming this concern would be to say that he aims to avoid the “uncanny 
valley,” a theoretical concept to be avoided in robot design and engineering. The “uncanny 
valley,” introduced by roboticist Masahiro Mori, is foundational to any discussion concerned 
with theoretical questions concerning robot reception, especially in the US. Mori’s thinking was 
practical, aimed to help those designing robots. His essay charts how certain elements of 
humanlike aesthetics and movement create varying sensations, where the most unpleasant 
combination lands in the avoidable “uncanny valley.” Mori conceptualizes the relationship 
between design and affinity through the mathematical concept “monotonically increasing 
function,” which describes an upward and forward movement where x increases continuously 
with the variable y. However, there becomes a moment in the design of the robot where the 
affinity dips, acting against the developed function. To make this more digestible, Mori 
compares the function to “climbing a mountain,” where continuous upward movement is 
disrupted by “intervening hills and valleys.”41 This metaphor describes Mori’s experience 
designing robots: “in climbing toward the goal of making robots appear human, our affinity for 
them increases until we come to a valley, which I call the uncanny valley.” Objects such as a 
puppet, a cute toy robot, or a humanoid helper robot are safely outside the valley in that they do 
not ever fool the human into believing an object’s life. Mori also figures industrial robots, 
designed for functionality rather than a humanlike appearance, do not invite an affinity from 
humans, and thus do not create confusion or uncanny feelings. Some humanlike android robots 
however, perhaps like the Geminoid F, skirt the uncanny valley, in that the human psyche does 
not know how to categorize the robot, and thus has feelings of discomfort, even fear in 
processing how to relate to the object. Mori’s most developed example of what falls into the 
																																																								
41 Masahiro Mori, “The Uncanny Valley,” trans. Karl F. MacDorman and Norri Kageki, in IEEE 
Robotics and Automation Magazine (June 2012), 2. 
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uncanny valley is a prosthetic hand, especially one that is encased in a flesh-like silicone, that 
startles during a handshake where the prosthetic nature of the hand is unexpected. Mori further 
suggests that movement steepens the slopes of the valley, and therefore, a myoelectric hand is 
even lower on the affinity scale. Mori’s concluding suggestion to designers and engineers is to 
“take the first peak as their goal, which results in a moderate degree of human likeness and a 
considerable sense of affinity”42 rather than trying to look too humanlike. Instead, Mori 
“predict[s] it is possible to create a safe level of affinity by deliberately pursuing a nonhuman 
design,” such as opting for eyeglasses to suggest a face rather than eyes, or a purposefully artistic 
hand rather than a hand meant to appear natural. In other words, stylized representation is 
presented as a way to manage the uncanny valley—which is precisely what theatre can do.  
 
Jennifer Robertson points out that Mori’s phrase in Japanese, bukimi no tani, more accurately 
translates to “the sense of spooky, eerie, disconcerting, or frightening. Valley of eerie feeling is 
closer to Mori’s meaning.”43 Robertson’s discussion of Mori is a valuable addition to scholarly 
writing on robots in the United States, as her translation and understanding of Mori’s context 
lends insight to the most useful applications of the uncanny valley, as well as some issues with 
the theory. For instance, Robertson points out that Mori’s understanding of what is “eerie” is 
highly personal, and his discussion of the eerie prosthetic hand is taken from his own experience 
and assumptions. For Mori, the relationship between the human’s affinity and the thing’s 
humanlike appearance is taken for granted, but more importantly, the human-like Mori refers to 
is a young, normative body. Robertson references this to point out Mori’s able-ism, consistently 
																																																								
42 Ibid., 4. 
43 Jennifer Robertson, Robo Sapiens Japanicus, 153. 
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privileging “able, healthy persons”44 in his thinking about what constitutes normal and pleasant 
encounters. This points to the connection of the robot body to a Japanese exceptionalism, but 
here the exceptionalism is even more narrowly defined. Not only should the body be Japanese in 
lineage, but also, healthy and “normal” in appearance. Robertson also contests that Mori’s 
uncanny valley discussion neglects the element of time, for if there is such a thing as the uncanny 
valley, “it is likely to last but a moment.”45 Therefore, whatever sets off the uncanny valley can 
quickly be passed over with time, and perhaps need not be such a concern. I will also add that 
many technological innovations have occurred since Mori’s initial conceptualization. The 
technology necessary to create a humanlike appearance and abilities in a prosthetic hand have 
markedly increased, so it perhaps is less likely to “startle” at all, while humans simultaneously 
become more attuned to and comfortable with objects that previously might have been off-
putting. A further element developed and not mentioned in Mori’s discussion is the relationship 
of sound, or more specifically a voice, in the uncanny scale. 
 
Often, Mori’s theory is traced back to psychologist Ernst Jentsch’s article “On the Psychology of 
the Uncanny” in 1906, which defines “uncanny” as a “dark feeling of uncertainty.”46 Freud also 
took up the concept of the uncanny in 1919 when he sought to find the roots of the uncanny’s 
fear and dread in the psyche. According to Robertson’s research, the common linkage between 
Mori, Freud and Jentsch is erroneous, as the word “uncanny” only occurred in a later translation 
																																																								
44 Ibid., 155. 
45 Ibid., 160.	
46 Ernst Jensch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny,” trans. Roy Sellars, Angelaki 2.1, (1995). 
Original publication “Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen” in Psychiatrisch-Neurologische 
Wochenschrift 8.22 (25 August 1906): 195-98 and 8.23 (1 September 1906): 203-05. 
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of Mori’s text into English.47 This context is critical, as it points to Mori’s greater interest in 
personal preferences in robot design rather than a more nuanced understanding or research of the 
robot’s effects on the human psyche that a connection to Freud would suggest. Mori himself was 
not linking the robot to repressed impulses. Interestingly, Mori’s discussion does implicitly 
depend, though not supported by research, on the human psyche’s reception of the robot, 
whether he was referencing psychologists or not; Mori’s sense of strangeness is located in the 
human’s automatic response to the robot, and therefore embedded in human perception. 
However, a limitation of the common focus on the psyche in Western discussions of Mori’s 
theory is that a focus on the psyche occludes the material that is evoking these feelings. By that I 
mean, by associating the uncanny valley with Freud’s notion of the term, which asserts that the 
uncanny is related to repressed impulses and infantile beliefs, there is a brushing off of the 
feeling as being wrong, weak, and something to be avoid. For Freud, the uncanny is “a class of 
terrifying which leads back to something long known to us, once very familiar.” His study is 
inspired by Jentsch, who locates the uncanny feeling in moments where there is doubt as to 
whether the object is alive or not, but Freud goes further to assert that the uncanny feeling occurs 
when the object threatens the ego by appealing to instinctual drives and early mental stages, a 
time when the ego was not yet differentiated from its environment.48 Freud’s uncanny can occur 
through interaction with objects, but also through intangible ideas and images. To focus the 
uncanny valley discussion on Freud’s uncanny, any details about the object itself are nearly 
irrelevant as the focus of the uncanny interaction is on the human reception, and more 
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specifically, on the repressed human psyche. Furthermore, this discussion of the uncanny accepts 
that the uncanny is a lie, the object’s falsity misleading the human, while feelings of discomfort 
at this sense of confusion is a foregone conclusion.  
 
An alternative line of thinking might consider that these senses that are confused about the 
presence of life in an object are not false or misled, but are responding to a very real form of life 
in the object, a life that looks different than a human life. John Bell considers this very thought in 
his puppetry scholarship. “We attempt to control [the animate nature of objects] with concepts 
such as ‘the uncanny,’ which want to tame the effects of object theatre by assigning them to the 
irrational and pathological, rather than to consider the disconcerting possibility of the agency of 
things.”49 Bell’s attention to the object’s agency, in part due to his interest in Jane Bennett’s 
concept of vibrant matter,50 is a helpful shift in the story toward an attention to the object’s 
material itself. An object must not simply appear to be human to gain affinity or have its “life” 
questioned. To assume so hides the life that is already there, in objects humanlike or not. 
 
In addition to Mori’s limited view of material, his theory only briefly mentions the topic of 
framing. According to Mori’s graph, the Bunraku puppet is situated one step below an unhealthy 
human in the scale of human likeness and affinity. However, Mori admits that the puppet does 
not look much like a living human. The reason for the high level of affinity is partially due to the 
puppet’s distance while it appears on stage, but also “given our tendency as an audience to 
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become absorbed in this form of art.”51 With this statement, Mori implicitly admits to the 
essential nature of the context and frame in which the human encounters of the object. The 
bunraku puppet is received with a high level of affinity not only because of the material, but also 
because of the arrangement of the stage and the dramaturgy—performance style, lights, 
costumes, narrative, and the audience’s previous experience with the medium of performance 
and/or the bunraku puppet itself. The audience has been taught an alternate way of reading the 
object, as a sympathetic actor within a narrative rather than a tricky or untrustworthy site of 
uncertainty, which suggests that alternate readings of other objects may also be possible, with an 
affective theatrical structure and time.  
 
To uncritically assume the validity of Mori’s uncanny valley theory, and with it the ideas that 
strange objects are off-putting in a way that forecloses a valuable interaction, is a dead end for 
theatre practice. Instead, we might understand the uncanny as a potential tool or strategy, 
occurring through the material’s relationship to the audience. Then, choices can be made to 
develop, and surpass, uncanny feelings for specific dramaturgical purpose. The relationship 
outlined in the Robot Theatre Project’s work, where the robot object and human object are on 
one equal plane, expands the human’s empathetic range, even with a possible “uncanny object.” 
James R. Hamilton similarly suggests that elements creating an uncanny effect in the audience’s 
cognitive perception of the object be analyzed on their own accord as “elements to be explained 
by a more general theory of the nature of spectating animated objects.”52 Then, an uncanny result 
might be found due to “a lack of clarity or by a clear presentation of unexpected features within 
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the perceptual data stream itself.”53 As Mori’s theories suggest, the uncanny arises when 
something is unexpected. So, the Robot Theatre Project’s gradual introduction of the robots’ 
abilities, and the robots’ vocabulary of movement being mirrored by the human actors, works to 
build a world where the robot seems natural, rather than unexpected. Furthermore, time as well 
as framing and practice affect feelings of affinity versus aversion. Thus, the theatre can train the 
audience to see and relate to movement and liveliness outside of a strictly human form. As I have 
argued earlier in the chapter, this is a helpful and worthwhile direction, especially if it might 
affect human behavior outside the theatre.  
 
Framing the Object: Kris Verdonck’s Dancer Series 
Thus far the performing robots in my discussion have all been broadly humanoid. To varying 
degrees, they gesture toward the human form through a general shape and suggestions of a face, 
which therefore invites an anthropomorphic relationship to the spectator watching these robot 
actors, and easily offers a site onto which the spectator can project their own sensations and 
emotions. As I have discussed, the suggestion of a human form has been useful in our discussion 
of the relationship between the human and robot, in that it invites a reflection on the state of the 
human as object. Additionally, to learn to relate to an object that is humanlike might lead to a 
greater ease in relating to additional, less anthropomorphic and stranger objects. However, this 
focus on humanoid performing objects invites questions about the many non-humanoid 
performing objects appearing in contemporary performance. These can range in type from an 
intelligent light source that tracks a performers movement across the space in real time, to more 




invite a similarly empathetic relationship between the object performer and audience member, 
even when the performing object looks like an object found in everyday life? 
	
To investigate this question, I look to the work of Kris Verdonck and his Dancer series, which 
includes Dancer #1 (2003), Dancer #2 (2009), and Dancer #3 (2010).54 Verdonck’s oeuvre 
mindfully works through the relations between the human and object, often questioning the 
binary division between the two and staging alternative relationships. According to Eckersall et 
al., “Verdonck’s works often ask questions about the relationship between human and machine, 
through a focus on developing our awareness of materiality and of collapsing borders between 
things.”55 One of Verdonck’s primary methods is this focus on materiality, which he achieves by 
placing the object center stage. For Verdonck, the object is a perfect actor in that it is “sincere,”56 
and he often refers to both human and nonhuman actors as “figures,” in reference to the notion of 
the figure in Giorgio Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. As Van 
Baarle explains, Figure (in German) “was one of names the camp-guards had for those prisoners 
who had entered the grey zone between life and death. Not only their appearance, but also the 
Figuren themselves were indifferent towards their own in-between state.”57 On Verdonck’s 
stage, then, the figure, whether nonhuman or human, is already both, presented as an active 
object. This activation of the figure is accomplished by giving objects the stage, framing the 
object in a theatrical language in ways that develop the audience’s capabilities to feel for the 
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object. Eckersall highlights Verdonck’s self-conscious contemplation of the theatre space: “he 
seems to want to recuperate an almost classical and formal idea of theatre wherein the capacity to 
show things to an audience is powerfully evoked through a demonstrable framing of the notion 
of theatrical space.”58 It is therefore the object’s status as actor for an audience, within the face-
to-face structure of performance, that invites the provocative man-machine encounter for which 
Verdonck aims. 
 
In Dancer #3, a robot in the form of a machine piston rests upright center stage, with a cable 
running from the top of the object to a connecting pulley system suspended in the air. The stage 
is dark, with one simple white spotlight focused on the piston. The robot is “built around a 
captive bolt pistol, a tool used to induce unconsciousness to cattle before they are slaughtered,”59 
but the potential violence is transformed in the theatre space as the object’s relationality is 
rearranged. The robot begins to move, bouncing up and down in a developing rhythm. With 
more bouncing, the robot loses balance and teeters over to one side, giving a few more punches 
before sending the signal to be pulled upright by a cable and begin the dance again. High-pitched 
beeps are audible, seemingly the robot’s means of communication given the theatre setting. The 
machine repeats this pattern of bouncing, falling, and beginning again. Sometimes the machine 
starts off with a loud, strong initial jump and falls quickly. Other times the machine begins with 
small, cautious jumps that build over a longer period of time before eventually falling. In the 
																																																								
58 Peter Eckersall, “Locations of Dramaturgy – Kris Verdonck,” Performance Research 17:3 
(2012), 68. 
59 Kristof van Baarle, “The Critical Aesthetics of Performing Objects – Kris Verdonck,” 41. 
	 156	
words of A Two Dogs Company, “The energy of this automaton is infectious. His clumsiness 
and constant failure display the optimism of a clown who’s always tripping over.”60 
 
Verdonck dramaturgically guides the audience to anthropomorphize the piston successfully; as a 
spectator, I quickly begin to cheer for the machine. I have a sense of expectation, and feelings of 
unease as the machine teeters, and perhaps even pangs of disappointment and embarrassment as 
the machine inevitably, and repeatedly, fails. As Helena Grehan reports, “as it falls there is an 
audible gasp from the spectators.”61 Grehan also admits her own sense of connectedness to the 
object when she viewed the jumping robot as the last scene in a three act performance called 
Actor #1.  In the first act entitled Mist, there is swirling that undulates and yet somehow—
through an invisible mechanism—stays in a pool in the center of the space. Grehan reports 
having a hard time finding any sense of agency in this intangible object. With the machine, 
however, Grehan reports, “I feel an emotional connection to this ‘pump’/machine because it 
appears vulnerable and falls.”62 Grehan surmises that the machine’s voice of beeps and its 
“face,” or at least the tangible matter that locates the machine, invites a stronger sense of 
connection than the smoke. I agree that the object’s material and design is at work here. 
Compared to the smoke, the object here can be located as something definite and corporeal. 
There is weight, scale, and dimension to the object. Its material is something that can be 
understood on a human level, as material ourselves. The feeling of presence achieved through the 
object’s movement within the frame creates a sense of it “looking” back at you, somehow 
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“facing” you even without a face. This finding goes directly against Mori’s placement of the 
industrial robot as nearly irrelevant on the affinity scale, due to its lack of lack of human 
likeness. What Verdonck stages, instead, is a development of affinity for the industrial robot due 
to its stylized presentation and consequently reevaluated relationship. 
 
Figure 9. Kris Verdonck’s Dancer #3. Photo by Reinout Hiel. 
 
This dancing object invites a sense of connectedness due to the dramaturgy surrounding the 
object’s actions. The object’s movement exists in time and space, beginning and then ending as a 
singular action. And the audience is invited to witness the repetition, and in the repetition, the 
difference in each iteration. Each time the object gets back up again, a sense of suspense and 
futurity arises with the question of whether or not this “attempt” will be better than the last. 
Through these iterations, and the comparisons between them, a perceived goal emerges: don’t 
fall. And the audience can therefore root for the object to “succeed.” And as in any theatrical 
space, there is a sense of hope. But of course, the object is bound to fall and will every time, 
eventually. The suspense is then released, only to be built up again. Much of this emotional 
connection between the audience and object develops as the audience is able to project onto the 
object, transposing learned abilities to project onto and identify with human actors on stage into 
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this similarly theatrical setting. The robot is, after all, the single actor on stage working. 
Eckersall et. al note that “the work engenders an emotional connection between us and this little 
machine because it appears vulnerable and falls. But this response in itself triggers worry about 
whether this is about attempting to contain or decode the figure, rather than to engage with it on 
some level.”63 This comment astutely notes that the act of projection, which is so strong here, 
blurs the details of the object’s material in favor of an anthropomorphized object, and we resort 
back to convenient modes of accessing the object in ways that may occlude another relationality. 
However, the material, as well as its framing and its actions, is partly responsible for this 
anthropomorphic affect—this is the sensual interaction that occurs through the collaboration of 
the object’s material and the audience’s sense. Eckersall et. al ultimately admit this fact: 
Of course we cannot help but anthropomorphise our relation with it, which is precisely 
the point. The DANCER #3 robot itself does not need to mimic human actions or 
gestures because the HRI [Human Robot Interface] is where the real action in this work 
lies: the circuit of affect between robot and audience that forms the basis of an oddly 
satisfying theatrical experience, with no live actors in sight.64	 
The “circuit of affect” cited here suggests another classical theatre element with which Verdonck 
experiments. Indeed, this affective relationship between the performing object and audience 
functions identically to the relationship between the human actor and audience. Eckersall et. al 
surmise that robots are therefore a type of “proto-subject,” operating “as ontologically 
indeterminate entities dependent on a specific context for their meaning and function.”65 
However, if the robot is a “proto-subject,” so too is the human actor onstage.  
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Failure is yet another ontological element of theatre at play in Dancer #3. Nicholas Ridout 
argues that failure is a constitutive aspect of theatre, as the form offers a face-to-face encounter 
that can only fail.66 Sara Jane Bailes further argues that the performance of failure onstage, 
through her proposed “poetics of failure,” underlines this inherent failure of representation that 
categorically creates performance. Failure as a technique therefore “allows for bold and radical 
misuse of previously established conventions,”67 though these conventions of course are still in 
use and visible. Verdonck’s Dancer #3 can be viewed through this lens of performing failure, in 
a method that draws attention to the always already performed failure of the theatre space. When 
projecting onto the human actor, the actor becomes an object, separate from their individual 
subjectivity and selfhood and according to Ridout, therefore existing outside the “face-to-face” 
encounter. It is only in singular moments, which stand out as embarrassing, rare or remarkable, 
that the face is returned to the human actor. Ridout reports on his own experience of an actor 
looking him in the eye during performance, who suddenly transforms into an individual rather 
than an image in the large ensemble. “Although he has been in my line of vision for over an 
hour, [he] becomes stranger in the act of looking at me because, in returning his look I see him 
differently – I notice his face as his face.”68 The reason this provokes embarrassment in the 
audience member, Ridout’s reported need to look away, is because it calls attention to the actor’s 
objecthood:  
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In moments of embarrassment (or stage fright) what is happening is that you are suddenly 
aware of being made to appear, of the fact that you have your being through your 
appearance. The discomfort, the embarrassment, is what comes with actually 
experiencing this as a reality rather than simply in theory, or, to put it another way, from 
the recognition that appearing is all you can do, that there is nothing else but appearing, 
here, that appearance is not just the flimsy opposite of reality.69 
In other words, the act of theatrical performance functions through appearances, rendering all 
actors and audience into aestheticized objects. Perhaps then this robot is not a “proto-subject”—
the first or foundational subject from which other subjects are developed and measured. Rather, 
we might consider the robot in Dancer #3, and all actors onstage, as objects in their own right, 
functioning aesthetically to create affect in their relations to other objects and the audience. By 
reorienting away from the notion of the subject to instead embrace the sense of objecthood on 
stage, we might more effectively attune to the ways in which objects communicate through 
sensual relations. 
 
Verdonck experiments with the object actor in other works in the series, continuing to draw 
human and object closer together. In Dancer #1, a pipe bent at a right angle attached to a small 
motor is suspended on a small stage in front of a white backdrop, with only a simple spotlight 
highlighting the assemblage’s shadow. The motor begins to work, twisting the pipe around in a 
manic dance until the motor starts to smoke, and then finally, stops working, bringing the object 
back to stillness. At the end of this performance, the archived video on Verdonck’s website 
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shows the audience laughing, while also breaking into applause.70 An end has been staged. The 
audience has witnessed a real end to this assemblage, as this machine has moved from a working 
machine, to a broken machine that cannot repeat the performed action. The ephemerality and 
liveness of the performance emerges through this sense of unrepeatability. Though the object is 
not “alive” per se, the shared time and space of this singular event centered around the objects’ 
action builds a sense of liveness. And since the object’s liveness comes to a halt, the end 
translates to a death when framed through the theatrical and anthropomorphic frame. By 
rendering the death of the machine, the object’s immortal nature is refashioned into a mortal one, 
recontextualizing and making strange the machine’s sudden brokenness in order to make the 
object’s unique trajectory reappear. Furthermore, this moment of the end can be captured on 
stage with an object, unlike the mortality of the human. Thus, the machine seems humanlike in 
its mortality, but it also comes forward as a machine, appearing differently due to the staging of 
this final moment.  
 
This notion of the death of the machine is taken up again in Dancer #2. Here, an engine sits atop 
a non-moving block in a gallery space. Like the small motor moving Dancer #1, this larger 
engine begins to labor. Although, in this space, the work feels especially frustrated and fruitless 
as the engine revs in increasing intensity, producing a growing sound, while unable to 
accomplish its purpose, if we connect an engine’s work to its propelling axels in some kind of 
vehicle. Much like Heidegger’s broken tool,71 the engine becomes visible as a singular object 
when disconnected from the purpose we generally associate with said thing. When displaced 
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from its bed in an automobile, removed from its typical use, the engine appears when fixed in 
space. It is wasting energy, labouring fruitlessly to no end. And in its failure, the engine is freed 
and achieves a “new-use.”72 Again, the framing and context of the object is integral to its 
relationship to the human. The engine continues to work at an ever-increasing intensity, until it 
smokes, and dies. In Verdonck’s footage of this presentation in his theatre company’s archive,73 
the audience begin to move through the gallery space into the next room, while many audience 
members applaud the engine’s work, and one particular audience member pats the engine as he 
passes it. The engine worked so hard, so honestly and devoid of ego, that its performance for this 
audience was both its purpose in the piece and its ultimate death, and a small sense of 
appreciation is visible in these audience reactions.  
 
I argue that the moving object, visible throughout this Dancer series, has the potential to activate 
the spectator’s mirror neurons in a method similar in kind if not in scale to the human performer. 
Mirror neurons were discovered through research into the neural responses of monkeys. 
Giacomo Rizzolatti and others found that certain neurons fired in the brain when the body was 
grasping and when the monkey watched the human performing the same activity.74 Further 
research found similar responses in human brains. Two popular theories regarding the workings 
of the mirror neurons are Simulation theory and Theory theory. In Simulation theory, the idea is 
that the mirror neurons invite an ability to re-enact what is witnessed in the other, implicitly 
simulating the actions of others in order to understand them. In Theory theory, the idea is that 
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interpersonal engagement is structured through one’s ability to construct a theory about the 
other’s actions through perceptual information. In The Phenomenological Mind, Gallagher and 
Zahavi argue that perception itself, rather than any additional system that builds on the 
perceptual stimuli, is the primary method through which the human comes to understand the 
world around us. According to the authors, developmental research shows children responding to 
behavioral cues long before any capacity for conceptual thought is developed, ostensibly due to 
mirror neuron processes.75 The mirror neurons are therefore part of the processes “that underlie 
intersubjective perception.”76 Therefore, on its most basic level, the mirror neuron allows for 
some pre-cognitive means of understanding, interacting with the neurons through direct 
perception that does not require conceptual thought. Bruce McConachie goes further in relating 
the functioning of mirror neurons to performance, stressing that “humans appear to have a more 
highly evolved mirror system than other animals, allowing them to access the emotions as well 
as the actions of others through direct simulation.”77 The mirror neurons’ ability to simulate 
leads to an understanding of others’ general intentions, drawing conclusions by combining 
knowledge of motion and emotion together. If this is indeed true, then the anthropomorphized 
movements of the performing object may be communicating in a very real way with the 
spectator, not through language or any conceptual thought, but simply through the ways its 
materiality and this material’s ways of moving in the space are perceived directly by the 
spectators’ mirror neurons. If the object performs anthropomorphized gestures that the spectator 
receives as human-like through the dramaturgical framing, and implicitly simulates those 
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gestures within themselves, and even accesses emotions related to those gestures as McConachie 
suggests, then the spectator may receive the moving object as communicating emotions through 
a model of intersubjective perception. 
 
When applied to Verdonck’s Dancer series, this information may help us understand the 
audience affinity toward objects. It is not only the theatrical framing that guides the viewer to 
read Dancer #3’s dance as a repeated failure. Rather, Dancer #3’s repeated attempts and falls 
invite a simulation in the audience mind, where each fall is translated in the mind of the audience 
into what a fall feels like for themselves. Perhaps, even, the brain simulates each repeated 
attempt with the addition of the emotional impetus to keep trying. The brain is especially 
equipped to understand the object’s actions. The reason this relationship is pronounced on the 
stage is because the stage provides a site in which focus is directed on the object for a sustained 
period of time.  
 
This understanding of the performing object’s relation to the spectator complicates the traditional 
view of mimesis in the theatre field, where mimesis is understood as an imitation and 
representation of the real onstage. First, the relationality between the object and the audience 
emphasizes that agency is dispersed. Mimesis can only take place through the object’s 
interaction with the cognition and perception of the audience, and the audience is capable of 
collaborating with the sensual elements of nonhuman objects to achieve this affect. Stanton B. 
Gardner, Jr. agrees that “mimesis is a sensorimotor act grounded in perceptual contact with the 
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world.”78 Second, the object’s performance questions the notion of mimesis as an imitation, since 
the object is not imitating another “real” action that takes place somewhere else, but actually 
doing this action and engaging with the spectators’ perception earnestly. McConachie goes into 
great depth parsing out the spectator’s ability to understand doubleness, moving smoothly back 
and forth between the character and the actor, falsity and reality.79 However, the object is not a 
character but always the object, always engaging through its material aspects, and its relationship 
with the audience occurs through interaction with the aesthetic elements of the object. The object 
is not engaging in mimesis in any special way onstage, because it is always relating to its 
environment through aesthetic means.  
 
The affective nature of Verdonck’s figures asserts that the dramaturgical framing of the object, 
rendering the robotic machine an actor center stage, can function just as effectively in ushering in 
an empathy of the object as theatrical examples of humanoid robots with complex narratives. 
The sensual encounter with the material of the object within this theatrical framing reveals the 
agentic nature of the object’s movement in communicating with the spectator, even activating 
mirror neurons for an identificatory and emotional connection. These encounters on stage are 
integral in moving toward practicing a renewed sight of objects’ tangible agency in the material 
world, as the object on stage is not imitating its role in life, but actively executing its everyday 
mode of relationality. This attention to material challenges the audience to reconsider their 
preconceived biases toward the robot and encounter the robot in real time, faced with the 
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Developments toward even more autonomous robots are on the horizon, while the distance 
between the engineer and robotic object grows as the engineer allows algorithmic programming 
to take over. Algorithms have thus become another form of an actor unto themselves, as in the 
work of Annie Dorsen. Dorsen experiments with what she has named “algorithmic theatre,” 
existing in a lineage traced back to algorithmic performance and visual art. The main component 
of this genre is that “algorithmic theatre is created by algorithms themselves, and is not 
particularly concerned with forms of representation.”80 For instance, in Hello, Hi There (2010), 
two chat bots perform improvised conversations based on a debate between Michel Foucault and 
Noam Chomsky. Later, Dorsen experiments with embodying algorithms and internet comments 
in human actors, as in The Great Outdoors (2017) where a performer reads a text culled from 
internet comments and fed through an algorithm and The Slow Room (2018), in which actors 
embody the inane conversations in the lobby of a sex chat room in a script written by algorithm. 
The algorithm itself becomes an active and equal creative partner. In Dorsen’s words, algorithms 
“produce thought, they make decisions, they act.”81 While the algorithm as actor is in line with 
many traditional notions of theatre, as it is located in time, improvised in real time, and 
continuously moving forward through time, the intangible quality of the algorithm questions 
traditional notions of the actor. Dorsen is aware that the algorithm does not “confront the 
spectator” and so the spectator is left “radically alone.” The reason the algorithm doesn’t 
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confront the spectator is precisely due to its lack of a physical form, its lack of a face. 
Interestingly, Dorsen has mitigated this issue by representing the algorithm through a human face 
in her later works, juxtaposing the human form with the inhuman thought process to which they 
give voice. However, the robot run by algorithm is another method with which to give the 
algorithm a presence.  
 
Increased algorithmic engineering enables the tangible robot to approach the robot of our 
imagination. One such development is the continuing work of Hiroshi Ishiguro, the same 
roboticist responsible for the robots in Sayonara and I, Worker. The new robot, “Alter,”82 has 
been presented in various science museums and technology exhibitions in Japan and Australia. 
The robot is designed to appear more “lifelike” in its movement, with a torso, arms and head. 
The torso, shoulders, and upper arms lack any exterior skin or shell, so that the engineering at 
work within is visible. But a silicone-appearing substance covers its forearms, hands, neck and 
head. The face is modeled to appear like a nondescript face lacking specific gender or age 
markers. The skin, however, is pale, and facial characteristics appear vaguely Asian and 
Caucasian. While the idea is that the face “could be anyone’s,”83 it is more accurate to say that it 
could be the face of a young Asian or Caucasian adult. The robot is equipped with 42 pneumatic 
actuators that allow for articulated movement of the head, arms, hands, and fingers. The most 
impressive innovation, however, is that this movement is not directly controlled through a human 
engineer’s programming, but through a signal generator that mimics the central pattern 
generators (CPG) of the neural circuitry of the human brain and spinal cord. The robot’s CPG, 
																																																								
82 I am indebted to Yuji Sone’s presentation at the annual Performance Studies international 
conference in Daegu, Korea, for alerting me to Alter and Ishiguro’s continuing work. 
83 “Alter,” Intercommunication Center, 2016, www.ntticc.or.jp/en/archive/works/alter/.	
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and the actions it prompts, respond to data from brightness and distance sensors communicating 
the robot’s surroundings. The robot is therefore responding, in real time, to sensory qualities of 
its environment. The resulting movement is sometimes fluid, sometimes stilted and jumpy, and 
always something reminiscent of a dance in its pure expression. 
 
In this performing object, the distance between the engineer/manipulator and the robot extends 
into a relationship where the engineer cedes attempts at control to an algorithm. Alter, therefore, 
becomes even more similar to the human actor in its relationship to its movement and 
surroundings; it responds through its algorithmic model, working much like a script or 
choreography, while simultaneously incorporating the sensorial stimuli from its immediate 
surroundings in real time. The nature of a future audience reception to Alter’s performance 
possibilities is yet to be tested. Thus far, the robot has been presented in exhibition and museum 
settings, which frames Alter and its actions as a scientific marvel rather than an empathetic 
testing ground. The fact that Alter is not attempting to communicate any concepts, words, or 
narratives further removes it from any conceived “attempt” toward human capacities. Because 
Alter is in a museum and exhibition setting, the response can focus without distractions on its 
technological innovations. It is not yet trying to be a human, but experimenting with human-like 
processes. This context also removes Alter from the objects otherwise discussed in this chapter, 
as it shows no signs of failure, given what its goals appear to be. It appears that, without these 
goals, Alter remains an oddity rather than an empathic object, which points to the necessity of an 
aesthetic framing in approaching the object as a the feeling, equal other. What Alter does offer, 
however, is a means by which to witness and experiment with sensory stimuli from the object’s 
environment and their real effect on the object itself. Alter faces the human through a direct 
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response to the human’s presence, “seeing” the human in a way more nuanced than inputs and 
directives. Alter helps us see the object as a sensory thing, a thing more like us.  
 
It is this sense of equality—between the sensory, active, agentic robot object and the sensory, 
active, agentic human object—that theatre and performance can discover and train. More than 
literature, TV, or film, theatre is specifically able to experiment because the material robot is 
present onstage, and the material nature of the object faces the human audience directly. The 
material nature of live performance forces a sense of singular time and place, of the present, that 
requires that the audience witness what is in front of them, potentially upending preconceived 
ideas or imaginary dispositions either for or against the concept of the robot in favor of a 
material robot of the contemporary moment. Now the robot is right here. The material acts 
alongside the human actor, and therefore, object agency is on display in real time. Furthermore, 
the dramaturgical framing of the robot can help the audience see the object, inviting a sense of 














Atmosphere in Performance: Shared Presence for Alternative Models of Agency 
 
Theatre scholars through the years have often noted the particular feeling of a performance 
space, which is something many theatergoers know to be true. Once through a theatre’s doors, a 
different set of rules are in play. Sometimes there’s a hushed silence, or an excited chatter. 
Sometimes the space greets the audience with a warm, inviting light, or the audience moves 
directly into a black emptiness. Music or soundscapes set the mood, and audiences have learned 
to heighten their focus on the newly constructed world around them. This has led to 
considerations of the theatre as a liminal space of ritual and transformation,1 or an empty space 
capable of hosting a “holy theatre.”2 Many would agree that it is a transformative space with a 
transformative potential,3 but the specific qualities that lend to this feeling remain a question. 
 
As my previous chapters have explored, the position of objects within the theatre and their 
relationship to the human are components of the theatre’s transformative potential. Objects act, 
and the theatrical framing of this nonhuman agency makes the object suddenly uncanny, thereby 
refreshing and refocusing the audience’s relationship with everyday things. In many ways, the 
object in the theatre space is no different than the object in the world, but suddenly, the object’s 
affective capability is put to work, and the human’s intimacy with those objects comes to light. I 
refer to the object’s affect as a means toward considering the human’s orientation toward the 
																																																								
1 Richard Schechner, Between Theatre and Anthropology (Pittsburg: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1985); and Performed Imaginaries (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
2 Peter Brook, The Empty Space (New York: Touchstone, 1968). 




object and the resulting relationality, emotional valence, and subject formation, following Sara 
Ahmed, Lauren Berlant, and Kathleen Stewart4 as well the ways in which the object’s sensory 
elements directly relate to the human through perception, following Brian Massumi.5 However, 
through my attention to the time and space of the performance event, the material nature of its 
elements, and the sensual relationality between object and human, I focus on the material over 
the more abstract concerns of affect theory that focus on subjectively experienced feelings or 
emotions. Thus far, I have focused on human interactions with plainly visible and physical 
objects—the puppets and robots that face the human as tangible material on the stage—as 
avenues toward interrogating the ways in which dramaturgy can reveal alternate relationalities 
with objects through their sensual agency. Even these solid materials invocate the considerably 
more amorphous question of affect—the immaterial material at work in the theatre space. 
 
While the ways these objects invite and provoke humans has been a consistent element of my 
discussion, I now turn to a different kind of theatrical object, which is created precisely through 
human entanglements: atmosphere. The term “atmosphere” first arose to describe the air 
enveloping the earth, but the notion expanded to refer to feelings or sensations carried “in the 
air” in the 18th century.6 Since then, the term has become interchangeable with mood, ambience, 
and tone in both everyday speech and academia, and might refer to “epochs, societies, rooms, 
																																																								
4 Sara Ahmed, “Happy Objects” in The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. 
Seigworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011); Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2007). 
5 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual (Durham, ND: Duke University Press, 2002). 
6 Gernot Böhme, “The art of the stage set as a paradigm for an aesthetics of atmospheres,” 
ambiances, 10 February (2013), 1. 
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landscapes, couples, artworks, and much more.”7 Whatever the referent, the notion of 
atmosphere suggests a multiplicity of factors that come together in space and time to create 
something that exists in between; something that is materially present and perceivable. In theatre, 
atmosphere is slightly more locatable, thanks to the bounded nature of the performance space. 
Indeed, theatre is a space in which the environments and atmospheres receive heightened 
attention, both by designers and by the audience whose ability to feel these effects functions as 
an integral element in theatre itself. Philosopher Gernot Böhme cites the stage set as a paradigm 
that “endows the idea of making atmospheres with objective reality.”8 Theatre design works with 
many individual elements including light color and focus, set texture and arrangement, and 
music or other sound choices. By shifting focus to the notion of atmosphere, we must consider 
the ways in which these elements meet the human audience. Every individual thing, as well as 
the larger assemblage of things, is agential, and intimately related to the audience’s bodies. This 
heightened attention to the atmosphere within the theatre space provides an opportunity to 
examine how humans join non-human objects to create atmosphere. A greater understanding of 
the atmosphere within the theatre space might then aid in understanding human relationality and 
effectivenes in the even more vast atmospheres at work in the world.  
 
In the field of eco-criticism9 and today’s era of eco-anxiety, where we search for ideas and 
resultant ways of being that respond responsibly and sustainably to shifting environmental 
																																																								
7 Ben Anderson, “Affective Atmospheres,” Emotion, Space and Society, 2 (2009), 78. 
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realities, I argue that the notion of “atmosphere” is more generative and responsive than the 
notion of “environment.” Atmosphere implies a situated and reactive connectivity among human 
and nonhuman agents in the creation of their shared surroundings. Theatre is an art form of 
atmosphere. We can read contemporary performances for their atmospheric dramaturgy, or the 
way they build a network of associations, hierarchies, and the location of the human within these. 
All performance engages in the creation of atmosphere, but I have chosen two that render two 
distinct conceptions of atmosphere and the human’s place within it. Kris Verdonck’s 
SOMETHING (out of nothing) stages a dramaturgy of absence and alienation. In the 
anthropocene, human absence stands as an impossible but generative goal, but as Verdonck’s 
creation of atmosphere shows, human absence does not mean that the human has disappeared. 
Contrasting Verdonck’s world, Heiner Goebbels’s Everything that happened and would happen 
stages a dramaturgy of accumulation and connectivity, where the human’s presence is inherent in 
always unfolding events, even when that presence is passive. 
 
I argue that atmospheres produced in live works are an integral aspect of the theatre experience, 
and an attention to the mechanics of atmosphere offers ways to think beyond binary notions of 
the boundaries between individual and atmosphere, human and nonhuman, and the theatre and 
the real.10 Atmosphere is a way to see and feel what is between and in process in an artwork, as it 
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is a collaborative unfolding of events achieved through multiplicities of different kinds of 
matter.11 Thus, it offers glimpses beyond distinctions between cause and effect, and human and 
nonhuman agency. Though the works by Verdonck and Goebbels offer distinct aesthetic worlds 
and contrasting models of the human’s place within their environment, they utilize similar 
methods to produce complementary worldviews. Through an analysis of both productions, I 
argue the atmospheres of both productions emphasize the implicit agency of the human’s simple 
presence, rather than human action, thereby promoting a dispersed understanding of power and 
causality. In such understandings, sensible, passive, and responsive ideals of the human are put 
forward as alternative models of relationality. I argue for the value of grounding the human in 
the shared materiality of the present moment through an attention to their contributions to the 
atmosphere, thereby highlighting one’s agency and the responsibility that comes with it. While 
the reality of destruction and darkness remain indelible parts of the history and future of the 
world, this alternative relationality suggests modes of moving through the inevitable mourning 
stages. In doing so, both productions gesture toward the transformative potential of performance, 
both inside and outside the theatre space, with ethical implications for the posthuman position in 
the world to come.  
 
Environments, Atmospheres, Nature and Implications for the Human 
																																																								
11 I am interested in the ways in which atmosphere is created through the collaboration of objects 
and affects. While objects and their design are integral in my discussion, I do not extend the 




The term “environment” refers to the “surroundings or conditions in which a person, animal, or 
plant lives or operates” or more broadly, “the natural world.”12 An environment, therefore, 
implicitly supports the concept of a singular, sovereign living thing at the center of its 
surrounding conditions. While that thing may be affected by the surroundings within which it is 
situated, it is still separated by some border delineating the thing itself. Importantly, the term 
began to develop a connection to nature and ecology in 1956, when Francis C. Evans 
popularized the concept of an ecosystem.13 Since then, it has become common for the term 
“environment” to be used synonymously with “nature.” “Reference is often made to the ‘natural 
environment’ of humans, to distinguish it from their social and cultural surroundings.”14 This 
association with nature means that now, the notion of “environment” will most often conjure 
images of idyllic mountain landscapes and green vegetation, as a basic Google image search will 
show, or dreamy notions of the personification of Earth in Mother Nature or Gaia. Furthermore, 
environmental and conservationist movements have been shaped by environmental aesthetics, 
influenced by differing notions of the sublime, the picturesque, and positive aesthetics and purity 
from human contact.15 However, both ecocritical theorists and aesthetic philosophers have 
sought to problematize the idea of a picturesque or pure nature as helpful to the environmentalist 
project, as they are anthropocentric and limiting to notions of the ways in which the natural and 
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the social are enmeshed.16 This idea of a natural or pure environment is based on a myth, and 
efforts to preserve or return to a pure nature obscure the diversity, both the beautiful and the 
undesirable, that constitutes our current environment. In his own effort to problematize the idea 
of nature as untamed, wild, or separate from the social realm, Timothy Morton argues in Ecology 
without Nature that: “All kinds of beings, from toxic waste to sea snails, are clamoring for our 
scientific, political, and artistic attention, and have become part of political life—to the detriment 
of monolithic conceptions of Nature.”17 This monolithic conception of Nature also depends on an 
inherent divide, where nature and the human are separate and distinct. Just as an “environment” 
surrounds a separate and sovereign individual, Nature exists “over there,” as resources for that 
sovereign. To understand the human as a being that is very much in and of Nature, constituting 
and constituted by the environment itself, ushers in alternate models of causality and a more 
nuanced goal of responsivity. 
 
The harmful effects of the anthropocentric constructs of Nature and Environment as separate 
from and existing for the human lie, in part, in the ways in which what has been deemed as part 
of the natural world is then co-opted and manipulated for human profit, which has gone on to 
support capitalist and colonialist models of relating to nonhuman entities. Part of this separation 
of humanity from nature can be traced back to the rise of Judeo-Christian beliefs over two 
thousand years ago. In the creation story of Adam and Eve, humans are given dominion over the 
Earth, as humans are created in the image of God. As Lynn White has argued in his study of the 
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rise of farming technologies, practices that aimed toward mastery over the environment,18 these 
values contributed to the anthropocentrism that came to dominate Western culture. These ideas 
took deeper hold in Enlightenment thinking, exemplified by René Descartes, who argued that the 
realms of mind and matter are separate. Furthermore, since the human is the only animal gifted 
with rational thought, it was their right and duty to tame and master nonhuman animals and 
matter for their own benefit, a thought that has taken deep root and been mobilized to support 
capitalist ideologies.19 Of course, the notion of nature is not uniformly dangerous, but the idea is 
embedded in Western culture and can be used for negative effect. As Morton points out, “since 
the Romantic period, nature has been used to support the capitalist theory of value and to 
undermine it; to point out what is intrinsically human, and to exclude the human; to inspire 
kindness and compassion, and to justify competition and cruelty.”20 Nature might inspire 
generosity toward the environment, but it might simultaneously justify greed as “human nature” 
or corporate waste as “natural” and therefore impossible to shift. While stuck within a myopic 
worldview that privileges all that is “natural,” one cannot see any other possibilities for ways of 
being in the world.21 It must be noted that modern science and many non-Western belief-systems 
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provide evidence and models of thought that support the notion of entangled ontologies, where 
the human exists of, with, and among nature. In political ecology scholar Heather Alberro’s 
article, “Humanity and nature are not separate,” she makes reference to Australian and 
Amerindian indigenous belief systems as examples where nonhumans are thought of as kin.22 
But within popular thought in contemporary Western culture, these are two-thousand-year-old 
thought structures that require dismantling.  
 
The limits of nature: hyperobjects to think beyond 
In order to dismantle the governing concepts separating the human from Nature and 
environment, different concepts must be developed and incorporated into normative thought. 
Indeed, the concept of Nature is profoundly limiting for a contemporary worldview that attempts 
to work through our current eco-panic, because it is a false nostalgia, looking backward and 
yearning for something that was never there in the first place. Therefore, any attempt to restore a 
pristine nature, to save it or reclaim access to it, is destined to fail because the very notion is not 
based in reality. Further, continued attempts at this goal are taking energy away from 
productively finding ways to improve habits and relations among things as they currently are.  
 
The task is how to reimagine the human relationship to their surroundings – and inversely to 
imagine how our nonhuman surroundings act upon the human in ways that decenter the human 
from thought, shifting our understanding of both time and causality. Applying an understanding 
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of the object developed through OOO to environment, while keeping in mind the critique of 
nature above, offers one method with which to consider the term. For Morton this is what he 
terms the “hyperobject.” Hyperobjects are things that are around us and “are massively 
distributed in time and space relative to humans.”23 Their wide-scale and granular distribution as 
well as their intimacy with humans connects them with the idea of atmosphere. The 
characteristics defining all OOO objects still apply to these hyperobjects. First, the environment 
is a singular, whole entity, with elements that are accessible to human beings through sensory 
means. But, the environment also has withdrawn elements that no other object is capable of 
perceiving. However, the immense scale of hyperobjects creates specific effects, which relate to 
the human in a variety of noteworthy ways and aid in conceptualizing human relationality to 
such a vast object. First, a hyperobject is “viscous” in that it sticks to other objects; it intimately 
and consistently affects and transforms them. The viscous hyperobject is always in sticky 
relations with other objects, never “over there” or “away.”24 Second, the hyperobject is nonlocal, 
and further upsets the very notion of there being a sense of locality and differentiations between 
the general and particular. For instance, in the case of water, the particular makeup of the water 
in one bay in Japan will ultimately mix with the water across the globe in New Orleans. The 
particular of one local place is also the general, becoming the particular in other places as well. 
Third, the hyperobject involves temporalities that humans are not used to. Hyperobjects do not 
exist forever, but “offer instead a very large finitude.”25 In such a vast temporality, cause and 
effect works differently, where the cause or the effect might show itself through different 
generations of humans. One example includes the preference of green ground cover in California 
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forests to please John Muir’s aesthetic predilection for green in the early 1900s, which could be 
agential in the strength of forest fires in the 2010s. Or, in 1938 a Dupont chemist discovered the 
slippery perfluorooctanoic acid eventually developed and sold as Teflon, essentially creating a 
hyperobject that by 2007 would appear as traces in the blood of the entirety of the general 
population in the US.26 As these examples exhibit, the hyperobject is concrete and measurable, 
even if beyond conventional and fathomable human scale. Finally, hyperobjects exhibit effects 
interobjectively, in an interobjective system Morton calls “the mesh.”27 Humans are just one 
among the myriad objects that make up the mesh.  
 
The notion of the hyperobject grounds my conception of atmosphere as an object—specifically, a 
performing object in the theatre space. Understanding atmospheres, both the theatre atmosphere 
and the larger atmosphere of the earth, as objects is helpful in understanding their substantial 
material presence, agentic capacity, and intimacy with the human. Many calls for ecological 
awareness and ecoconscious thinking ask for the dissolving of boundaries, of inside and outside, 
of here and there. But, this train of thought is still working from a foundation of binary 
categories; working to dissolve a boundary requires much thinking about the boundary itself and 
therefore implicitly reinforcing that boundary. Furthermore, the human that has developed within 
the Western tradition feels their own selfhood, grounding their experience from their located 
perspective that is often distinct from their environment. The human feels as one object within a 
larger object—a hyperobject. Perhaps ecological conversations might begin here, where the 
human can remain an embodied human, with the aid of Morton’s thinking to take us into the 
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possibility of expanded awareness and distributed intimacy. The notion of the hyperobject 
supports the idea of a single, whole human object, while simultaneously saturating the human 
with points of connection with the object it finds itself within. Furthermore, it pushes our 
thinking into different temporalities. In Morton’s words, hyperobjects “disorient normative 
concepts such as ‘present,’ ‘life,’ ‘human,’ ‘nature,’ ‘thing,’ ‘thought,’ and ‘logic.’”28 They also 
disrupt common notions of cause and effect, and control, which by extension means that the very 
notion of human mastery or any controlling agency is troubled. The hyperobject is essential in 
that it helps us think outside the concept of human as master (where the human is at the top of a 
hierarchy, using their environment as tools). The human cannot master such an object that spans 
beyond the human’s ability to perceive, and must allow for different models of power. This 
brings to the fore an important question: how is it that humans perceive hyperobjects? Where do 
these points of access occur? Following the logic of the object, these points of access are found 
in the ways that the objects’ aesthetic elements radiate outward to create sensual encounters with 
other objects. The aesthetic elements of each object are what intertwine with the surrounding 
environment. The aesthetic functions here entirely differently from its tradition in philosophy, 
following Kant and Adorno, as a concern with the creation of art, beauty, and taste. Rather, when 
approached from ecology, “the new resulting aesthetics is concerned with the relation between 
environmental qualities and human states.”29  
 
Indeed, the aesthetic aspects of objects, which are the elements that radiate outward and into the 
human’s sensory capacity, are part of what constitutes the atmosphere. Atmosphere is something 
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intangible, ephemeral, and mysterious in that it exists through the interaction of a variety of 
elements. Thankfully, this intangibility cannot easily be rendered into picturesque scenes or 
decontextualized images, as the atmosphere requires active contribution from the human to 
create an event that disappears. Nor does the notion of atmosphere lead to nostalgically rendered 
representations of a pure “Nature,” as in the case of the environment’s green landscapes, thanks 
in part to popular associations between the atmosphere and atmospheric pollution and global 
warming. There is no pristine original to be grasped and returned to, while unfolding changes are 
already in process. Furthermore, the notion of atmosphere is intrinsically intimate—it includes 
the very air we breathe instinctively, becoming part of us whether we are aware or not. In an 
atmosphere, the human is one of the many objects radiating affect while simultaneously taking it 
in.  
 
There is a twofold logic that brings the role of arts into this pursuit toward nonanthropocentric 
models of thinking about the atmosphere. First, the arts are a realm in which alternative 
relationalities between human and nonhuman objects can be modeled. The generative potential 
for these models is heightened due to the fact that the arts work with the very same tools we are 
trying to understand—namely, sensual qualities that render objects agential. And because art 
offers a creative space where new rules for new worlds can be envisioned, the world onstage can 
be nonanthropocentric world. As Morton eloquently frames it, “Art is thought from the future. 
Thought we cannot explicitly think at present. Thought we may not think or speak at all. If we 
want thought different from the present, then thought must veer toward art.”30 Second, arts 
inherently encode space and invoke a particular worldview. Close reading methods help to 
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discern the ideologies encoded within texts, and other art forms. However, there are ambient 
qualities in any artwork. And if we are attuned to the environment, we can consider the arts 
“with an eye to ecology, no matter what their content.”31 Every work inevitably communicates a 
worldview, which concerns the human’s relationality to their environment. “Ideological 
determination depends not just upon the content and form of an artwork or rhetorical device, but 
also upon the subject position that it establishes. The artwork hails us.”32 Therefore, I consider 
both the production and affective nature of atmospheres in theatre for the futures the production 
envisions, and the way the production hails the human into a subject position.  
 
Gernot Böhme and the aesthetics of atmosphere  
The atmosphere can be helpfully understood as the location and production of interobjective 
interactions. Gernot Böhme’s conception of atmosphere highlights atmosphere as something in-
between and in tension. It occurs among subjects and objects but does not belong to either. It is 
not locatable but occurs within a space. It moves and develops, but it is both finite and 
ephemeral. These tensions invite a multilayered discussion that must account for both subject 
and object, and production and reception. Atmosphere offers a means to account for more stable 
and embodied materiality as well as the material nature of affective intensities. Indeed, it is a 
place where the material meets the abstract. Furthermore, Böhme’s theories of atmosphere are of 
great relevance to theatre studies, for their attention to the ways in which one might build 








By highlighting the collaborative nature of atmosphere’s actualization, objects’ agential impact 
on the human comes into view. Böhme describes atmosphere as “a typical intermediate 
phenomenon, something between subject and object.”33 Atmosphere is a marker of collaboration, 
requiring at least two objects to come together and create. Atmospheres are thus evidence of an 
objects’ agency, which aids in creating this highly affective force. Furthermore, atmospheres 
stand outside the binary divide of subject and object previously discussed. The atmosphere is 
neither here nor there, you nor me, but something existing between and linking the two (and 
more) together. As Böhme describes, “atmospheres are always spatially ‘without borders, 
disseminated and yet without place that is, not localizable.’ They are affective powers of feeling, 
spatial bearers of moods.”34 The materiality of specific objects creates elements that radiate 
outward, where the object’s presence is articulated through these elements that can create 
profound affects. These elements belong neither to the object from which the qualities proceed, 
nor the subject (or object) perceiving them. Rather, they are sensed. In other words, they occur in 
the act of sensing, joining the otherwise discrete objects together through this event. Thus 
conceived, the atmosphere is an object created collaboratively through other objects. And 
notably, it offers a place to witness and consider an object that exists outside strict ideas of time, 
place, and cause and effect.  
 
While the agential impact of objects in the atmosphere is clear, the human is still quite influential 
in this collaboration, so that the human’s responsibility does not diminish. Of course, the 
atmosphere, with this emphasis on affective qualities, requires one who receives the affect. As 
																																																								
33 Gernot Böhme, “The art of the stage set as a paradigm for an aesthetics of atmospheres,” 
Ambiances, 10 February 2013, http://journals.openedition.org/ambiances/315, 2. 
34 Böhme, “The Art of the stage set,” 7. 
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philosophers Böhme and Ben Anderson35 both emphasize, one can approach a study of 
atmosphere from the side of production aesthetics or reception aesthetics. Regarding reception, 
atmosphere has often been thought of as a force that has the power to induce certain moods in a 
subject, appearing as something nebulous and irrational. Yet, as set design, environmental art, 
and architecture prove, there are distinct elements that take part in generating the atmosphere. 
One such element is the human—another object activating and adding to the atmosphere. Rather 
than a sense of labor and purposeful action, the bare presence of the human subject takes part in 
the collaboration. Like a feedback loop, then, the subject receives what they have already added 
to, which occurs to different degrees. One can open oneself to mindfully receive the affect, but 
the human organism will inherently be affected by the materiality of the space either way. As 
Böhme notes, “one must expose oneself.”36 To “expose” rightfully notes a sense of vulnerability 
in this event; the human cannot control the interaction. However, the ways in which the subject 
participates is affected by the individual’s mode of perception instilled through culture and habit.  
 
Another element of the human’s responsibility falls on the side of production aesthetics, as the 
atmosphere arises in part due to the material conditions of the place, which the human can 
influence. While the atmosphere is certainly without borders, it is not something that is free 
floating or unattached. Rather, it is “something that proceeds from and is created by things, 
persons or their constellations.”37 In staged events,38 therefore, the atmosphere can be affected 
through the manipulation of these material conditions, such as objects, sounds, apparatus, and 
																																																								
35 Ben Anderson, “Affective Atmospheres,” Emotion, Space and Society 2 (2009).	
36 Böhme, “The art of the stage set,” 3. 
37 Ibid., 11. 
38 While the staged events in focus here include theatre and performance, the staged nature of 
much of 21st century life also applies, including political rallies, sporting events, shops and 
marketplaces, etc.  
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light. Böhme calls these material conditions “generators,”39 as they aid in the generation of 
phenomena. Böhme’s use of the term “phenomena” to describe atmosphere both situates 
atmosphere as an aspect of phenomenology, occurring through its perception, as well as its status 
as an event. Indeed, atmospheres are shifting, contingent and unstable. “Atmospheres are 
perpetually forming and deforming, appearing and disappearing, as bodies enter into relation 
with one another. They are never finished, static or at rest.”40  
 
The atmosphere within the theatre space works in the same way as larger atmospheres, but on a 
smaller scale. While atmosphere may seem unfixed and ethereal, its material foundation grounds 
its presence in a specific space and time. The atmosphere is made in the very space in which it 
appears, where the space itself is among the many objects radiating its own aesthetic qualities. 
Indeed, the very word “atmosphere” stems from Greek “atmos,” or vapor, and “sphaira,” or 
globe, where “globe” indicates a specific space, or a fixed sphere of influence.41 Anderson 
asserts that an atmosphere’s characteristic form is diffusion within a sphere. While the 
atmosphere and its affective properties proceed from and are produced by objects, they are not 
irreducible to them, as the diffusion pattern creates something else while interacting in the 
space—a singular affective quality. It is through this affective quality that the atmosphere creates 
an intensive space-time, which exceeds lived or conceived space-time.42 The singular affective 
quality and resulting space-time “creates a space of intensity that overflows a represented world 
																																																								
39 Böhme, “The art of the stage set,” 3. 
40 Anderson, “Affective Atmospheres,” 79.	




42 See Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, [1953] 1973). 
	
	 187	
organized into subject and objects or subjects and other subjects.”43 The overflow here is 
twofold, as the represented world onstage spills over into the audience’s space, and the 
conventional rules of the represented world are overwhelmed by this intensity. 
 
Performance is a valuable site to understand the workings of atmosphere, especially as the 
understandings of atmosphere discussed here provocatively pair with discussions of the ontology 
of performance, especially in the rise of performance studies, as they support arguments 
concerning the nature of liveness, presence, and ephemerality as the foundations of 
performance.44 A study in theatrical atmosphere more specifically hones in on a consideration of 
inter-relationality, looking at ways that the theatrical atmospheres touch the human body. Erika 
Fischer-Lichte includes atmospheres in her larger discussion of the performative dimension of 
materiality and its transformative potential in theatre. She focuses most specifically on the 
invisible, intangible elements of the atmosphere, such as smell, light and sound, with special 
attention to the material effects of these elements on the audience’s body. For instance, Fischer-
Lichte finds that “spectators exposed to continuous changes of light will find their disposition 
changing frequently and abruptly without being able to consciously register, even less control 
these swings.”45 What Fischer-Lichte describes is precisely the confluence of the material and 
affective. Design elements such as light and sound are the most apparent actors in the 
atmosphere, as they most clearly and literally radiate outward. They are objects seen obliquely – 
light by the level of visibility it grants other objects, air by the audibility of its motion through 
objects, sound through the vibrations created in other objects. Furthermore, they are objects that 
create physical effects in the human body, asserting their presence in the body’s very materiality. 
																																																								
43 Anderson, “Affective Atmospheres,” 79. 
44 As in Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
45 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance, 119.	
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They draw attention to a shared presence in space and time, and the specific emergence of this 
performance event. As Fischer-Lichte argues, “spectators become aware of their own 
corporeality in atmospheric spaces. They experience themselves as living organisms involved in 
an exchange with their environments.”46 This is important because it makes the audience aware 
of themselves as other objects within the space, perhaps even other objects active in the creation 
of this emergent atmosphere. 
 
While theatre’s attention to presence and liveness aids in making atmosphere palpable, 
contemporary theatrical examples often engage the form in order to comment upon the form 
itself—in other words, create an atmosphere to think about atmosphere. Peter Eckersall, Helena 
Grehan, and Edward Scheer consider the agency of the atmosphere as an integral component of 
new media dramaturgy. They think more profoundly about the ways in which the atmosphere is 
related to the audience than Fischer-Lichte, in that the agency of the audience’s materiality is 
also affective. “Atmosphere is the feeling we have when we enter a space and it is also the way 
in which both we and the space are altered or changed by this experience. It can also be a public 
feeling that we share with others or even a material force that emerges to alter our mood. […] 
atmosphere has agency.”47 Their work shows how atmosphere is made visible in live 
performance and their case studies include art works using clouds, fog, mist, haze, and smoke as 
performing objects. The formless entities shapeshift, move without boundaries, and touch the 
audience, at times literally immersing them. These art works are provocative as they are 
																																																								
46 Ibid., 119. 
47 Peter Eckersall, Helena Grehan, Edward Scheer, New Media Dramaturgy: Performance, 
Media, and New Materialism (London, Palgrave Macmillan: 2016), 81. 
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“developing micro versions of the earth’s troposphere,”48 bringing a vast hyperobject to a scale 
that is tangible and easier to understand, where that hyperobject’s affective qualities can be put in 
focus. 
 
I am interested in theatre’s potential to play with scale and focus to make atmosphere more 
visible, as a means toward understanding the nature of atmosphere, and perhaps more 
importantly, the ways in which humans are implicated and affective in the creation of 
atmosphere. Theatre crafts atmosphere, whether or not this is a dramaturgical goal. Indeed, 
theatricality involves an awareness of the audience, where the audience’s presence and response 
is taken into account. But, the atmosphere is not only aware of the audience, but actively created 
through the audience, so that the audience presence is a necessary component. Thus, atmosphere 
offers a way to consider the agential nature of the sheer presence of the human in the ongoing 
mattering of their surroundings, in a theatre space, but also in the world, as well as the value of 
honing sensitivity towards those surroundings. I approach the following two performances, 
which are explicit in their eco-critical viewpoints to different degrees, for how they imagine the 
human’s position in the atmosphere, and how they implicate their human audience within their 
own atmospheric generation.  
 
Something (out of nothing): Staging the End of the World 
My first atmospheric case study discusses Kris Verdonck’s Something (out of nothing), which 
premiered in May, 2019, at the Kunstenfestivaldesarts in Brussels, Belgium.49 The performance, 
which features contemporary dance, sound, performing objects, and a voice-over text, presents a 
																																																								
48 Ibid., 82-83.	
49 I attended in May, 2019, at the Spring Festival in Utrecht, Netherlands.  
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case study of affective intensity, created through specific dramaturgical generation of 
atmosphere, which engulfs the entirety of the theatre space. Drawing loosely from noh theatre, 
Samuel Beckett, and Walter Benjamin’s concept of the “angel of history,” it is a dance work that 
explores the state of mind when faced with extinction. Verdonck describes the piece as a 
reflection on what it means “to live after the end, like a ghost that is alienated from its 
environment.”50 The performance proceeds in three parts, organized through introductory texts, 
which move from a distanced narration of a post-apocalyptic condition, into a recounting of 
destruction, and finally into a poetic telling of a lived experience of the end. The performance 
explores human alienation from the environment, and the effective agency the nonhuman actors 
have on the human, even if the human is completely unaware of their presence. While the human 
figures on stage, who appear more as specters of human life, exhibit an unawareness of their 
staged environment, the human experience in the audience is markedly different, as the audience 
is made acutely aware of the nonhuman actors alongside the human. Indeed, the audience 
watches as bulbous performing objects loom over the human figures. The audience therefore 
witnesses the experience of alienation while the specters search for meaning, unsuccessfully. 
And yet, the performance does not linger in or indulge the melancholy atmosphere of alienation. 
Rather, the piece moves through the frustration of denial and resistance but ultimately finds “as 
in a mourning process—acceptance.”51 Something (out of nothing) dramatizes extinction and an 
end, calling for a withdrawal from action by referencing all the destruction human action has 
accomplished. The possibility of human absence is imagined, and yet we are still here in the 
theatre space, still doing something. We are performing our presence, but with a passivity and 
																																																								
50 A Two Dogs Theatre Company, “Something (out of nothing),” n.d., 
http://www.atwodogscompany.org/en/projects/item/410-something?bckp=1.	
51 Ibid.  
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acceptance that contrasts with the neoliberal mandate to perform…or else.52 Instead, the 
performance suggests that one might sit back and perform, anyway. 
 
Figure 10. An object hangs over the figure in section three of Something (out of nothing). Photo 
by Bas de Brouwer. 
 
Human agency within a Species 
The figures on stage in Something (out of nothing) do not appear as individuals or specific 
subjects with particular characteristics. Rather, the ghost-like figures appear more as members of 
a group, or representatives of something larger: the human species facing human extinction. The 
human species can be understood as a hyperobject, much too vastly spread across time and space 
to understand through normative understandings of presence or cause and effect. In fact, Morton 
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explains the species as a spectral object: “Contemporary science allows us to think species not as 
absolutely nonexistent, but as floating, spectral entities that are not directly, constantly present. 
Spectral is in some senses cognate with species.”53 The concept of species troubles the notion of 
the individual’s agency, as the individual is both independent while also existing as one within a 
larger object. But the individual’s agency remains a part of the larger object’s agency, and all 
effects created by the larger object (species) are the sum of the smaller parts. Thus, a sense of 
accumulation accompanies individual action. This troubling of the difference between individual 
and species factors into eco-critical conversations attempting to cultivate a sense of individual 
responsibility, as the individual becomes implicated in the environment as a species. Indeed, 
Morton links the species/specter directly to ecological awareness more generally, as species and 
ecology are similarly difficult to define in time and space. “One is unsure whether a specter is 
material or illusory, visible, or invisible.”54 Similarly, one is unsure if one’s actions are 
immediately, materially agential, or if they will become agential in the years to come, in ways 
entirely unimagined. Likewise, we are living with the specters of the past, still effected by their 
actions, and indelibly linked to them through the human species. 
 
The notion of the human species evoked by the spectral figures onstage signal a question of 
temporality, as the species-wide accumulation of the individual’s relatively minute actions 
cannot be measured on an individual human scale. It is often hard to comprehend the long-term 
effects the smallest actions might grow to have, and this inability to perceive cause and effect on 
such a vast scale is a part of our challenge as a human species in the struggle in implementing 
eco-conscious practices. As Morton also argues, “We can only perceive things after they have 
																																																								




arisen, never before and never at exactly the same time. In this sense, all experience is only a 
passing memory.”55 Like Benjamin’s “angel of history,” the full scope of human effects, and 
their destruction, is only perceivable when looking backward. This is one of the many 
contributors to the discordant relationality between the human species and the atmosphere; we 
are not skilled in perceiving on the same scale in which nonhumans act, or the scale in which our 
own actions’ effects are fully realized. The atmosphere built in Something (out of nothing) 
echoes these concerns—causality, temporality, scale—and their sometimes estranging effect that 
keeps the human species disconnected from their surroundings. And it is precisely this sense of 
disconnection that leaves the human feeling incomplete, unfulfilled, and ineffectual. Following 
the structure of noh drama,56 the ghostlike figure in Something (out of nothing) returns to address 
its unfinished business, ultimately seeking a sense of peace with the world through a lack of 
worldly attachments. If there is any sense of progression in Verdonck’s three parts, it emerges as 
the figures seek a more peaceful relationship with their atmosphere, turning inward to admit the 
effects of their own state of mind as a species. 
 
Generating Atmosphere in Something (out of nothing) 
The performance begins with a sense of absence. After the audience takes their seats, the 
proscenium stage remains barren and immersed in a colorless, low light. Upstage right sits a 
																																																								
55 Morton, Ecology without Nature, 68. 
56 Traditional noh drama is structured in three parts: introduction, development, and conclusion. 
Following the aesthetic principle of jo-ha-kyū, the play begins with a slow tempo, then speeds 
up, and culminates at the top of a crescendo. This tempo is produced in part through ambient 
music of instruments and chants, and the purposeful movement of the dancers, who are masked. 
The topic of noh dramas traditionally focus on a person who has died, but who has unfinished 
business and cannot reincarnate, and therefore returns as a ghost. The third section ends in a 
reflection and prayer that the audience is asked to resolve. Mikiko Ishii, “The Noh Theater: 
Mirror, Mask, and Madness,” Comparative Drama 28, 1 (1994): 43-66.	
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musician, Leila Bourdreuil, barely visible through the shadow seated on a low platform with 
cello in her arms. Then, a disembodied feminine voice speaks through a recording, haunting the 
dark stage as a sound object that is disconnected from its source. Without the source, the voice 
becomes an “acousmatic experience” in that the audience experiences the materiality and effects 
of the sound within the body perceiving it, rather than its creation.57 Each of the three sections 
begins this way, with the disembodied nature of the voice drawing attention to the absence of the 
source of the sound, and the presence of the audience’s body. The subject matter of the narration 
further supports this sense of absence, as images of destruction are conveyed. The voice begins, 
“Look. From up here I can see everything. I am looking toward the past. I am like a bird keeping 
watch.”58 Even though the voice is human, the words proclaim a nonhuman perspective; perhaps 
Benjamin’s angel, or another bird-like form. The voice goes on to talk of tragedy, fear, and 
wreckage. Two phrases noticeably repeat: “In this place we say walls have ears and rocks have 
mouths;” and “What is done cannot be undone.”59 In the second section, the voice again reports 
on images of destruction, as the bees, moles, beetles, and worms all disappear. In the third 
section, the voice has shed its grammatical structure and instead conveys images of trauma: “no 
refuge. open mouth. black. wreckage. cold white face. toward the heated earth.”60 In each, 
themes of uncontrollable time emerge as the voice looks backward and forward at what appears 
to be inevitable. The voice mourns this, acting as witness to the different forms of life coming to 
realize what is happening, and ultimately surrendering to the force of death.  
																																																								
57 See Brian Kane, “Pierre Schaeffer, the Sound Object, and the Acousmatic Experience,” in 
Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice, 15-44 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
58 Kristof van Baarle, “Something (out of nothing): Notes on the text,” in Machine Made Silence: 
The Art of Kris Verdonck, ed. Peter Eckersall and Kristof van Baarle, 165-167 (Aberystwyth: 






While the stage’s barrenness comes to feel apocalyptic and otherworldly, the narration is firmly 
rooted in references of this world, continually asserting the relevance of this staged experience in 
the world outside the theatrical frame. Inspiration for the text comes from sources including 
W.G. Sebald’s On the Natural History of Destruction (1999), Svetlana Alexievich’s Chernobyl 
Prayer: A Chronicle of the future (1997), Curzio Malaparte’s Kaputt (1944), Masuji Ibuse’s 
Black Rain (1965), and bits from newspapers. Perhaps the most conventional narrative element 
ends the first section: a fable written by Jesse Miles and compiled by the Dark Mountain 
Project.61 In this fable, a community has long lived with the belief that spirits will kill you if you 
cut down a tree. The community heeds this rule faithfully for thousands of years, until one day a 
man buys a chainsaw and cuts down one palm tree. He doesn’t die. When the others see this, 
they eventually follow his lead and also cut down trees. The voice tells us “they all lived happily 
ever after.”  
 
This framing fable coalesces many themes suggested in the first section of text that continue to 
develop in the piece. First, a posthuman sense of temporality is suggested through the 
juxtaposition of the fable’s “happily ever after,” and the delivery of this story through a 
disembodied voice who has just informed us of so much destruction. For the humans who cut 
down the tree; yes, they will live happily ever after, as death from natural causes will occur in the 
typical human timeframe. However, the question of what will happen in future generations, 
though not explicitly stated, lingers. Furthermore, the consequences of these human actions on 
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the future of the trees, and the future of the tree spirits, are not included in this “happily ever 
after” narrative. And finally, while the community does not believe themselves to be punished or 
harmed by the disappearance of trees, this change in their environment will forever change them. 
For one, this story, a myth reflective of their culture and effective in its guiding agency, will now 
disappear along with the trees. Without the trees, the human community has forever changed, 
and the long-term effects of this on their wellbeing, and their very identity, are yet unknown.  
 
Whereas the voice conjures a sense of absence, Verdonck implements strange performing objects 
whose material presence add to the production’s atmosphere. In each of the three sections, large, 
sculptural objects descend to hover over the stage from the above. The first, which appears alone 
and center stage, slowly creeps down from the rafters, inflating to grow slowly but steadily in its 
bulbous shape until finally, it erupts into a behemoth. It rests there, and then eventually recedes, 
drawing back upon itself. In each section, the number of objects grows until they overwhelm the 
stage space. The shape of the object is unfamiliar, undeniably strange. It is made of dark 
material, coming to eventually inhabit a spiky, cactus-like form. Their slow movement and 
bulbous nature led me to imagine a deep-sea creature, in my own attempt to make sense of the 
object. However, the object does not connote the stereotypical idea of “natural,”62 instead 
echoing natural images but making them strange, even uncanny. The object is an example of the 
unnatural nature, upsetting the conventional rhetoric device of “Nature.” It is a manmade object, 
not designed to represent any biological form on the stage, but contributing to the atmosphere 
and becoming an indelible part of the environment nonetheless.  
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The ways in which the object moves add to the atmosphere created through visibly agential 
objects that draw attention to the limits of human agency. They appear to move onstage 
according to their own devices, like an algorithm that is constructed and programmed but then 
follows through and continues to develop on its own. The object grows slowly, and the way that 
it unfurls, as well as the moment of its eruption, evolves from the elements of the object itself. 
The object, therefore, performs on stage just as so many objects perform in our environments—
surpassing their initial purpose or design and going on to develop an agency beyond the human’s 
ability to plan for or control. Consider, for instance, the ways in which a seed grows from 
nothing, eventually able to multiply by spreading more tiny seeds. That this object would hang 
over the human specters onstage, invisible while in plain sight, serves as a strong reference to 
Western culture’s blindness toward the growing effect of objects within our own environment.  
 
The object’s movement stages the experience of the human’s inability to fully perceive the ways 
in which objects work in real time. Due to the stage’s low-lighting, paired with the object’s blue 
hue against a black stage and its markedly slow pace of movement, the sculpture is nearly 
indiscernible at first. Indeed, it is hard to pinpoint beginnings and endings, or even any specific 
moments of alteration. Yet, once the change has occurred, it is obvious and impossible to ignore. 
What the audience is able to see is the mark of an event already passed. Further referencing the 
workings of nonhuman actors in the world, what begins as something small, considered to be 
inconsequential or not worth attention, grows beyond the point of return. When it is suddenly 




The bulbous moving structures are weird and exhibit weirdness, where “weird” refers to “strange 
of appearance;” and “weirdness means the turning of causality,”63 further staging alternate 
models to normative cause and effect, time progression, and perception.  Notably, Verdonck 
calculates and employs this weirdness in a manner that problematizes normative binary notions 
of cause and effect. As the objects creep forward, appear and disappear, and multiply, they do so 
in no apparent pattern or causal system. Any sense of their beginning and end, in space and time, 
are further blurred. The inability to make out the nascent object in the moment that it arrives 
onstage, or points of reference in the object’s growth, makes defining the boundaries or ontology 
of the object more complicated. The object is not always immediately accessible, as in it is not 
always immediately perceivable, nor is it ever complete or static. Yet, the object still undeniably 
exists, whether visible, receding, or haunting in its absence. As the object receded, my own eye 
saw an afterimage, the negative outline of the object that appears after staring at the image for a 
period of time. The objects’ constant shifting, and our inability to perceive their details and 
nuances, provides an experiential replica of objects in our daily environment, helpfully 
supporting the notion that one does not have to see something for it to be real. In efforts toward 
ecological thinking, it is helpful to expand the imagination to deem objects that are not 
immediately perceivable, whether due to the limits of human perception or the strictures of 
human time, as real nonetheless. Because real objects are agential, and accounting for the 
agential presence of these invisible objects helps us expand thought beyond the anthropocentric. 
Like the present absence evoked by the disembodied voice, perhaps the absent presence evoked 
through the objects’ looming, potentiality, and ghosting could also be considered present 
agentially.  
																																																								




The human dancers appear onstage as another embodiment of the “weird” spectral. While the 
figures’ costumes change in each of the three parts, their face and skin are always covered. As 
dramaturg Kristof van Baarle describes, “Wearing black masks and velvet black bodysuits, these 
are objectified creatures without a face, almost without a body that would give them a persona. 
The figures in Something are shadows, silhouettes, negative outlines. They disturb not only the 
subject-object, but also the absence-presence divide.”64 They do not engage with their 
atmosphere as full individuals, nor do they engage with Bordreuil, always seated upstage. Instead 
they seem to exist as if in a bubble all to themselves. 
 
 
Figure 11. Figures during section two of Something (out of nothing). Photo by Kristof Vrancken. 
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The actions of the figures echo the themes suggested by the objects, adding to a long view of 
time and strange causality beyond the scale of the individual, while still asserting the connection 
of the figures to our world. The figures enact a study in movement, testing their bodies’ abilities 
through various jumps, squats, and poses. A sense of accumulation is reflected in the figures’ 
choreography, as each individual adds an infinitesimal action to the growing score: one jump, 
one squat, one flex of the fingers. The action is so small it feels inconsequential in the moment 
that it occurs. And yet, once it is taken up by others, repeated and built upon, a substantial score 
is created. The lineage of each movement becomes impossible to track, although we saw each 
movement originate. Thus, the agency of the group and the individual meld, as the figure and the 
larger species work simultaneously to build these habits. In the first section, two wear male-
gendered business wear, khaki dress pants and matching suit jackets, while the two other figures 
wear female-gendered business casual: collared dresses in complementary pink floral designs. 
The nature of these costumes irrevocably links the figures to the contemporary world, but more 
specifically to the white-collar class of a capitalist society. Their trivial repetitive movements 
therefore take on an absurdist quality, seeming to comment upon the arbitrary nature of the 
white-collar workers’ routines, and by extension, culture. The building momentum of the score, 
as the figures learn from each other, join in, and add on, also takes on a political commentary, as 
we watch learned behaviors being passed on, while noting those behaviors’ random inception. 
Thus, the choreography suggests the figures’ nature as untethered from deeper meaning and 
purpose, rendering them into spectral entities due to their estrangement. 
 
In the second section, the figures wear uniform over-sized tan button-up shirts, drawing further 
away from the everyday world. Here, some of their playfulness is gone, replaced instead with a 
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sense of desperation, perhaps violence, or maybe just restlessness. They make more physical 
contact with each other, sometimes bumping or manically waving for attention. Remnants of the 
previous choreography emerge, as if embedded in their bodies and appearing unconsciously, but 
this old choreography does nothing to change the mood on the stage. The number of sculptural 
objects increases, as if the initial object has multiplied and invaded the environment, but still the 
figures do not acknowledge the presence of these nonhuman neighbors.  
 
The third section is even more stylized than the first two, showing influence of noh drama in the 
use of masks, as well as an altered tone in which the figures perform in a more relaxed, peaceful 
state, much like noh’s final section of reflection. The figures appear without their contemporary 
dress, instead wearing white masks with objects radiating from the face. For instance, one mask 
included white feathers around the face like a sunburst, while another appeared to have flowers 
around the face. In the performance I attended, the figures remained in their black bodysuits, but 
with the headpiece removed. In later iterations of the production, the figures reveal their skin in 
shorts and long sleeve shirts.  The temporal relationship between part three and the prior acts is 
productively muddled. On the one hand, the figures call to mind the tree spirits of the framing 
myth, as they are otherworldly yet linked to the environment through the objects in their masks. 
On the other hand, the figures could just as well represent a later generation of the human we 
saw in the previous time, but figures who have attempted to renew a relationship with their 
environment or bring back the disappeared spirits through their own ritual or embodied practice 
and fetishistic use of organic objects. In part three, the overwhelming presence of the bulbous 
objects is even more striking. This time they are all black, with borders that are even harder to 
make out, but they proliferate from the rafters to such an extent that they take over the stage, 
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becoming ubiquitous. Indeed, it feels as if now these objects are the environment, and the figures 
below guests. 
 
An additional and integral element effective in the creation of atmosphere is the use of sound 
throughout the entirety of the performance, which eventually expands in intensity to display the 
intimacy of the atmosphere more literally on the audience’s bodies. An ongoing soundscape by 
Leila Bordreuil and an automated drum fills the theatre space. The durational noise alternates 
between intense volume that quite literally saturates the theatre as well as more subtle tones that 
play with intervals of silence and space. Like the gradual, imperceptible movement of the 
objects, the alterations in tone also shift slowly, so that their change is barely noticeable until it 
has already happened. However, in the end, the sound fills the theatre space to capacity. The 
stage is black, and Bordreuil’s work with the cello has increased in intensity. Then, she puts 
down the cello and begins to manipulate the chord, wrestling it with her whole body to produce a 
feedback that takes over. This sound grows in volume and intensity, with a squealing, scratching, 
and thundering all at once. The sound was so affronting that many in the audience covered their 
ears, reflecting the intensity with tension in their own body, ducking down in their seats and 
bowing their heads. Many also left the theatre. In this final moment, the urgency of the 
environment’s affects, its clamorous insistence, provokes response in many of the audience. This 
is especially noteworthy after watching the figures remain unaware of their environment for so 
long. Even our own eyes were unable to perceive changes in the environment in real time. But 




As this description of the performance outlines, any clear sense of cause and effect or progress is 
missing, instead offering a different way of thinking about time and causality. Here, time appears 
more looped than linear, or as van Baarle describes, like a Mobius strip.65 There is no first or last 
among the three parts, and perhaps the more mythical figures of part three are both an end and a 
beginning, or rather a continuance, to the species’ relationship with their environment. 
Furthermore, no matter which comes earlier or later, both past and future potentials are always 
haunting the present. As the narrating voice says, “I look at the past, but it is the future. 
Inevitable.”66 This model of time and causality is useful for ecological thinking. While present-
day actions will be agential in the years to come, we are currently affected by actions from 
generations past. The material of our current atmosphere is like a ghost created from past events, 
and we are ghosts for the future. Humans are always responding to our own species in a different 
temporality. Therefore, it may be more helpful to abandon the concept of linear time, and of 
simple cause and effect, for a looping Mobius strip of concentric temporalities. Perhaps then, the 
three parts feel linked but nonlinear because they coincide better with this view of a nested 
series; each of three parts are equally present, each affecting the other.  
 
Performing Presence 
Like the third section of a noh play, which is an act of revelation and ritual, the mood changes in 
the third section of Something, coming to suggest the value of continued performance. The 
figures enact a new ritual in their masks, styled with feathers and flowers, suggesting a greater 
sense of connection or attention to the nonhuman world. Signifiers of contemporary society, such 
as the business clothing, are gone, as are remnants of the movement score from the first and 
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66 van Baarle, “Something (out of nothing): Notes on the text.”  
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second sections. Here, the figures are trying something else, finding meaning and a greater sense 
of ease in their newly developed habits. Due to the figures’ softened tone and more relaxed pace, 
especially in comparison to the previously manic attitude, the atmosphere shifts slightly toward 
something lighter. As hints of joy are palpable in the dancers’ movement, the value of their 
continued performance, and the willingness to break old habits for new techniques emerges, as 
their new tactics lead to a different atmosphere. In fact, the production itself is enacting this very 
suggestion; creating something out of nothing through the act of performance. Indeed, we watch 
the figures continuously perform, for themselves, for each other, and for the audience. They are 
constantly in the act of creation, and this creative labor has instigated the community gathered in 
the theatre space. Something has been created, even if the ephemeral nature of it looks like 
nothing, out of nothing. 
 
While the shift in tone of section three embodies the shifts in atmosphere made possible by 
alterations in the kind of performance contributing to said atmosphere, the final climax in the 
performance’s last moments accomplishes something else: a direct address of the audience’s 
physical presence. This final climax occurs through Leila Bordreuil’s work with the amplified 
cello. Bordreuil experiments with noise music, which is characterized by “abrasive frequencies 
and profuse volume,” producing an aesthetic that can be described as “chaotic, unfamiliar, and 
offensive.”67 The style rejects conventional goals of virtuosity, rather foregrounding liveness and 
participatory interaction between the artist, materials, and audience. For much of the 
performance, Bordreuil responds to her instruments and the other materials onstage, but in the 
final minutes of the production, her sphere expands to account for the entire auditorium. Just as 
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the objects ceased existing as background and insisted on full attention by the audience, so too 
does the sound, which overtakes the entire space; even the figures stop their movement. The 
volume of the cello’s sounds grow until Bordreuil sets down the instrument and stands in order 
to physically wrestle the cable to produce a staggering sound of feedback that obliterates the 
room. The human ear is capable of hearing a range from 20 to 20,000 Hertz,68 but other bodily 
material is affected by frequencies outside this range, whether ultrasonic or infrasonic. 
Therefore, sound is an especially powerful agent, in theater and beyond, for its capacity to 
literally touch and transform the bodies of others in the environment, through its vibrations 
within the body’s materiality. In short, sound creates physical effects. Bordreuil describes the 
physical effect of music as one of her main interests in her own experimental work, often 
referencing the “wall of sound.” She describes, “You can touch the air when there’s that much 
sound.”69 Rather than creating emotional signifiers or demonstrating proficiency on the 
instrument, Bordreuil focuses on the music’s effect on the audience. It is no surprise, then, that 
this final moment of the performance seems to turn its attention directly to the audience, sending 
out sound to envelop them. 
 
In my own experience as an audience member, as the sound grew, I initially felt as if the 
materiality of sound were assaulting me, but eventually the sound became a means that grounded 
my body in the theater space. I could feel the vibrations in my gut, but the scratchy feedback 
sounds felt as if they were piercing my ears, indicating both high and low frequencies vibrating 
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in the space. As the sounds grew, I noted a fear within myself, wondering how far the sounds 
would go, as I was apprehensive if my own body could handle it. And yet, I was at the mercy of 
this environment (and I trusted the artists to not endanger their audience). With this realization, I 
was able to release my own growing tension and apprehension, and allow the sound to envelop 
me. Instead of resistance, I became intensely aware of my physical presence in the theatre space, 
and my body’s proximity to other people and nonhuman objects, all of which were being equally 
affected by these intense frequencies. Because of the sound’s capacity to ground my own self in 
the moment, I became more aware of the environment I had already been a part of for the past 
ninety minutes. 
 
The final onslaught of sound helps to catalyze some of the themes already present within the 
production, as it highlights the physical presence of the audience’s bodies within their 
environment, which in this case is the theatre space. Just as we had witnessed the figures act with 
little awareness of the other nonhuman actors on stage, the sound makes evident the full 
atmosphere of the audience, which was perhaps a more overlooked element up until now. Thus, 
the sound opens up the audience’s perception to their own surroundings. Furthermore, it gives us 
a way to notice the materiality of nonhuman actors, and the ways in which these materials can 
physically affect others. The sound itself is everyday—defuse, distributed, and invasive—rather 
than manipulated into something aesthetically pleasing, or even catering to a human’s perceptive 
abilities. The sound is on a nonhuman scale, further accentuating the atmosphere of which 




The concluding sections of the performance, therefore, offer a sense of peace found through an 
acceptance and awareness of the body’s place, or presence, in the atmosphere. The figures find a 
greater sense of ease in their space when they abandon their costumes of capitalism and release 
their old gestural habits to dance in their masks. Then, the experience of noise, which requires an 
acceptance and submission, also enacts a certain kind of approach to action and performance in 
the audience. In my own experience, I left the performance with a sense of calm, a feeling that 
was also expressed by others in the talkback session with Verdonck and van Baarle. This might 
seem strange, but the sweetness of the release at the end of the show is an affect that has a place 
in ecological understandings. As Morton describes, “dark ecology begins in darkness as 
depression. It traverses darkness as ontological mystery. It ends as dark sweetness.”70 The 
feelings of frustration, anxiety, and helplessness that are expressed through the figures and often 
accompany a response to the current ecological crisis are not the only possible state. Rather, a 
sense of sweetness can be found in the release of oneself, and a turning outward to sense one’s 
environment, in relishing the new structures and relationships that have emerged.  
 
Something (out of nothing) points out the estrangement, and accompanying frustration, that has 
been a feature of human relationality to the hyperobject within which they find themselves. The 
experience of Verdonck’s performance suggests something else—a state characterized by 
acceptance, awareness, and humility, where the human experiences something outside the 
common binary between control and submission. Instead, by becoming one among many 
dispersed agencies, the human might find a liberating sensation in their ambient affiliations. It is 
something different, something fresh outside of our deeply entrenched habits, and so who knows 
																																																								
70 Morton, Dark Ecology, 160. 
	
	 208	
where it might lead. This vision emerges in large part through the way the production creates its 
own atmosphere, and points to the larger atmosphere it exists within. This theatrical atmosphere 
embodies Kathleen Stewart’s understating of the term, as something that is a force field pulsing 
with everything within it. “It is not an effect of other forces but a lived affect—a capacity to 
affect and to be affected that pushes a present into a composition, an expressivity, the sense of 
potentiality and event. It is an attunement of the senses, of labors, and imaginaries to potential 
ways of living in or living through things.”71 First, we witness the figures in their lack of 
attunement to their surroundings, although their atmosphere continues to affect them. Eventually, 
both the figures and the audience find a greater sense of this attunement, in part through realizing 
one’s own capacity to be affected, or one’s own simple, accessible, and dynamic presence. 
 
 
Everything that happened and would happen: Feeling Entangled Agencies 
While the relationality of the human to the environment begins as alienation in Something (out of 
nothing), the following case study begins with the assumption of intimate collaboration, as the 
human and nonhuman performers labor together to create the performance’s shifting atmosphere. 
Heiner Goebbels’s Everything that happened and would happen premiered in October, 2018, at 
the Mayfield Depot in Manchester, UK.72 Goebbels describes the piece as “part-performance, 
part-construction site,”73 as the entirety of the performance involves an ensemble of dancers 
constructing, dismantling, and building anew the stage setting in order to explore the history of 
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Europe in its continuous cycle of coming near to collapse and then rebuilding as if nothing had 
happened. The performance also looks toward the future with a vision of history as an ongoing 
process that the audience watches being built upon the stage. Thanks to this progressive sense of 
the “past,” Goebbels’s investigation of the relationship between human and nonhuman actors in 
the creation of history is also as a way to consider ongoing human/nonhuman relations for a 
speculative future. Everything that happened and would happen stages a world in which agencies 
are shared to such a degree that cause and effect, linear time and understandings of power are 
reshaped in an alternative world order. Every historical event exists due to an act of co-creation 
between human and nonhuman objects. But Goebbels’s focus is less on the objects themselves 
than on the events in which the objects participate. Indeed, Goebbels’s dramaturgy of 
connectivity and accumulation creates an atmosphere in which events—ways in which the 
atmosphere is built, affected and then active in the creation of the next atmosphere—are the basic 
ontological unit. Notably this atmosphere also depends upon the presence of humans, a presence 
that is active through its responsiveness rather than its attempts at mastery or control. 
 
Nonhuman performance and dispersed perspective 
Heiner Goebbels’s oeuvre demonstrates an interest in experimenting with the performative 
agency of different materials, such as sound, light, text, materials, bodies, and space, creating 
atmospheres that highlight the affective potential of dispersed focus that reorients the human in 
their surroundings. Goebbels works as a composer with these materials, preserving their 
individual integrity and bringing them together to contribute to an event, or a “drama of 
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experience”74 in which the spectator is activated to create their own meaning. Goebbels 
characterizes his work through an “aesthetics of absence,” in part due to the disappearance of a 
human actor from central focus of the performance. But his aesthetics of absence are conversely 
overwhelmed with presence, albeit a dispersed presence of elements that divides focus and 
creates in-between spaces that actively promote discovery of something new, even unexpected. 
Goebbels sees “absence as the presence of the other, as a confrontation with an unseen image or 
an unheard word or sound, an encounter with forces beyond man’s control, that are out of our 
reach.”75 I find the notion of Goebbels’s absence to be misleading, in that this naming diverts 
attention from the very active presence of so many nonhuman materials, as well as the continued 
presence of the human within his work. Indeed, a more productive notion that accounts for a 
non-anthropocentric collaboration of these materials can be found in atmosphere, where 
atmosphere is understood as a collaborative event. With atmosphere, we might consider different 
ways in which the human can be present in theatrical work among nonhuman actors, beyond 
traditional dramatic or representation works. Furthermore, the notion of the atmosphere makes 
room for the individual spectator’s perspective and contribution to the performance, which 
Goebbels finds so integral to his purpose.  
 
Indeed, Goebbels continuously experiments with methods of dispersing agency, audience focus, 
and his own artistic perspective. For instance, in Stifter’s Dinge (2007), Goebbels highlighted 
nonhuman activity for a live audience in a music theater performance where the only performers 
were objects such as pianos and water, and according to Gelsey Bell, thereby “created a 
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meditation on objecthood and our relationship to things, materials, and the environment.”76 In 
this performance, the audience was seated for the first portion, and then invited to explore the 
installation for the following 30-minute period, which encouraged a more individual, intimate 
interaction with these newly uncanny objects—a relationship that Bell reported followed her out 
into the world. Alternatively, De Materie (2014) was presented more like a traditional opera, 
with opera singers and a grand spectacle displayed for a seated audience. However, the spectacle 
included dancing sculptures and a flock of sheep. When human dancers appeared, they worked 
with the performing objects as equals. Through these compositions, Goebbels has continually 
troubled human/nonhuman hierarchies to spectacular effect. 
 
Given Goebbels’s background as a composer, it is no surprise that sound is an important element 
in his performance compositions. Indeed, his way of working with sound provides theoretical 
support for his wider conceptual framework. For instance, the sound of the human voice is 
figured as an equal component to other ways sound is produced. The human voice is produced 
through the material body, and just as machinic sounds are produced through material friction 
and interaction, so to is the human voice. Throughout different productions, Goebbels has 
worked with classically trained singers as well as amateur voices, but as he has noted, “that even 
a classically trained voice cannot deny its origin, the body (and indeed should not and would not 
want to), only establishes the strength of its corporeal trace.”77 This highlights Goebbels’s 
relationship with sound as a material form. Furthermore, Goebbels experiments with the 
production of sound within a political framework, as the hierarchies and relationships produced 
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through sound reflect a social structure. In order to establish a more communal sound creation, 
Goebbels separates the musicians from each other, placing them at different areas of the stage, 
and does not include a conductor. Thus, each musician must know and attend to each musician’s 
work, and they work together to keep tempo and tone.78 Goebbels’s utilizes this same method in 
Everything that happened and would happen with musicians dispersed around the theatre, 
collaborating to create the soundscape that carries on through the entire performance. Just as the 
ensemble onstage works continuously with the objects onstage, so too do the musicians work 
with their instruments and each other, adding to the intricate human and nonhuman network on 
display.  
 
In addition to his varied experimentations with nonhuman agency and sound, Goebbels’s oeuvre 
also marks a notable interest in form and structure, and the ways in which artistic form and 
structure reflect their social and political context. Goebbels has worked extensively with texts. 
For instance, in the 1980s he began composing and directing audio plays, many of which were 
based on texts by Heiner Muller.79 Other inspirational sources include the writings of Gertrude 
Stein, Edgar-Allen Poe, Henry Thoreau, and Søren Kierkegaard, and the music of John Cage. 
Goebbels finds inspiration in the ways in which composition—textual, musical, or otherwise—
can be open-minded, where the open structure of the piece invites creative work from the 
audience to make sense of the work themselves. In an interview with Stathis Gourgouris in PAJ, 
Goebbels explains, “I’m very skeptical about direct political relation between artistic statement 
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and the message to the audience. Once you’re working in an open-minded way, I trust that 
sooner or later the work will come to breathe in the situation around it.”80 This sentiment is 
further reflected in Goebbels’s thinking behind Everything that happened and would happen. In 
his director’s note, after citing Gertrude Stein’s open hierarchy of words, Goebbels goes on to 
explain:  
Guided by a deep mistrust in the transmission of a one-directional message, I don’t even 
try. Everything that happened and would happen seeks to open up a space of images, 
words and sounds generous enough to avoid the impression that somebody on stage is 
trying to tell you what to think. It is a space for imagination and reflection, in which the 
construction of sense is left for everyone to assemble.81 
Interestingly, Goebbels’s insistence here on an open and collaborative process of thought-
creation further reflects the communal process of meaning-making formally enacted in the 
production and represented in its presentation of the creation of history. In other words, ideas and 
meaning circulate with the human and nonhuman actors, becoming another kind of performing 
object within the network on stage. This generative, in-between space Goebbels aims to manifest 
is precisely the atmospheric space, teeming with the presence of human and nonhuman materials.  
 
Goebbels puts these materials to work in Everything that happened and would happen. The 
performance is a non-narrative composition of choreographed movement—dancers moving and 
moving with a wide variety of objects—in collaboration with sound, spoken text, and news clips. 
The performance is a sea of movement and rhythm, where scenes are continuously being built 
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and unbuilt in waves. The result is a meditative experience of dispersed agency, where the 
audience is left without one clear perspective, but instead with a rich fabric of ideas.  
 
 
Figure 12. Ensemble engaged in construction. Everything that happened and would happen, Park 
Avenue Armory. Photo by Stephanie Berger. 
 
Karen Barad and Agency of the In-Between 
Goebbels’s attention to events, and the dispersed material agencies collaborating to create them, 
corresponds with Karen Barad’s concept of “intra-action,” a mutually constitutive event 
produced by and producing entangled agencies.82 As Goebbels reflects through constant, ever-
incomplete and layered actions, Barad’s theory stresses the fundamental nature of the event. 
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Barad asserts, “the primary ontological unit is not independent objects with inherent boundaries 
and properties but rather phenomena.”83 The common understanding of “phenomenon” is “a fact 
or situation observed to exist or happen,”84 or an object known through the senses or the mind. 
For Barad, it is not that the human is essential and must observe phenomena for phenomena to 
exist.85 Rather, Barad’s emphasis points to the effects of the event interacting with multiple 
agencies and making more events and effects. In Barad’s formulation, the individual, whether 
human or object, is not an essential unit, but instead something that appears and performs as a 
component in an intra-action. Indeed, phenomena are precisely the ontological inseparability of 
intra-acting components. Any distinct agencies do not precede the event, “but rather emerge 
through their intra-action”86 and mutually constitute the other entangled agencies. Barad’s theory 
differs quite drastically from the conception of the object proposed in OOO discussed earlier in 
this dissertation. Whereas Morton and Harman both consider the object to be interacting through 
their sensual properties, they both maintain that the essential quality of the object remains 
hidden. However, by arguing that an object only exists through its intra-actions, Barad’s 
conception finds that the effects are the object. Interestingly, while the differences are apparent 
between the two notions—the unique individual object of OOO versus the object existing 
through intra-actions in agential realism—both philosophies still find the object’s effects to be 
accessed through perception, and therefore through sensual interaction. Therefore, both OOO 
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com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780195392883.001.0001/m_en_us1277476. 
85 Rather than a phenomenological perspective, Barad builds her theory from her experience in 
quantum physics. 
86 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 33.	
	
	 216	
and Barad’s agential realism depend upon interactions among aesthetic properties—properties 
that are in focus in the theatrical sphere. 
	
	
The significance of Barad’s agential realism involves the way it reconsiders the very nature of 
causality to one of a more dispersed agency. Instead of a linear pattern of dominos, Barad speaks 
of effects in diffraction patterns.  These diffraction patterns are “patterns of difference that make 
a difference.”87 In essence, they are performative. Barad bases this assertion (and her study as a 
whole) in quantum physics, using the introductory image of a stone dropped into a lake that 
creates ripples. When another stone is dropped into the lake, these ripples interact with and 
change the previous ripples. Like other scholars engaged in both theory and science studies, such 
as Donna Haraway and Alfred North Whitehead, Barad’s theory draws connections between the 
quantum and social realms. For instance, Donna Haraway argues, “diffraction patterns record the 
history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference.”88 Indeed, Barad is engaged in the 
study in order to find an analysis that “enables us to theorize the social and the natural together, 
to read our best understandings of social and natural phenomena through one another in a way 
that clarifies the relationship between them.”89 Diffraction is therefore a way to think without the 
nature/social binary, and perhaps binaries more generally.	
 
Staging Agential Realism 
This social and natural confluence, in the form of diffractive phenomena, is precisely the view of 
history staged in Everything that happened and would happen, which makes plain the integral 
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nature of the human’s presence through the theatrical form. Rather than a linear narrative, or 
even a sense of building toward one finished or singular construction, Goebbels stages nonlinear 
and continuously unfolding events occurring between the varied materials of space, objects, 
dancers, musicians, light, sound, and text. Even the last image on the stage (since the production 
needs to come to an end somehow) appears as a haphazard construction zone, and movement is 
retained through smoke circling up toward the rafters. There is no object, human or nonhuman, 
that has one single role, so they all are defined more in their actions and relations than their own 
individual defining features.  
 
 
Figure 13. Smoke moving through the assemblage. Everything that happened and would happen. 
Photo by Thanasis Delgiannis. 
 
One of the production’s most striking features is the overwhelming mass of objects that never 
leave the stage, lending to an atmosphere brimming with energy and potentiality. The Park 
	
	 218	
Avenue Armory’s Drill Hall is one of the largest unobstructed interior spaces in New York City, 
and the building takes up an entire city block. This performance takes place within the Drill Hall, 
with one large set of bleachers set up for audience seating on the west side of the space. 
Otherwise, the remainder of the 55,000 square feet is dedicated to the playing space, and this 
space is filled with objects. This invites the divided attention Goebbels seeks and creates a sense 
of what Helen Shaw termed “muchness:” “There are too many things to take in with the eye, and 
the pressure to do it, the enforced sensorial gluttony, has its own velocity and excitement.”90 The 
rich mesh of objects includes fabrics of various material and density, folded up in different 
containers and attached to rigging as drops; cardboard cylinders with material rolled and unrolled 
upon them; boxes on wheels; sculptural boulders; shell and grass shaped cutouts in flats; and 
more. All of these objects are in constant flux, as the ensemble constructs a new assemblage, and 
as soon as it reaches a peak, they begin deconstructing to find a new shape and relationship 
between the objects. This constant movement leads to the feeling that nothing is ever complete, 
no position ever final, and there is not one singular use for any given object. This sense of 
movement, even beyond this particular stage, is supported further by the fact that the objects 
onstage are all recycled things. They were originally set elements designed by Klaus Grünberg 
for John Cage: Europeras 1 & 2, a separate piece directed by Goebbels in 2012. Thus, the 
objects’ history also becomes an element of the production, while the unknown future of the 
objects remains a relevant question. Though the objects are made for the theatre as sets and 
backdrops, they exist differently in this theatre space, as their positions suggest different 
perspectives. Often drapes are hung upside down or backwards, with the painted area facing 
away from the audience. Likewise, theatrical flats take a different relation to the audience, 
																																																								




resisting the traditional presentational relationship in theatre. The constant labor of the ensemble, 
and the labor suggested in the visible seams and joints of the materials, gives an impression that 
the audience is behind the scenes, getting to see how events are made rather that a complete 
image. Perhaps too the varying perspectives serve to highlight the multiplicity of perspectives 
that Goebbels seeks to disseminate. While the objects shift and move around the space, they 
never disappear. Rather, everything that comes on stage stays, even if it is folded up into a cart or 
put to rest on the still visible side of the stage. Nothing is ever fully “gone” or “away,” and the 
ongoing mattering of past events remains ever present.  
 
The teeming energy of the moving objects, and the ways in which the human performers work 
with these objects to continuously create new images, embodies a sort of diffraction pattern 
itself, highlighting the agential impact of objects on each other. For instance, one segment 
featured dancers interacting with a long bin set on rolling casters. As they interacted with it, they 
found new forms of movement—the dancers and the bin bouncing off of each other’s materiality 
and movement capacities. As it moved around the stage, different dancers would reroute it with 




Figure 14. Bin on casters moving through the space. Everything that happened and would 
happen, Theatre Olympics, Saint Petersburg. 
 
Importantly, within the diffraction pattern on stage, the human and nonhuman actors all appear 
as objects, equal in the ways in which they must remain responsive to other materials on stage. 
Goebbels reports that he wanted to hire dancers because “like musicians, they have an 
instrumental relationship to their bodies; they don’t use their bodies to manifest ‘meaning’ in the 
same ways as actors. They can simply be.”91 Goebbels’s intention here reveals his thinking of the 
dancer as another kind of material onstage, more object than subject. Helen Shaw’s review of the 
production notes the nontraditional balance of human and nonhuman achieved onstage: “People 
are treated like objects, and objects dance. The set, basically, is alive.”92 Shaw’s comment that 
the set is “alive” reflects the nonhuman agency at play, as both the set and dancers are clearly 
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laboring throughout the production. The dancers wear overalls such that they appear as 
stagehands or construction workers. They perform a postmodern choreography with everyday 
movements, which involves working with the material in their environment. The tone of their 
labor shifts throughout the production. At times, it appears as real manual labor, as they sweat 
and breathe heavily when wrestling with the weight of large pieces of heavy fabric. Some of the 
labor is more playful, and other times the labor is more rote and methodical, as when we watch 
them tie a drop to a lengthy fly rail one knot at a time. In other sections, the work feels more 
futile, as when pairs of dancers slowly roll boulders from one to another across the stage, 
creating an image reminiscent of Sisyphus. While the labor takes on different styles and tones, a 
uniting theme of all this labor is that it is endless, and continued effort is an end in itself. Without 
a clear beginning or end to any task, the time is filled with incremental and related events or 
processes that indiscernibly shift from one to another. Therefore, the human’s labor is visible but 
dispersed, with objectives that do not appear as the center of this world, but as an enmeshed 
component that must necessarily remain receptive and responsive. 
 
Goebbels further highlights in-between spaces and the affective agency found there through the 
ways in which light interacts with other materials in the space, creating another embodied 
diffraction pattern. The Drill Hall has an unfinished and industrial appearance with visible 
support beams and brick along the ceiling and walls, and Goebbels draws attention to this 
construction. In many sections, beams of light move through cutout drops or flats to illuminate 
the far wall or crossbeams in the ceiling between the shadows. In fact, Goebbels’s use of light 
works to create another sort of diffraction pattern on stage, as when light or video projections 
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reflect off some objects, while other objects deflect and distort the image. Notably, one of the 
objects distorting the rays of light were the human objects onstage and in the audience.  
 
I refer pointedly to the human as an object in this setting, as the objecthood of the human is a 
relevant aspect of both Goebbels’s and Barad’s worlds and integral to the restructuring of 
causality and power. As Melanie Sehgal points out, “The physics of diffraction not only forces 
us to reconsider what an entity ‘in its essence’ is, but brings the entire distribution of subject and 
object, knower and known, words and things, words and world under reconsideration.”93 Indeed, 
Barad’s agential realism changes the nature of subject and object. In one sense, any distinction 
between the subject and object disintegrates when there is not one with a capacity to act with 
another existing to be acted upon. Further, the notion of the boundaries of a singular self is 
problematized when every object appears through intra-action. As Barad states, “Physics tells us 
that edges or boundaries are not determinate either ontologically or visually.”94 This assertion is 
in line both with the importance of the event in agential realism, and the primacy of perceptual, 
sensual effects of the event in Barad’s thinking. We know that there are no boundaries due to the 
aesthetic properties of the object and its visual lack of boundaries. 
 
Elements of this dissolution of boundaries between natural and social realms, as well as the 
subject and object, can be found in Goebbels’s framing of the nature of the human’s dispersed 
and embedded agency through history, represented strongly through the text segments of Patrik 
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Ouředník’s novel Europeana: A Brief History of the Twentieth Century.95 The novel, read aloud 
in pieces by different ensemble members, lists natural and social objects as varied as “The 
French,” mustard, and postmodernism as sets of agencies coming together through intra-actions. 
Contradictory ideas and the juxtaposition of events, which vary wildly in tone, challenges the 
reader, or in this case the listener, to make their own connections, since the narrator does not 
write with a clear point of view. Rather, the events, ideas, and groups of people are presented in a 
non-hierarchical list of actors enacting history. Goebbels includes multiple sections of the text, 
which highlight the birth and force of big ideas, which are agentic in their capacity to sort 
humans into different groups; groups that also become objects. For instance, Ouředník writes, 
“When people stopped believing in God, they started to seek ways of expressing that the world is 
absurd, and they invented Futurism and Expressionism and Dadaism and Surrealism and 
Existentialism and the Theater of the Absurd.”96 He goes on to list the effects of “the Futurists,” 
“the Expressionists,” “the Dadaists,” etc., just as previously he listed the French, the Germans, 
the Senegalese, the English, the generals, the writers, the historians, etc. These lists suggest that 
individuals are known through their relations to others, which inherently includes their relations 
to ideas. By including these sections of text, Goebbels underscores the agentic primacy of ideas, 
which are forces as literal and tangible as the figures and objects at work upon the stage.  
 
The boundary of the individual self expands to mesh with ideas and groups, and Europeana 
describes all human actors in history equally in this way. It is not that there is no difference 
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between these groups or that the ideas separating groups are trivial. On the contrary, these 
differences are quite substantial and material. Rather, it is that the defining characteristics are 
created in the same way, and are not essential to the object, but developed through intra-action. 
Barad is quite clear that ideas and theories are crucial in intra-action, for “theorizing, like 
experimenting, is a material practice.”97 As we consider and become more attuned to material 
agency, we must also consider our conception and production of knowledge itself, as knowledge 
is another material agency at work in our environment. According to Barad, ideas and 
methodologies are “boundary-drawing practices – specific material (re)configurings of the world 
– which come to matter.”98 If theories shape human relations, which is the same as shaping 
material relations, theories have grave effects on our environment. Indeed, the Europeana 
excerpts make clear that the destruction of WWII would not be possible without the earlier 
phenomena of the Germans, the French, the Americans, etc. Phenomena are not products of 
human will or intentionality or social consequences. Rather, humans are one small but integral 
part of the ongoing reconfiguration of the world, and these intra-actions are an endless cycle of 
distributed agency, where human and nonhuman actors are engaged in constant relations of 
exerting, receiving and co-creating the next event.  
 
As an audience member listening to the lists of human groupings and taking in the rhythm of the 
stage events, my attention was drawn to the new group formed as an audience. The streaming 
text has an overwhelming affect in that it is challenging to keep track of the deluge of words and 
ideas. It is even more challenging to make sense of the events through logic or causality, as the 
dramatic tradition from Aristotle through naturalism has trained an audience to do, because this 
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sense of causality is eschewed. To attend to the events onstage requires a different style of 
spectatorship, where there is no overarching point of view delivered by the performance, but the 
point of view remains uniquely in the perception of each individual audience member; different 
connections will be drawn through the different contexts each brings, and another generation of 
unique ideas—new objects contributing to the atmosphere—will become agential. The 
commonality uniting the audience is precisely their material presence in contact with the 
materials generating the performance. The commonality is the affectual exposure to the room. In 
the case of Goebbels’s performance, this exposure relies on the multitude of objects and ideas. 
Indeed, while listening to the long lists of human groupings, I was struck by how different the 
groups sounded when given proper names, and yet, how similarly they were formed. They were 
equal in their coming to matter. Further, one individual can be a part of multiple groupings and 
shift among them; I was named multiple times among the groups of “Americans,” “women,” and 
“college students.” And I became a part of another material grouping as the audience formed a 
new group, united through this experiential time and place. As the performance progressed, the 
rhythmic quality of events on stage invites a meditative response, where a sense of time and self 
are weakened. This in turn adds to the formation of the new group—the audience as an object. 
Affect theory accounts for this phenomenon. The social exchange ongoing through the 
performance is able to produce “global feelings” when the actors are not able to distinguish their 
individual effects on the exchange, but instead find a shared responsibility as a group. E.J. 
Lawler posits that this style of exchange can produce cohesion as a group, where the group is 
perceived as the source of (positive or negative) feelings in the individual group member.99 
Through Goebbels’s choreography of experience, the human relations in the room are re-shaped.  
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The profound consequences of the ways in which humans participate in intra-actions for the 
current and future world appear in the performance through the inclusion of news clips projected 
onto the stage. Multiples times in the performance, the ensemble steps aside and video clips are 
projected onto the most recently created screen, often a cutout backdrop or flat. The images are 
only partially visible, as certain parts of the picture are in focus on the de facto screen, while 
other parts of the image ricochet onto the back wall of the armory, the ceiling, and even the 
audience. These clips are sourced from No Comment, a newsfeed from EuroNews presented 
without commentary, similar in structure to Europeana in that different events and contexts 
appear in a nonhierarchical collection that rejects natural and social binaries. Goebbels includes 
clips from the day of the performance in the feed. The day I attended, clips showed flooding in 
multiple settings across the world—something that is still called a “natural” disaster despite 
societies building in floodplains, rerouting waterways, and of course contributing to rising water 
levels. These videos of flooding are presented in the same list, appearing in a completely 
nonhierarchical manner, next to the more “social” conflicts of refugees fleeing their homes and 
communities attempting to recover from bombings, despite the fact that many refugees must flee 
due to their home becoming inhospitable for human life and conflicts erupting over “natural” 
resources. Furthermore, Goebbels’s method of presenting these clips through broken images 
makes it quite challenging to make sense of what is happening—often the only clarifying 
headline projected along the bottom of the screen is also obscured or blurred. Yet, the 
fragmented nature of these news clips supports the theme that there is not one whole story, but 






Figure 15. “No Comment” news projected onto a de facto screen. Everything that happened and 
would happen, Theatre Olympics, St. Petersburg. 
 
This entangled space of distributed agencies staged in Everything that happened and would 
happen highlights a specific notion of power and causality, in which the human’s agency is 
dispersed, while the human presence and responsivity remains essential. Through the mesh of 
unfolding events and transitioning objects, Goebbels problematizes intentionality itself. Objects 
are not used in the ways that they were initially designed, and traditional theatrical perspective is 
done away with. The selection of texts, images, and video clips do not communicate a clear point 
of view, but list items in a nonhierarchical, even haphazard structure. Human figures cannot 
control, but only bump or reroute objects’ trajectories and must collaborate with the object itself 
to create the dances and structures. Music elements build as they go rather than follow a 
composition or conductor. Even the possibility of a clear intentionality of an artwork itself is part 
of Goebbels’s question. Instead, “perhaps intentionality might better be understood as 
attributable to a complex network of human and nonhuman agents, including historically specific 
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sets of material conditions that exceed the traditional notion of the individual. Or perhaps it is 
less that there is an assemblage of agents than there is an entangled state of agencies.”100  The 
sense of movement, of collaboration, and of being-together in the creation of our environment is 
something theatre is uniquely poised to communicate.  
 
This vision of the world has profound implications for the place of the human in our ongoing 
intra-actions and the future of our atmosphere. It is clear that the human has never been in 
control, at the same time, human action is pivotal in the intra-actions forming the world. Indeed, 
our intra-actions “contribute to the differential mattering of the world,”101 profoundly affecting 
the different directions intra-actions might move, and tangibly contributing to the material 
present and future. As Barad points out, “the future is radically open at every turn.”102 Here we 
find a different approach to Verdonck’s estrangement, where humans are living within a spectral 
environment built by ghosts of past generations with little hope to see the effects of our efforts in 
our own lifetime. Rather, with this notion of continuity that Barad theorizes, seeing the effects, 
or “results,” is not really the point. Instead, “intra-actions reconfigure both what will be and what 
will be possible – they change the very possibilities for change and the nature of change.”103 Our 
actions change the material present, and therefore affect the possibilities of future intra-actions 
by affecting the material that future intra-actions have to work with. Barad refers to this is as 
“sedimenting,” or “an ongoing process of differential mattering,”104 where the past is not left 
behind, but a part of the matter that continues unfolding in the present and future. The human’s 
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responsibility is highlighted in this model. As Barad succinctly argues: “We are responsible for 
the world of which we are a part, not because it is an arbitrary construction of our choosing but 
because reality is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a role in shaping and 
through which we are shaped.”105 Responsibility is even greater when shared in this 
understanding of reality than if responsibility were the human’s alone, because a true 
responsibility involves continuously responding to our entanglements with all other agents, 
human and nonhuman, past, present and future. And these entanglements not only affect, but 
actively build the world. 
 
Part of what this performance offers to Barad’s argument is precisely the affective sense of 
presence, and therefore community and agency, of the human through their position as audience. 
The audience is not only a witness to the building, shifting, and re-building going on onstage, but 
another agent in the atmospheric intra-actions within the theatre. Even while seated in the fixed 
bleachers, light and sound deflect off the audience, and the audience’s thoughts, relationships to 
each other, to space, and to context, all contribute to intra-actions. This is of course something 
always happening in theatre—precisely through the ongoing collaborative creation of 
atmosphere. Indeed, atmosphere itself is an intra-action, and one that is affectively present. As 
previously discussed, the atmosphere proceeds from objects, radiating outward to create 
something else in between. Further, it occurs through the act of sensing. In other words, 
atmosphere could be conceived as a phenomenon or event that occurs through actions of the 
agencies contributing to the intra-action. In Everything that happened and would happen, the 
atmosphere is felt, and part of that atmosphere is the vital materiality and presence of human and 
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nonhuman objects alike, where the whole room is engaged in the creation of this event. The 
audience is matter that matters, contributing to the affective atmosphere by their sheer presence, 
which is something that an audience within a theatre space can feel to be true. Thus, presence 
itself is underscored as a form of causality, reorienting the ways power and purposeful action 
account in intra-actions, instead offering a more dispersed, responsive, even passive model. 
 
The attention toward agentic presence achieved in the theatre space offers potential relevance in 
the contemporary era of eco-anxiety. As the effects of climate change grow more apparent, “eco-
anxiety” also builds, described as overwhelming feelings of loss, helplessness, and frustration.106 
According to a Yale survey published in “Climate Change in the American Mind,” 70% of 
Americans are “worried” about climate change, 29% are “very worried,” and 51% “feel 
helpless.”107 The feeling of anxiety is so widespread that the American Psychological 
Association took part in publishing a guide to mental health in light of the changing climate.108 
Among their tips are fostering optimism, cultivating active coping and self-regulation, practicing 
mindfulness and finding personal meaning, and maintaining social connections.109 Furthermore, 
a technique recommended to deal with general anxiety is “grounding,” which involves a 
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mindfulness that grounds oneself in their material presence and the space around them.110 
Interestingly, the attention to atmosphere and the audience’s material presence within the 
theatrical space addresses multiple of these goals, including grounding the audience in their 
material body, providing social connections and a sense of community in the theatre space, and 
even activating the self-regulation techniques through the ideas that one’s own matter has real 
effects in the world. Rather than the paralysis that often accompanies these feelings of eco-
anxiety, here the importance of action is a highlight. Indeed, as Goebbels and Barad both make 
plain, one’s very presence is participating in an intra-action, through that presence itself. If the 
future is radically open, and the human is responsible for the differential mattering that is 
ongoing this very moment, then performing through a responsive presence is essential.  
 
Conclusion 
As this study of the generation of atmosphere in Something (out of nothing) and Everything that 
happened and would happen demonstrates, atmosphere is a way to think beyond binary notions 
as it is a collaborative event, created through the many contributions of every object in the space. 
Atmosphere is something in-between and ephemeral, an intra-action in which the human is 
integral in collaboration with nonhuman materials. The atmosphere then becomes another actor 
itself, going on to create effects in a continuing stream of events. Whether or not a theatre 
production actively addresses eco-conscious concerns, its atmosphere affects the audience and 
hails them into a style of relationality with their surroundings. Therefore, it is imperative that we 
consider each performance’s atmosphere and actively attend to its affects.  
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Atmosphere thus defined is an important antidote to the myth of “Nature.” Where the notion of 
nature conjures up images of something “over there,” separate from the human’s social sphere, 
or something to be used as resources, the notion of atmosphere is the opposite. Atmosphere is all 
around, existing through the intra-actions of natural and social events together, and something 
intimately of the human alongside the nonhuman. Rerouting the eco-conscious conversation 
from “saving” or “restoring” a nature that never truly existed into one of working with and 
remaining responsive to our atmosphere as it is now has potential to aid in taming eco-anxiety by 
grounding the human in the shared materiality of the present moment. Because human 
materiality, one’s very presence, is always already engaging in intra-actions that are building the 
world around us, and therefore building the future possibilities. We cannot extricate ourselves 
from the process; if we are always already participating, we should be doing so responsibly. The 
experiences of Verdonck’s and Goebbels’s performances offer useful insights into what this 
responsible participation might look like. In Something (out of nothing), this involves a turning 
outward from oneself to relinquish old habits of mastery and instead grow in awareness and 
responsiveness to the atmosphere. In Everything that happened and would happen, this similarly 
involves finding a responsive presence that is gracious to other nonhuman actors and mindful in 
the ways in which one is responsible for our material present. In both, questions circulate about 
the potential for a human presence that releases attempts at controlling agency, 
anthropocentrism, and self-importance. But this is not an absence. Rather, it is a dispersed 





Experiencing the Body as Object: Solidarity Among Affective Relationality 
 
As earlier chapters have argued, the human body understood as an object aids in reenvisioning 
the human’s relationality to nonhuman objects, and in working toward a posthuman subjectivity 
that is integrated in the environment through dispersed agency, rather than attempts at human-
centered unilateral control. However, in order to conceive of the body as an object, we must 
understand what I mean by object. Here I define an object as a complex and active agent, with a 
withdrawn reality that is unknown and unnameable, but enmeshed within the world through its 
aesthetic qualities that create sensual effects. And these effects are highly agentic, interacting 
with other objects in order to create phenomena—enacting differences in the world that go on to 
create more difference. In other words, to call the human body an object in this context is not the 
same as “objectifying” it in common vernacular. Whereas objectification emerges from power 
imbalance, assuming that there is one object beneath and demeaned by a subject, objecthood 
reflects a sense of materiality within a flattened ontology of objects sharing the atmosphere. As 
Katherine Behar succinctly describes in her introduction to Object-Oriented Feminisms, “all too 
many humans are well aware of being objects, without finding cause to celebrate in that reality.”1 
Yet, this sense of objectification is always within the binary thinking of subject versus object, 
assuming that an object exists for a subject. And as this dissertation has already argued, this kind 
of binary thinking is taking a limited outlook for granted rather than embracing the in-between 
for its potentiality. Behar offers a productive provocation however: “the call for solidarity should 
be to rally around objects, not subjects. Primarily a white, male, hetero, abled, rational heir to 
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Enlightenment humanism, the subject is a red herring.”2 This argument does not deny or ignore 
the degrading effects of objectification; rather, it investigates an alternate train of thought for the 
potential of a reorganized sense of agency and power that begins outside the assumption of the 
subject. What futures could be enacted if we do in fact rally around the object, as objects, finding 
solidarity in our solid matter? What does it is look like for the human to embrace objecthood, and 
what relations to nonhuman objects does this promote? What are the implications for a resulting 
subjectivity? And importantly, might performance be a grounds for practicing this sense of 
objecthood? 
 
In order to find this kind of solidarity, the connotation of a human object must be shifted from 
something suggesting power relations, fear and exploitation, into something radically exposing 
those power relations, something finding power in solidarity with such vast masses of forms. 
This is precisely about finding a creative posthuman subjectivity. This is about finding pathways 
outside those that are well known and imagining a different set of relations than those to which 
we are accustomed. In order to do this, we have to practice feeling as an object, while attuned to 
what relationalities emerge and which sensibilities develop. With these attunements, one might 
experience this objecthood as a positive and generative condition; rather than a loss of agency, 
here is growth of other connections and abilities. Theatre is equipped to function as this training 
ground, with its framing devices, attention to presence, liveness, and community, and active 
objects and atmosphere. It is a space offset from outside society, offering a liberatory space, 
while still reflecting back on and related to real relations. Theatre has historically been an 
effective tool towards subjectivity formation. Perhaps then, when the theatrical form generates 
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the conditions for an experience of dynamic objecthood, it can aid in developing an embedded 
posthuman subjectivity. 
 
All of my case studies up to this point have implied the human’s condition as an object by 
emphasizing the active role of the object; the human and nonhuman objects work together, and 
the human learns from the nonhuman object. Now, it is necessary to consider some examples 
where this is no longer implied, but stated and performed outright. The performance events 
discussed in this chapter, including Jacques Herzog, Pierre de Meuron, and Ai Weiwei’s 
performance installation Hansel and Gretel (2017), Romeo Castellucci’s Julius Caesar. Spared 
Parts (2016), and Ryoji Ikeda’s supercodex [live set] (2017), all dramaturgically render the 
human body as an object, where the human object is acted upon. However, the body-objects are 
not lacking agency in their state of objecthood. Rather, they perform in material and affective 
ways that help to reveal the already active nature of the body’s material. These performances 
help to reincorporate the individual subject’s consciousness into the material body’s similarly 
responsive abilities, pointing toward the possibility of an expanded awareness—a more critical 
subjectivity.  
 
The body is an element that has been essential to theatre’s ontology throughout the history of the 
form, and interest in what the body does and how the body represents are equally important and 
inseparable to the study of theatre throughout history. Indeed, Philip Auslander claims the body 
“is a central problematic of theatre and performance,”3 citing the tension inherent in the body’s 
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serving as signifier while simultaneously exceeding that function.4 This tradition understandably 
leads to the notion that theatre is inherently an anthropocentric art form, dating back to 
Aristotle’s assertion of theatre as an art of mimesis and representation, requiring and privileging 
a human performer who performs for the human eye (opsis). However, numerous avant-garde 
and modern genres have chipped away at anthropocentric ideals.5 For instance, focus on the 
human subject and human psyche faded in the work of the Italian Futurists, Gertrude Stein’s 
landscape theatre, and modern theatre influenced by Wagner’s “total theatre,” instead focusing 
on the body as one material element in the larger composition. In an effort to draw equally from 
the elements of art forms such as visual arts and music, Jon Erickson argues that, “for its 
synthesis to be complete, [total theatre] depends upon a certain dehumanization of the actor, for 
the human presence is too strong to allow everything to be viewed with equal attention.”6 Here 
the material body weighs more heavily than the human individual. However, Erickson’s 
argument belies an anthropocentric worldview and the accompanying assumption that human 
presence is necessarily a human audience’s natural focal point. If a performance is engaged in 
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the representation of a landscape, network, or the human within an environment, this is not a 
dehumanization, but rather, a refocusing on the nonhuman realm. As I will go on to discuss more 
fully through specific performances, figuring the body as an object is not inherently a 
dehumanization, when a certain notion of the object and nonhuman realm is taken into 
consideration. 
 
In a different approach to the topic of anthropocentrism, I have argued throughout this 
dissertation for the essential performative agency of objects that are at work within the wider 
theatrical tradition. In this configuration, the human subject is not the de facto center of a 
theatrical stage. But this chapter will go on to argue that even the human body on stage can 
function as an object, and can resist anthropocentric tendencies when the body’s material is the 
focus. Thus, I show how there is a shift from the representative body to the explicit, material 
body.  
 
We can find a history of the body on stage as a body as-such in the performance art from the 
1960s on, where the body is made material and political. Here, the materiality of the body is on 
display—the body is an organism that breathes and bleeds. However, many performance artists 
displaying the body, including Carolee Schneemann, Chris Burden, and Ron Athey, for instance, 
did so in order to free the body from its representational status and the ideologies restricting this 
gendered, racialized, or stigmatized body in society.7 Philip Auslander finds that the body in 
some postmodern performance exposes the ideologies that have produced it by insisting on the 
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body as a historical and cultural construct.8 Rebecca Schneider further explores feminist 
performance art and finds “explosive literality” in which artists “peel back layers of 
signification” in order to make explicit the body itself.9 However, in the performances in the 
contemporary era of eco-anxiety, the explicit body framed on stage is not responding to 
ideological limits imposed on specific identity categories. Instead, the body on stage is resisting a 
humanistic and anthropocentric worldview, offering the human body as a material object 
implicated in its environmental network and relationships to other objects. Rather than a body in 
reference to its humanness, I want to focus on the body in reference to its material situatedness in 
the nonhuman atmosphere.  
 
Thus, the body-object in focus here becomes material as an atomic organism. This posthuman 
view deconstructs the boundaries that support the fallacy of bounded subject in favor of an object 
embedded within and responsive to their nonhuman atmosphere. Within the history of theatre, 
the atomic body-object relates to the idea of the body that Artaud took into account in his theatre 
of cruelty. He was troubled by what he perceived as a weakened ability in the masses to sense, 
appreciate, and respond to emotional and aesthetic influences, and so argued that “we need above 
all a theatre that wakes us up: nerves and heart.”10 His proposed theatre found sound, light, and 
gesture of the utmost importance in an attempt to “treat the spectators like the snakecharmer’s 
subjects and conduct them by means of their organisms to an apprehension of the subtlest 
notions.”11 Notably, Artaud turns his attention to the spectators’ bodies rather than limiting his 
																																																								
8 Auslander, From Acting to Performance, 92. 
9 Rebecca Schneider, The Explicit Body in Performance (New York: Routledge, 1997), 2. 
10 Antonin Artaud, The Theatre and Its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: 




view to the actors’ bodies onstage. As my previous chapter on the intra-active nature of theatrical 
atmospheres argued, the audience’s bodies must be taken into account as active contributors to 
the shared atmosphere. While Artaud’s interest in the audience reflects an interest in control,12 
which the comparison to a snakecharmer’s snake makes clear, it also reflects an awareness of the 
body’s proprioceptive capacities where the body’s sensory reception is a means of knowing and 
relating to the atmosphere around it.  
 
In the late stage of capitalism, as Franco Berardi has argued in the last ten years, we’ve returned 
to a need to awaken the body, in order to recombine the material body and its innate sensibility 
with the brain. Berardi describes the contemporary condition of “breathlessness”13 as a form of 
depression due to the panic caused by a sensory overload of digital capitalism added onto a 
semiocapitalistic system, where signs, affects, and attitudes are taken as directly productive. We 
submit ourselves to this system, smoothing out our own affects to fit into the system more 
efficiently, but become fragmented and lose a sense of solidarity as a result. But, as Berardi 
emphasizes, the mythology of the future, and with it a sense of progress and improvement, has 
died. I would add that panic is propagated by the looming unknown futures suggested through 
climate change. Berardi’s recommended response: a post-futurism found through a radical sense 
of the present-tense and “cognitarian self-consciousness,” where there is pleasure taken in the 
senses and “the beauty of autonomy.”14 By grounding consciousness in the materiality of the 
present moment, consciousness is pulled out of the accelerated forces of semio-capitalism and 
																																																								
12 See Kimberly Jannarone, “Audience, Mass, Crowd: Theatres of Cruelty in Interwar Europe,” 
Theatre Journal 61, 2 (2009): 191-211.  
13 Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Breathing: Chaos and Poetry (South Pasadena, CA: semiotext(e), 
2018), 10. 
14 Francisco “Bifo” Berardi, After the Future, ed. Gary Genosko and Nicholas Thoburn 
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 2011), 163, 165.	
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twenty-first-century media and back to the solidity of the body itself. Berardi looks to poetry and 
therapy as the forces in this awakening, although I suggest that an Artaudian return to the 
sensory and affective in theatre is also a promising approach. In both approaches, there is a 
“vibrational search to attune oneself to one’s environment”15 and its rhythms, which finds 
potential in humility and passivism. 
 
The notion of the body as a material object bears political implications. A reformation of the 
human as an agentic object leads to a kind of empowerment through awareness of a literal 
solidarity. Here, the notion of humans as primarily material, tangible beings promotes a 
communist connection to the material world, and a kinship expanded to include other material 
forms. This is adverse to the intangibility inherent in the human’s position as the central subject 
of capitalism, as well as the human’s value according to the neoliberal compulsion to continually 
perform. As Florentina C. Andreescu explains in “Embodied subjects in late capitalism,” the 
relations between people no longer exists between themselves, but between products with which 
they participate. Even more extreme, the human body or organ has become another commodity 
on the market, as a production of labor, where the body’s status as a commodity “elides the 
actual humans and relations out of which they emerge.”16 However, attention to the body as a 
unit of materiality helps to resist these impulses, as the body persistently exists without 
validation from any other outside source. It is not what the body does or produces that is worthy 
of measure, but simply that the body is; the body’s basic material bears a vibrational presence 
that is already active and in relation. Thus, the body-object is not cut off from its surroundings, 
but intimately connected through affective means.  
																																																								
15 Berardi, Breathing, 139. 




Clearly, there’s a pressing need to reconsider understandings of the body in light of the 
contemporary condition of semiocapitalism, where 21st century media is changing the social 
sphere and our means of perception psychologically, even neurologically. I argue that theatre and 
performance is a provocative site in which to locate this interrogation, not only because of the 
form’s history in embodied inquiries into the nature of the body-object, but also because the site 
foregrounds the sensory communication, presence, and expanded perception for which Berardi 
calls. Furthermore, developing technologies, appearing in performance spaces as well as the 
everyday, help us to experience an expansion of the body and access a sensuality that is not 
human to human, but displaced in the nonhuman networked world. In the ensuing chapter, I first 
turn to Jacques Herzog, Pierre de Meuron, and Ai Weiwei’s performance installation Hansel and 
Gretel. As an installation, this performance event stands outside the more traditional 
understanding of a theatre event, instead engaging in traditions of site-specific and participatory 
art installations. However, the event is especially interesting to this discussion, as participants 
become the performing objects in the installation. Further, the participants’ bodies are 
understood as objects within a datasphere, and so the installation specifically reveals the body 
within its context of embeddedness within twenty-first-century media. As my discussion will 
show, the installation’s encounter with the body presents useful provocations toward the ways in 
which we are required to reconsider the material body now, and possible implications of these 
shifts. 
 
Then, I turn to more formal performances with discussions of Romeo Castellucci’s Julius 
Caesar. Spared Parts (2016) and Ryoji Ikeda’s supercodex [live set] (2017). By moving into a 
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more traditional theatrical framing, these examples offer opportunities to examine the ways in 
which a sense of the materiality of the body can be accomplished even despite a divide between 
the audience and human performer. Both offer posthuman conceptualizations of the body as an 
object while also considering the implications of this sense of objecthood on subjectivity. The 
performances offer their audiences experiences of the human body as a material, atomic object, 
which cannot be completely appropriated into a political or economic structure due to its 
tangibility, and yet the object is highly affective and in tune with its atmosphere. Notably, these 
performances do not only aim to represent this notion of the object, but actually render the 
audience body into this object, offering an opportunity to feel and to practice an alternative 
perception.  
 
Hansel and Gretel: The Body-Object’s Extensions 
Jacques Herzog, Pierre de Meuron, and Ai Weiwei’s installation Hansel and Gretel, which 
premiered at the Park Avenue Armory in June, 2017, casts the participants as the actors of the 
performance, performing for themselves and their fellow participants through an interaction with 
the installation’s technologies. In this performance, the participants themselves are interpellated 
as body-objects, with the relationality of their material body to its atmosphere emerging as a 
central theme. Named in reference to the famous disappearing breadcrumbs left behind by the 
characters Hansel and Gretel in the Grimm fairytale, here digital breadcrumbs trail the audience. 
But these do not disappear, and are instead stored for unforeseen purposes that invite reflection 
regarding the prevalence of surveillance in contemporary society. The notion of the body-object 
here must be revised to account for the ways in which the body moves through today’s world. 
The material agency of the trail of personal data, what I will call a data-body, is suggested to be 
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just as immediate as the body itself due to the vast technoscape of contemporary society.17 Thus, 
any notion of the material body must be amended to account for this rematerialization of the 
data-body. The following section will investigate how the installation’s dramaturgy renders the 
audience into objects, and how the performance’s provocation offers an addition to the 
implications of the body-object in light of the ways that personal data moves through the 
contemporary world.  
 
Hansel and Gretel is a collaboration between architects Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron, 
and artist Ai Weiwei, and the project reflects their varied interests and experience. Herzog and de 
Meuron have worked on an array of notable projects with their architecture firm, such as the 
conversion of the Bankside Power Station into the Tate Modern in London, Beijing National 
Stadium, and the Elbe Philharmonic Hall in Hamburg, Germany. Their style reflects an interest 
in designs that are sensitive to the site, geography, and culture of the region for which they are 
designing, as well as an innovative and formalist use of materials. Hansel and Gretel reflects 
their thinking about the ways that space performs and enacts different relations among the human 
bodies implicated in the designs. Collaborator Ai Weiwei’s contemporary work transcends any 
particular genre, but includes conceptual work, sculpture, installation, and documentary film. 
Prior to Hansel and Gretel, Ai collaborated with Herzog and de Meuron on the design of the 
Beijing National Stadium for the 2008 Olympic games. He is also known for his open criticism 
																																																								
17 The notion of developing subjectivities through the datasphere is also found in Hiroki 
Azuma’s Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, which argues that the effects of the otaku (a term 
describing a person with obsessive interests in particular areas of popular culture, like anime or 
manga, and participate in online fandom) subculture in Japan results in the otaku becoming 
animalized, driven by specific needs in the technosphere rather than intersubjective desires. 
(Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, trans. Jonathan E. Abel and Shion Kono [Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, (2001) 2009]).  
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of the Chinese government, for which he was arrested and detained for 81 days without charge in 
2011. Ai has since moved from China, and continues to create politically relevant work, 
including Hansel and Gretel. 
 
The artists reported an interest in creating a sense of disorientation in the participants through the 
crafting of space, which they accomplished through a variety of means that put the body in 
specific relations to its environment.18 Instead of entering through the Park Avenue Armory’s 
main entrance, through the mansion’s doors on Park Avenue, participants were directed around 
the block to a nondescript service entry on the east side of the building. Participants then 
proceeded down a long, brightly lit white hallway before entering the dark, cavernous space of 
the Drill Hall. The lack of light, juxtaposed with the whiteness of the hallway before it, is near to 
sensory deprivation. Participants moved slowly and carefully as their eyes adjusted, while this 
transition insisted that one pause before diving into the new environment. In my own experience, 
I was first overcome by the darkness and felt the vastness of the space around me. I also 
immediately noticed the sound of drones buzzing in the air; even before noticing any other 
human guests, the drones were the most apparent objects sharing this new space.19 The artists 
describe this initial moment of entry as generating a sort of fight or flight response in the 
audience’s bodies, as the body attempts to be more alert in order to protect itself while the eye 
adjusts. This is the first moment where the audience’s material bodies—and the actual molecular 
workings of the body itself—are taken into account, as the eye’s very functioning figures in the 
performance’s dramaturgical choices. 
																																																								
18 Park Avenue Armory, “Hansel and Gretel: Artist Talk,” YouTube, 9 June 2017, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHwv9-QKbqM. 




As the eyesight adjusts to the new atmosphere, it becomes more possible to explore and engage 
with the space. This is when I became more aware of two additional actors in the space: the 
moving lights on the floor, and the playful movement of dozens of fellow participants. Upon the 
ground were different lines and images. Fine red grid-like lines mapped out space and tracked 
human forms. The space was also broken into larger square sections, with some in near complete 
darkness and others in a slightly brighter shadow. Participants are tracked by infrared cameras 
and overhead drones that are continuously capturing images, which are then projected onto the 
dark ground. Thus, every individual audience member experiences an immediate trace of their 
movement through a shadowy likeness that stays behind and slowly fades. If one keeps moving, 
footsteps are left behind as footprint images. But as participants realized the ways that the 
cameras could interact with the body, many found ways to experiment. One could pause in place 
to leave a stronger image behind. If the participant looked up directly at the drone for an 
extended pause, you could then see your face projected on the floor. Many laid down in order to 
see their body’s outline or played with controlled movement to leave motion-capture like images 









Figure 16. View of Hansel and Gretel in the Park Avenue Armory Drill Hall, with drones above 
the audience. Photo by James Ewing. 
 
This experience of interacting with the drone cameras and infrared sensors leads to another 
experience of the body-object in space, where the body’s material is foregrounded as the entity in 
communication with the performing objects active in the installation. The drones and sensors are 
responding to and interacting with the body’s material presence, activated by the body’s heat and 
marking its trace as it moves. The installation therefore is activated by and responding to body-
objects’ location in time and space. The images left behind, like a mirror or photograph, invite 
the interior subject to see themselves from different vantage points, from the exterior and in the 
past. But unlike a mirror or a photograph, where there is a singular locatable object that creates 
this image, or a singular moment in time framed in a photograph, the drones and sensors saturate 
this environment, and the subject cannot opt out or escape the objects’ effects. The interior 
subject cannot control the body’s sensual interactions in the space. This creates a disorienting 
experience through the body’s immersion in the activated space. And this disorientation is only 
heightened as the images do not appear in real time, but are delayed, creating a mark where the 
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body no longer is. In Queer Phenomenology, Sara Ahmed argues that disoriented bodies that are 
allowed limited involvement in the world or are effectively out of place become objects; that 
“disorientation involves becoming an object.”20 For better or worse, moments of disorientation 
restructure and make strange the ways we commonly orient ourselves to other objects in our 
atmosphere. By making these orientations strange, they suddenly become visible, emerging from 
the background to the forefront of our perception. Here, the body’s intimate and involuntary 
orientation to the space and to the other objects sharing the space is brought into focus. 
Furthermore, the experience of the body-object invited within the installation involves an 
extension of that body-object, where its trace becomes another tangible material with affective 
qualities. The body begins to expand outward.  
 
After participants are satisfied with their time in the Drill Hall, the installation continues in the 
mansion, where the body’s relationality is further complicated. However, participants must leave 
the dark space and move through the public streets before re-entering the Armory through the 
main entrance on Park Avenue. Upon re-entry, the audience finds an entirely different 
atmosphere generated through the mansion’s elaborate interior, designed in a Renaissance 
Revival style of the nineteenth century, with a massive wrought iron and oak split staircase, 
chandeliers and other fixtures designed by Louis C. Tiffany, and elaborate woodwork and stencil 
work throughout the main floor’s seven central spaces. For this particular installation, the space 
also includes multiple large screens and work stations throughout the halls populated with 
different interactive tablets. While the space is entirely new for the participant, traces of 
themselves are already present here. A live-feed of the Drill Hall is displayed prominently on 
																																																								
20 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 133. 
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monitors, and life-sized images of participants, captured earlier in the installation, are cycled 
through on another screen. When first entering through the white hallway, it turns out that 
images were captured of each individual’s face. Now, one can turn to a computer program that 
will find your earlier image with a simple face scan. Furthermore, a small pinhole for viewing 
directly into the Drill Hall is also available. Little did I know that there was an entirely different 
audience watching my earlier actions, and each pose for the drone’s camera was also a pose for a 
much larger audience. The theme of disorientation grows in this second part of the installation. 
First, the individual unexpectedly faces a disembodied version of themselves, which was 
performing in another time and space relative to the body-object. Further, it prompts a 
reorientation toward past events, reconsidering the previous experience in a different context—
who could have been watching? Yet, the past events were undertaken willingly, pointing to the 
ways in which the participants all submitted to rules that were not fully understood. In 
undergoing the physical action of gazing through the peephole, the participant becomes the 




Figure 17. My face appears in the second part of the exhibition in the Park Avenue Armory 
mansion. Photo by author. 
 
The materiality of data representations and implications of surveillance  
With these revelations, the performance takes on the larger themes of the implications of 
surveillance, which Ai Weiwei suggests is not necessarily a warning, but a mirror to the ways in 
which individuals are embedded in contemporary mediatized culture. Individuals in the general 
public now have a trail of personal data, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which goes 
on to work as an actant in the datasphere. PII is defined as: 
Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including (1) any 
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, 
social security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric 
records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as 
medical, educational, financial, and employment information.21 
In addition, there is the category of linkable PII, which is information about an individual for 
which there is the possibility of more information through logical association.22 For instance, 
different PII in two different databases may be linked to provide new information. In the US, 
anyone with a social security number, or a bank account, or a computer, or an email, has their 
own PII trail. Then, anyone who uses social media sites or apps like Google maps that geotag the 
user’s location is willingly adding to the pile of information. As in the outside world, participants 
																																																								
21 GAO Report 08-536, “Privacy: Alternatives Exist for Enhancing Protection of Personally 
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22 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of 




join in and offer their information to the technology while in the space of Hansel and Gretel. 
Also like the working surveillance methods, Hansel and Gretel’s drone images appeal to vanity, 
harnessing the urge to snap selfies and receive “likes” on their chosen app. We expose ourselves 
to this technology regularly, so much so that it has become our general condition. 
 
There’s much more to be said about the sobering ways that surveillance adds to power and 
inequality,23 and the larger installation set up throughout the mansion includes interactive tablets 
with archival information on a range of topics documenting examples of technology and 
surveillance in the world. For instance, when scrolling through examples of drones, I 
encountered information about Charlie, a remote spying robot catfish used by the CIA, as well as 
the insectothopter, a miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicle for collecting intelligence through an 
object that looks like a dragonfly. The archive also included information about other artworks 
dealing with the theme of surveillance, such as Drone Shadows,24 a series of public installations 
by James Bridle that traces the shadows of drones and other military surveillance weapons, and 
the WeiWeiCam, the live stream Ai Weiwei created in response to his previous arrest and 81-day 
detainment in China.25 More alarming information regarding a list of confirmed drone strikes and 
the growing death toll also appeared in the installation. 
 
																																																								
23 For an introduction to the topic, see David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); and James Harding, Performance, Transparency, and the 
Cultures of Surveillance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018). 
24 James Bridle, “Drone,” Jamesbridle.com, accessed 14 January 2020, 
https://jamesbridle.com/works/category:drone 




As the examples from my interaction with the archival information show, the installation resisted 
taking one specific point of view regarding drones and surveillance, instead offering a multitude 
of tones and perspectives. As Jacques Herzog noted in an artist talkback, the drone is simply a 
tool. It can be used for positive or negative means, and it can be threatening but it can also be 
helpful. This stated ambivalence underscores the installation’s broader interest in the state of 
being created through our developing relationships with these technologies, rather than a pointed 
political argument. By putting participants’ bodies into contact with the surveillance drones, the 
artists create a space that highlights the material effects of the drones on the body, asking 
questions about how the body now acts in space, and how we can identify that body. The first 
section of the installation in the Drill Hall engaged with the participants’ bodies as body-objects, 
objects that provided data for the other objects sharing the space. However, the insight suggested 
by the full installation is that this body-object as it exists in the contemporary culture of 
surveillance must be understood also as a cyborgian body-object, where the object is extended in 
time and space to include that object’s data-body representation as an agentic object itself.  
	
	
The Body-Object as Hyperobject 
The notion of the cyborg has figured in both feminist and posthuman discussions since Donna 
Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” in 1985, but the theories of an unbounded subject becoming 
indecipherable from technology has relevance in the twenty-first century semiocapitalist and 
surveillance society. In her essay, Haraway resists binary definitions of the human, instead 
insisting upon a single entity that is simultaneously human, animal, and machine, created by and 
existing through social reality and fiction. Importantly, in her conception of the cyborg, the 
boundary between the physical and non-physical is imprecise, reflecting the developing micro-
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technologies that create material effects in the world through seemingly immaterial means.26 
Haraway’s article foresaw the ways in which developing technologies and cybernetic culture 
would affect human subjectivity, such as the effects of data-bodies created through contemporary 
surveillance culture. Now, one of the many elements that make up the cyborg is their data avatar, 
which is simultaneously present and at work in virtual realities and algorithms, an object that is 
technological but inseparable from its human tether. These themes are mirrored in discussions of 
the posthuman body, which Jack Halberstam and Ira Livingston call “a technology, a screen, a 
projected image;”27 a body that is equally as non-binary in its embodiment as Haraway’s cyborg. 
As Haraway, Halberstam, and Livingston all show, in imagining something outside the dualism 
that has infiltrated so much Western thought, we must think beyond the visible borders of the 
human form. Of course, this cyborg is an offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism. But 
this origin does not dictate one predestined future. As Haraway suggests, “illegitimate offspring 
are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins”28 and are well-situated to forge new, unforeseen 
trajectories. Thus, there is political potential in understanding the body as this extended cyborg, 
for “a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not 
afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial 
identities and contradictory standpoints.”29 As the experience of Hansel and Gretel suggests, we 
cannot simply deny, ignore, or reject the state of being engendered by growing surveillance 
technology. It is already here and we are already enmeshed in it, often willingly. Therefore, the 
																																																								
26 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 149-181 
(New York; Routledge, 1991).  
27 Jack Halberstam and Ira Livingston, “Introduction,” in Posthuman Bodies (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1995).	
28 Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 151. 
29 Ibid., 153. 
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question is how to understand this joint kinship, and how to not be afraid of it in order to find 
what new realities might come out of it. 
 
While the notion of the cyborg is useful in approaching a binary-resistant conception of being, I 
still find that the notion allows for a lingering sense of multiple, distinct things coming together 
rather than these things existing as one inseparable object. Therefore, I utilize the notion of the 
hyperobject as developed by Timothy Morton to help in conceptualizing this extended body-
object. First, a hyperobject accounts for the immaterial nature of certain objects. Graham Harman 
in his initial object definition in the foundation of OOO asserted that all objects are not equally 
real, but they are equally objects, calling upon fantasies such as nymphs and utopias in a gesture 
to the agentic nature of fictive objects as well literal matter.30 Furthermore, these immaterial 
ideas are not of one individual mind, but exist outside of the mind through networked relations as 
well. Morton extends Harman’s initial definition with his notion of the hyperobject, which is a 
special kind of object, even an immaterial object, for its relation to the human through time and 
space. This hyperobject is sticky, nonlocal, and works at a different temporal scale than the 
human is able to perceive. Morton argues that the hyperobject’s superhuman scale has ushered in 
a new human phase of hypocrisy, weakness, and lameness where we must reassess more 
conventional understandings of human agency and causality.31 
 
To consider the human body-object and data-body cyborg as a singular hyperobject underscores 
its inseparability, as well as the ways that this new form influences human perception and 
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31 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013). 
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subjectivity. It is not a body-object with prosthetic data-bodies, but the body-object is the data-
body, and the effects of the data-body in the world are the effects of the same body-object. 
Therefore, the human itself distends into a data-body that extends in time and space. Aesthetic 
qualities of the object are precisely the qualities that the object radiates outward in order to relate 
to other objects. Like other objects, here the aesthetic qualities of the body—the appearances, 
representations, measurements, locations, etc.—have turned into data that travels. In fact, the self 
is so dispersed through space—active simultaneously in the local body as in the global 
datasphere—that it is no longer able to be perceived at once. The human’s own actions are 
outside the human’s perceptual capabilities. The vastness of the data-body also applies to the 
human’s relationship with time. In my previous chapter, I have discussed how the human’s 
actions add to the human species’ actions in ways that can only be measured through deep time. 
However, shifting relationships to time also applies to a micro sense of time that is equally 
impossible for the human to perceive. The data components of the data-body interact with 
algorithmic technologies at a pace too rapid for human perception. The human cannot keep up, 
but can only follow traces and track the new data delivered by the algorithm once the algorithm 
is set in motion. Furthermore, these algorithms have the ability to continue their work for an 
extended period of time, where our data may be components of algorithmic functions for years to 
come.  
 
The way that developing technologies alter the human experience is particular to the media itself, 
such that Mark Hansen has defined this type of technology as twenty-first-century media, which 
he defines as “a form of media that operates predominately beneath or beyond the registers of 
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human sense experience and for purposes other than storing such experience.”32 As other forms 
of media and technology have changed the human’s relationship to knowledge, twenty-first 
century media is an inescapable aspect of the way we currently take part in, experience, and 
understand the world around us. However, a shift is that we no longer choose to use media for 
our benefit and on our terms, nor does the media specifically function to enhance the human 
sensory capacity that has already developed. One example of twenty-first-century media is the 
Fitbit and other health trackers, which can tell you when your heart rate has risen, before your 
body is able to comprehend the change within itself. There is also potential for this information 
to be stored and made available to doctors or health insurance agencies as PII.33 Another 
example can be found in location tracking; data collected through location tracking can be sold 
and harnessed by advertisers, so that an algorithm delivers an ad for a specific restaurant that a 
person is about to drive by at dinner time that reflects their age demographic.34 These examples 
highlight the ways in which our data interacts with media technology at a rate beyond our 
perceptual ability.  
 
The ways that technology changes our perception of the world are inherently also changing our 
embodied sense of being. As Maaike Bleeker et al. suggest in their introduction to Performance 
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and Phenomenology, “technologies alter the very basis of our sensory experience and therefore 
affect what it means to live as an embodied human agent.”35 Mark Hansen’s conception of 
twenty-first-century media attempts to account for the embodied nature of this shift when he 
describes this media as a new organ of the human body. “We literally acquire new and alien 
‘organs’ (which must not be confused with prostheses of our human sense organs) for excavating 
extraperceptual dimensions of experience—our own as well as that of other entities.”36 The 
addition of this new organ leads to a shift toward a more porous and less self-referential concept 
of embodiment:  
[…] this direct targeting of the organs chips away at the body’s privilege: no longer 
positioned as default mediator and integrator of worldly microsensibilities, the body has 
itself become increasingly dependent on technical supplements for its capacity to sense, 
or more precisely, for its capacity to encounter—to em-body—worldly sensibility in its 
operational present.37  
This alien organ, therefore, effectively denaturalizes the body, while simultaneously diminishing 
the material body’s privilege, as new media becomes necessary to process the new data created 
by media. The data that has now become accessible is so small and swift, such a micro-
experience, that it is impossible to be lived by human consciousness. For instance, the shift in a 
heartbeat as it quickens an eighth of a second, or the rise in body temperature of a half degree, 
are not easily perceived. Furthermore, Hansen finds that technical sensors and other media in our 
environment can record events “directly at the microtemporal level of their operationality and—
																																																								
35 Maaike Bleeker, Jon Foley Sherman, and Eirini Nedelkopoulou, “Introduction,” in 
Performance and Phenomenology: Traditions and Transformations (New York: Routledge, 
2015), 3. 
36  Mark Hansen, Feed Forward: On the Future of Twenty-First-Century Media (Chicago: 




independently of consciousness’s mediation—‘feed them forward’ […] in ways that can 
influence consciousness’s own future agency in the world.”38 Temporality has therefore shifted. 
Rather than moving from the present, thinking through the experiential past, and moving to the 
future, now this temporality bypasses the past, moving directly from the operational present into 
the future. For instance, if a machine can alert you at the first rise of heartbeat, there is no need to 
notice the shift in oneself relative to a prior state, nor to connect this shift directly to a cause. 
Rather, the machine alerts in order to orient future actions: breathe in order to lower the heart 
rate. Berardi concurs with Hansen’s notion of this shift in the human’s relationship to 
technology, asserting that “the machine is inside us” in ways that transform human interaction in 
society. “The ‘infomachine’ now intersects with the social nervous system, the ‘biomachine’ 
interacts with the genetic becoming of the human organism.”39 With the advent of this new 
organ, then, the body is understood as porous, unbound, technologically open, and shifting in its 
relationship to time. In other words, the body itself might be understood as capable of extending 
to incorporate its data-body.  
 
As these shifts in perception and embodiment take place, we must reconsider the ways that our 
bodies take up space in the world, as material agentic in the vast atmosphere of virtual space. 
The lived body is tied to one’s perception of the world. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty describes the 
lived body as the “expressive space” by which we experience the world.40 But, the lived body is 
changing as it develops, growing alien organs that become an inseparable part of it. The lived 
body is dispersed and extended. It is this lived body that is brought into view in Hansel and 
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Gretel. The audience’s lived body is put into contact with their data-body, albeit in miniature. 
Typically invisible and at work beyond our perception, here the data-body literally greets the 
lived body face to face, arriving into the second part of the installation faster than the lived body 
can get there, active in ways that the lived body could not expect or predict. The installation 
therefore makes available the relationship between the body-object and its expanded self created 
and manipulated by twenty-first-century media. The participant’s body-object is the central 
object of the installation, from which an expanded attention radiates outward towards this 
object’s extended reach. But it is essential to the installation’s dramaturgy that the lived-body 
object enter the space, for it is this object’s aesthetic qualities that interacts with its surrounding 
atmosphere. The body-object’s aesthetic trace is one of the means of data-capture. Indeed, the 
body’s facial structure, fingerprint, body mass—all aesthetic qualities—are some of the elements 
that go on to become the PII circulating in the datasphere. The installation highlights this element 
of the data-body, as well as the psychological draw that comes with seeing one’s own likeness 
conveyed in an aesthetically pleasing manner, through its construction of space. OOO supports 
the primacy of this aesthetic interaction, as the object is in contact with its surroundings through 
aesthetic means. Here, those aesthetic elements become objects themselves, captured as data and 
growing proportionately more agentic. 
 
As previously discussed, a theme of the installation is precisely that this twenty-first-century 
media is not inherently good or bad, but a revealing of the condition itself, and within this 
condition emerges multiple potentialities. Twenty-first-century media is a part of our way of 
being. Dystopian aspects emerge in the ways that our identities, our extended bodies, can be 
purchased, manipulated, and policed so quickly that we are incapable of perceiving it. And yet, a 
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potentiality also emerges in the way this condition interrogates the interior body, revealing 
certain withdrawn elements of experience and the space created there. Indeed, OOO offers the 
notion that the body-object, as an object with both sensual and withdrawn elements, still has 
some withdrawn elements that belong to that object alone and cannot be subsumed into that 
system. There are some elements of each object that exist in and of themselves regardless of their 
connections or performativity in relation to other systems. Further, the body-object’s futurity is 
radically open, capable of transforming and reorienting. It can produce data that is unproductive, 
contradictory, and confusing. Hansel and Gretel provides an opportunity to realize the potential 
of disjunctive data. Many participants interacted with the drones in order to create images of 
other shapes and entities.41 For instance, some participants created superhuman shapes; one 
person created an image with multiple arms radiating out of a center body, while another 
participant shifted their arms in order to blur the image to appear as a body with wings. These 
creations highlight the limits of drone imaging to accurately capture and track human identity, 
since some aesthetic elements that contribute to data are malleable. Furthermore, this experience 
with the drones reveals the creative potential of engaging directly with the technology with this 
sense of play; play, artistry, humor, parody do not fit cleanly into the set of data. In a related 
study, Harris Kornstein finds countersurveillance and digital obfuscation methods in drag 
performances, as drag queens perform shifting identities online, in part through makeup that 
confuses facial recognition algorithms.42 Here, drag queens engage a sense of play and 
experimentation that resists the notion of fixed identity inherent in surveillance attempts. As 
James M. Harding’s Performance, Transparency, and the Cultures of Surveillance and Toby 
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(photo by @upinthenimbus),” Instagram, 8 August 2017.	
42 Harris Kornstein, “Under Her Eye: Digital Drag as Obfuscation and Countersurveillance,” 
Surveillance and Society 17, 5 (2019): 681-698. 
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Beauchamp’s Going Stealth both argue, surveillance depends on strict social categories, 
including those of race, class, nationality, and gender. But individuals can provide disjunctive 
data to these categories to varying degrees.43 Artists and activists are at the forefront of this 
resistance, such as the Dazzle Club, who use anti-facial recognition paint and choreographed 
walks mapping surveillance in public space in London.44 Hansel and Gretel, therefore, highlights 
our embedded condition within this datasphere in order to aid in a recognition of the system we 
participate in, but dystopic and resistant potentials are implicit in this condition. 
 
Figure 18. A morphed image of myself projected onto the floor’s grid. Photo by author. 
 
In Hansel and Gretel, the audience body itself is the central performing object of the installation, 
but the installation makes visible the ways that this body-object is extended due to the ways that 
twenty-first-century media has shifted the embodied nature of being in contemporary society. 
The human body itself has grown into a hyperobject after its own aesthetic elements and its data-
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body have grown to exist in multiple time scales and virtual locations at once, all acting 
simultaneously. As Morton argued, the hyperobject is beyond our ability to perceive, but this 
time, that hyperobject is us. Conceiving of the data-body as the body itself requires a 
reorientation to the ways in which we engage with media, in which data traces of all kinds are 
taken seriously for their agentic potentiality. The human as hyperobject implies the object’s 
withdrawn nature and ability to produce contradictory data. The data-body is a part of the 
human, able to be manipulated and played with in order to produce messy, unexpected, or 
disjunctive data. And Hansel and Gretel offers the potential for a playful interaction where the 
malleable nature of the body-object’s image is part of the fun. Embracing this malleability in the 
sensual sphere and the ability to create unprofitable data may be a potential antidote to the 
otherwise overwhelming nature of the hyperobject’s scale and its embeddedness in the 
datasphere. The performance operates at the level of the senses, and by disturbing the senses and 
revealing aesthetics of the body-object, it expands an understanding of them. Our sensual 
elements engage with nonhuman forms and technology in ways beyond our perception and 
control. Indeed, there is a remapping of sensuality itself, because it is not only within the human 
sphere. 
 
The Explicit Body45 as Affective Object: Romeo Castellucci’s Julius Caesar. Spared Parts 
The following discussion of Romeo Castellucci’s Julius Caesar. Spared Parts brings focus back 
to an inarguably material body, potently present in one time and space opposed to the vast space 
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Body in Performance, in its reference to the literal, material body in performance aimed to 
“liberate” the female body from patriarchal delimitation. Here, I find a similarly literal, material 
body, but in this case, the explicit body in performance aims to expose the integrity of the 
material body itself. 
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of the hyperobject-body staged in Hansel and Gretel. Rather than the expansion of the body, 
Castellucci’s performance moves inward, staging an explicit body—undeniably material and 
fully revealed—that brings the body’s inner-workings into audience view. But by exploring 
inward, Castellucci’s performance harnesses the simultaneous labor of the material body as well 
as its incorporeal affect. Produced as part of the Crossing the Line Festival in New York City in 
2016, the performance is a site-specific adaptation of Castellucci’s previous Giulio Cesare 
(1997), broken into fragments and performed in Federal Hall.46 The updated production 
streamlines the original into three main scenes, with added contextual resonance due to its 
current space. Federal Hall now serves as a National Memorial in honor of “the birthplace of 
American government.” While the Greek Revival architecture, with eight striking columns along 
the building’s façade and a marbled dome atop the main chamber, recalls the classical style of 
Julius Caesar, the building’s context within US politics is also relevant. The current structure 
lies on the site where the Congress of the Confederation met and George Washington was sworn 
in as the nation’s first president, and it now has an address on Wall Street, steps away from the 
New York Stock Exchange and 40 Wall Street, named “The Trump Building.” The performance 
therefore took place in the shadow of US democracy and the impending 2016 election that saw 
Trump rise to power.  
 
It is in this context that Castellucci stages three scenes from the play. First, an actor, wearing a 
name tag with the title “vskji” in reference to Stanislavsky, performs Flavius and Marullus’s 
speech to the citizens of Rome with an endoscope placed within his throat in order to project a 
live stream of the movement of his vocal cords onto the dome ceiling. Then, an aged Caesar 
																																																								
46 I attended the performance at Federal Hall on 2 October 2016.  
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takes the stage silently, communicating only through gesture. Finally, an actor who has 
undergone a laryngectomy performs Mark Antony’s famous oration to the public.  
 
Figure 19. The “vskji” nametag projected onto the dome ceiling of Federal Hall in Julius Caesar. 
Spared Parts. Photo by Maria Baranova. 
 
Through the juxtaposition of the three bodies, and additional performing objects and imagery, 
Castellucci stages the body as an affective machine—conceiving of the body as a specific kind of 
agentic object where affective force lies in the body’s materiality itself in a manner that 
questions normative measurements of successful labor. For the purpose of this discussion, I will 
call this affective machinic body an “onto-machine.” I adopt “onto” in reference to a being and 
individual. “Machine,” then, suggests a device that transmits a force, but also refers to Levi 
Bryant’s use of the word “machine” to refer to units of being. Bryant chooses “machine” over 
“object” in order to avoid subject/object associations, as well as to support the idea that entities 
function and operate within themselves.47 The image of the machine is also helpful in implying 
the interlocking working of parts. As I will go on to argue further, Castellucci’s onto-machine 
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labors in ways that will remain unknown to us. Julius Caesar considers how the body’s 
representation on stage, as well as its place in societal power relations, proceeds from the literal 
body and its material capacities. As in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, the affective power of 
rhetoric and charisma, and the way one can sway the masses through communicative means 
stand as strong themes. However, Castellucci looks to where this rhetorical ability actually stems 
in the body. Is it the voice? Is it other aspects of the body’s material? As the affective 
performances of the aged Caesar and muted Mark Antony show, there is more to communication 
than spoken word alone. The performance therefore provides a way of considering the 
performing body as a body that works, not necessarily successfully laboring towards its stated 
aim, but nevertheless with working parts that collaborate for great effect. The onto-machine 
possesses an “ontopower,” which Brian Massumi describes as an affective “power to” as 
opposed to a “power over.”48 Ontopower describes “a power to incite and orient emergence,”49 
an abstract force with effects that prime and direct consciousness, laying groundwork for even 
greater effects to come. In other words, ontopower aids in thinking about the invisible, 
immeasurable agency material holds, as well as ways to conceive of what aesthetics and affects 
do in the world.  
 
The onto-machine staged in Julius Caesar provides an opportunity to think about the 
implications of OOO, and its ensuing flat ontology, on the human body. As in OOO’s definition 
of the object, the body is an object with elements in withdrawal from even itself, strange and in a 
loop, yet this does not mean that the body is separate and sealed off from other objects in the 
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environment. Rather, the onto-machine communicates through complex affective and aesthetic 
means. Katherine Behar has argued that OOO offers the body a place of resistance to the 
neoliberal compulsion to perform and network, through its notion of the object as singular and 
withdrawn in nature.50 I argue instead that the onto-machine is intimately connected to its 
surroundings; however, the connectivity modeled here is rebellious with a potential to subvert 
clean and profitable data. It is urgently affective with a vast capacity for troubling and 
uncomfortable encounters as opposed to smooth interactions. Its connections are aesthetic, but 
unendingly productive through a form of ontopower. To be and think posthuman is not removing 
the human from these elements, but rather making those connections stronger.  
 
Theatre of affective material 
The theatrical style and aesthetic interests of Castellucci’s body of work points to a continued 
attention to the materiality of the stage and its affective potential. Romeo Castellucci has worked 
within the collective Societas Raffaello Sanzio based in Cesena, Italy, since 1981, formed with 
his sister Claudia Castellucci, Chiara Guidi, and Chiara’s brother Paolo, with the express goal to 
explore the potential of theatre outside narration by fusing theatre, performance art, and visual 
art. Castellucci himself comes from a background in painting and stage design, and the group is 
highly influenced by the visual arts and avant-garde theatre. Since 2006, Romeo, Claudia, and 
Chiara have been making work independently within the collective, of which category Romeo’s 
original Guilio Cesare (1997) and Julius Caesar. Spared Parts fall under. According to Societas, 
“theatre is the field of art which has the greatest potential to suspend the laws governing 
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everyday life, and institute a new reality.”51 Dorota Semenowicz finds that for Castellucci, image 
is the primary form through which this new reality is found, but the image is a subject of 
philosophical reflection and investigation. Castellucci often engages with classical works, 
whether paintings, literature, or myth, in order to interrogate their implicit ideology and to put 
the work into a different perspective. The foundational text with which Castellucci works is 
secondary to the materiality of the stage and what the materiality itself can produce. For 
Castellucci’s ideas are embodied on the stage through the materiality of the production. Thus, the 
work of Castellucci is rich with potential for considering the performativity of materiality of the 
body within its atmosphere, which is made up of material ideas as well as other nonhuman 
objects.  
 
The Onto-Machine: A Body of Laboring Parts 
Different iterations of Castellucci’s work with Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar have appeared in a 
variety of locations since the 1997 premiere of Giulio Cesare, but the version at Federal Hall 
presented three scenes in which the body was affectively striking.52 In the 2016 production, after 
waiting in a winding line outside Federal Hall and finally entering to find seats directly on the 
marble floor, the audience witnessed an actor, Sergio Scarlatella, manipulate an endoscope. First, 
he turned the camera and projector on, which filled a large square area of the dome ceiling with 
																																																								
51 Dorota Semenowicz, The Theatre of Romeo Castellucci and Societas Raffaelo Sanzio (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2.	
52 Julius Caesar. Spared Parts was Romeo Castellucci’s New York City premiere, which pared 
down his previous Caesars into a few spectacular fragments, discarding previous sections that 
included, for instance, two female actors whose bodies bore the marks of anorexia and an actor 
modulating his voice through helium. For analyses of this original production, see Erika Fischer-
Lichte, “Reality and Fiction in Contemporary Theatre,” Theatre Research International 33, 1 
(2008): 84-96; Nicholas Ridout, Stage Fright, Animals, and Other Theatrical Problems 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Dorota Semenowicz, The Theatre of 
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the endoscope’s view. Then, the actor moved the camera to his face, closer and closer, so that his 
pores became larger than life on the ceiling. And so no one was confused as to the temporal link 
between the actor and the image, we watched him move the camera to his ears, eyes, and nose. 
Then, the actor moved the endoscope into his nostril and snorted it into his throat, guiding the 
scope to a resting position directly above the epiglottis. The image was of slimy pink tissues that 
appeared much more vulnerable than the sterile drawings of vocal cords found in anatomical 
textbooks. Then, the actor spoke, delivering Flavius’s and Murellus’s lines from Act I, Scene I, 
in which they scold the commoners of Rome for their celebration of Caesar’s triumph when they 
had celebrated Pompey so recently. The subtitles translating the Italian words were featured 
directly below the actor’s contracting muscles. As the words grew more impassioned, the actor’s 
vocal folds swelled, sometimes bulging with a hoarse scream, and developed a white mucus that 





Figure 20. The endoscope’s projections of the actor’s throat during a production of Julius 
Caesar. Spared Parts in Gdańsk.  
 
The technology of the endoscope gave the gift of sight to the audience, bringing our eyes into 
areas otherwise impossible to access and effectively creating an image where the lack of light 
and sightlines would otherwise render an image impossible. What’s more, the endoscope allowed 
access into the body cavity without disrupting the body’s borders or requiring any incisions. Yes, 
one could dissect vocal cords if removed from the body, but this would require inanimate, dead 
muscle. Here, we are witness to the active working of these parts. The ability to witness the 
mechanism of the voice in action suggests the concept of a machine, as we are able to see the 
interlocking parts that are working together and having an effect on one another. Indeed, the 
definition of “machine” refers to “an apparatus using or applying mechanical power and having 
several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task.”5354 In this 
case, the vocal folds, epiglottis and cartilage function as these “parts,” and the audience is made 
privy to the technical mechanism of the creation of sound.  
 
The concept of the body as machine has a long lineage in both science and philosophy, dating 
back to pre-Enlightenment models of dissection and anatomical drawing, which supported the 
																																																								




54 The notion of the machine also suggests a connection with the theories of Deleuze and 
Guattari, which I will go on to explore in my discussion of Ryoji Ikeda’s supercodex [live set] 
later in this chapter. 
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notion of the machinic body understood as an object separate from reason and spirit.55 The 
privileging of sight as a means to know what the body is and how it works only supported the 
definitive separation between the knowing subject and the knowable object.56 As Maaike Bleeker 
argues, this concept of body as matter distinguished from spirit was an invention of European 
civilization. Then in the 1600s, Descartes moved away from the concept of life as a vital force 
toward a more scientific materialism. Cartesian subjectivity was accompanied by and made 
possible through deployment of new language to describe the body’s interior, language that was 
made available due to dissection practices. As Bleeker asserts, “As a machine, the body became 
objectified and fully divided from the Cartesian subject.”57 The body’s interior became 
understood as a new territory to be explored and conquered, reproducing the processes of 
discovery and exploitation in a colonial mindset. Notions of the body therefore contributed 
greatly to the underpinnings of modernity. Castellucci’s Caesar draws upon this history of the 
body in modernity, but the endoscope shifts away from the divisionary procedure of dissection. 
Instead of violently dismantling the object for one’s own purposes, here the object is 
undisturbed, inviting a sense of voyeurism rather than domination.  
 
Julius Caesar. Spared Parts focuses on the body as part of a complex dramaturgical landscape, 
and the body as machine thematically underlines some of the larger concepts at play by turning 
																																																								
55 See Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance 
Culture (London: Routledge, 1995).  
56 It is worth noting that this same privileging of sight and separation between subject and object 
is also enacted in traditional representational theatre forms.  
57 Maaike Bleeker, ed., Anatomy Live: Performance and the Operating Theatre (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 13. 
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symbols into material. Castellucci demonstrates an interest in literalizing theatrical metaphors,58 
and when speaking about the 1997 Caesar, Castellucci explains that it “came from a series of 
notes that had to do with voice, that had to do with power, the power of the voice, the power of 
words and with rhetoric.”59 If Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar locates potential political power in 
the power of speech and rhetoric, Castellucci takes this location to be more literal, looking 
deeper into what lays behind speech to the power of the voice itself, or perhaps, the power of the 
body to create the voice itself. Of course, the body’s intricate inner mechanisms are the forces 
behind the voice, and all of the body’s capabilities and effects on the world. Interestingly, the 
actor maneuvering the endoscope is called “…vskji” rather than Flavius or Murellus, in reference 
to Constantin Stanislavski as the leading developer of naturalistic acting. If Stanislavski’s 
method seeks to engage the actor’s interiority and subconscious in order to release honest 
emotions, Castellucci literalizes this as well. It’s the body’s mechanisms that create the 
subconscious just as the body’s mechanisms express this to the audience. And Castellucci takes 
us further inside the body than Stanislavski’s method ever could.  
 
Whereas the first scene presents the normative construction of an ideal body—a young, healthy 
white male—the following scenes present bodies often marked as lacking within a capitalist 
society that privileges the healthy laboring body. Next, Gianna Plazzi enters the stage as an aged 
Caesar wearing a blood red robe. The actor bears the markers of age, shuffling slowly and 
unsurely with a stooped back. He does not speak, but stares into the audience and slowly makes 
gestures. Then, three younger men wearing white robes, a sort of chorus, approach him and 
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disrobe him in a ritualistic manner, ostensibly removing him from power through its societal 
markers, before laying him down and covering his body. His material body rests on stage, 
immobile in a body bag, before the three men carry him away. Then, the actor who delivers 
Mark Antony’s famous speech regarding the wounds of Caesar, Dalmazio Masini, is without 
vocal cords. Masini underwent a laryngectomy many years prior due to throat cancer.60 A wound 
in his throat is visible to the audience, appearing as a hole a few inches above his collarbone. 
Masini manages to produce some sound, somewhat like speaking, by sending air through the 
stomach and esophagus, as the muscles in his neck contract in an imitation of the vocal cords. 
Castellucci highlights the attempt with a microphone taped to Masini’s neck adjacent to the hole. 
In both bodies of Caesar and Mark Antony, the mechanical properties of the body are somehow 
deficient, with aged or removed parts unable to be replaced.  
 
By framing the first body to appear onstage as a working machine, the dramaturgy drew attention 
to the ways in which the two bodies that followed differed in their material functioning. Erika 
Fischer-Lichte, referring to the original production, describes how the bodies of Castellucci’s 
actors had such a disturbing impact on the audience that it upset the conventional connection 
between the actor’s physicality and the actor’s dramatic role. “They did not perceive [the actors’ 
bodies] as signs of a particular figure but solely as their particular bodily being-in-the-world.”61 
Semenowicz echoes this effect with the notion that “there is no actor, only physicality on the 
brink of life.”62 This has been discussed as a means toward Castellucci’s elision between fiction 
and reality, a theme in his larger interrogation of the theatre form and challenging audience 
																																																								
60 Fringe Arts, “Julius Caesar: Spared Parts,” n.d., accessed 16 October 2017, 
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61 Fischer-Lichte, “Reality and Fiction in Contemporary Theatre,” 86. 
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perception. For instance, Fischer-Lichte argues that when perceiving the body’s phenomenality, 
associations and memories are induced that are not directly connected to the object being 
perceived. I agree that these bodies invite responses that are not grounded in their representation 
of the text, but these responses might be understood as responses to the affective nature of the 
onto-machine, which is a material first and foremost, rather than a symbolic representation. 
 
Indeed, the ways in which the material body itself, or the onto-machine, is capable of generating 
affective stimuli is central to Castellucci’s efforts in making textual symbols into something 
literal and tangible. In the original Shakespearean text, Mark Antony is second to Brutus in 
education and supposed public speaking skill. And yet, Mark Antony succeeds in winning over 
the public’s opinion through his charismatic, affective manipulation of his audience. In the text, 
the affective tug is just as effective as logic itself. This affective tug is another idea literalized by 
Castellucci, as Masini’s speech is without language and yet equally as stirring as Scarlatella’s. 
As a member of the audience, watching the endoscope enter Scarlatella’s throat made me, and 
many others around me, squirm uncomfortably and hold onto our own throats. Multiple reviews, 
such as those by Rowena Hawkins and Molly Grogan, make reference to this scene that made 
people “visibly recoil”63 because “it’s hard to keep watching.”64 But Masini’s speech as Mark 
Antony was even more physically discomforting to me as an audience member, as the long 
section featured a body asked to perform language, something that it could not do, but 
continuously trying, and failing. The labor of the attempt was heightened as the actor stood 
nearly still, save for the puckering of the muscles surrounding the hole in his throat, which the 
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microphone accentuated. The body’s labor is the action here, but the labor is not productive 
according to normative evaluative measures. This failure is also in direct reference to the 
working machine that the endoscope displayed. The puckering muscles mimic the contracting 
vocal folds, while the visible hole of the throat is aesthetically similar to the trachea extending 
beyond the glottis. In both cases, what can be seen—the hole, the vocal cords—gesture to the 
fact that there’s more that cannot be seen. There are deeper layers of this machine that remain 
unknown to us.  
 
Affective Onto-machines 
The unknown layers of the machine can be accounted for through the object’s withdrawn realm, 
in OOO terms, but in this staging of the body, the unknown depths are an element of the 
affective relationality as well. Since objects exist on different planes,65 there is one realm of the 
object that we can see and interact with—the sensual object, which includes the aesthetic 
qualities that radiate outward. These are the aesthetic qualities of every object, such as the slimy, 
pink, undulations of the vocal folds, or the exterior appearance of the body itself (objects can 
exist within other objects, and so I refer here to both the vocal system as well as the human body 
as objects in their own right). Notably, the performance offers access to more aesthetic elements 
than is regularly possible, and other additional aesthetic elements remain unknown in this 
interaction. However, Graham Harman insists that there is a particular realm of the object not 
revealed through perception—the real object—that is in constant withdrawal, which the aesthetic 
realm cannot fully encompass or express. This concept of withdrawal is foundational in OOO, as 
it implicitly asserts that objects have a reality, and that this reality exists beyond and independent 
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of human perception. Objects do not exist for the human or depend upon the human in any way. 
No amount of perception, no exhaustion of relationships, and no quality of sensual interaction 
will reveal every single aspect of the object. It is this potentiality for which the notion of the 
withdrawn accounts. Another foundational concept in OOO is the need for a flat ontology in 
which the human subject is considered to be one of the many kinds of objects, but an object just 
the same. Levi Bryant argues that we must understand the human as an object in withdrawal as 
well, while he finds proof in Lacan’s graph of sexuation for psychological withdrawal from 
oneself.66 Yet, the physical body is in withdrawal too, as withdrawal refers to the concept that 
there remain unknowns, as well as potentialities and relations in the body of which other objects 
do not have a perception or access.  
 
The affective onto-machine on stage suggests that the concept of withdrawal is a foundation for 
both the definition, indeed the very being, of an object, while also lending to its affective 
qualities. Aesthetic, sensual qualities are considered the accessible aspects of the object.  
But in the case of Mark Antony, the visible stoma draws attention toward its depth through its 
aesthetic qualities, including the definition of the flesh’s void, and the dark space within in. The 
allusion to yet undiscovered and beyond reach—withdrawn—sensuality is a part of the affective 
encounter. The body is affective, not despite, but in part due to its withdrawal, and the allusion to 
what is unknown adds to the affective qualities.  
 
The connection here between the onto-machine and affect has its basis in the theoretical 
foundations of affect, in addition to this specific dramaturgy Castellucci has created. Brian 
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Massumi, in his study of affect in Parables of the Virtual, asserts that the muscle’s biology is 
bound up in the human’s reception of affect. Whereas feelings must be decoded and translated by 
the brain, affect is the direct input of sensation that the body receives. In fact, Massumi finds a 
lag time between this direct input and the brain’s perception and following response. In those 
infinitesimal moments, the body’s material responds on its own. The term Massumi uses for the 
perception by the muscles itself is “proprioception,” following the studies of Charles S. 
Sherrington in 1906 through to Jacques Paillard’s edited Brain and Space (1991). This concept 
of proprioception further supports the idea of the onto-machine, as it highlights how the body’s 
material is agential in perception and response. Here the onto-machine does not depend on the 
subject. I do not mean to suggest that the body and the brain are split in a Cartesian manner. 
Rather the brain is of the body, and studies in neuroscience as well as cognitive reception would 
be helpful in parsing out the anatomical functioning of the brain as an object as well. However, 
for the purpose of this argument, I’m interested in bodily materiality as something not entirely 
under the control of the subject’s reason. For instance, when studying the work of conceptual 
performance artist Stelarc, Massumi finds that the body can indeed be its own subject and object, 
in that the body can both give and receive information within itself.67 The proprioceptive model 
accounts for how the body’s material interacts sensually, even though the interaction may not be 
entirely noticeable or governed by the brain. We can see that the animacy of the material body 
itself can act independently from the fully bound human subject, withdrawn from human 
perception, but available to other materialities. 
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The final image of Castellucci’s Julius Caesar. Spared Parts returns to the image of nonhuman 
objects, once again making symbols tangible while also drawing connections between the object 
and the human body through their relationship to their aesthetic qualities. On one side of the 
stage was a stand with a horizontal bar with a series of bare light bulbs. A screw-like machine 
turned on its axis, slowly moving ever closer to each light bulb. Painstakingly, the machine 
pressed into each light bulb’s glass sphere one by one. Microphones emphasized the scratching 
sound of the glass, and the sound of the bulb’s tension under the extreme pressure. One by one, 
the machine shattered each bulb, extinguishing its radiation, and scattering glass shards upon the 
floor. When the excruciating pattern of scratching and shattering was complete, the performance 
ended. The scene may be the embodiment of Caesar’s final act, in which many lives are lost in 
the battle between Brutus and Cassius’s versus Antony and Octavius’s armies. To complete the 
pattern of literalizing ideas into images, Castellucci literally extinguishes the lives of objects 
onstage, and the audience witnesses the end to the object’s aesthetic radiation as it breaks apart 
into a new form, with an entirely different set of qualities. 
 
Figure 21. The light bulb shattering machine used at the end of Julius Caesar. Spared Parts. 




This affective onto-machine has implications that upset certain assumptions of the defined and 
governable object prevalent since the Enlightenment. Indeed, the Shakespearean text included in 
the first section of Julius Caesar. Spared Parts refers to the carpenter and the cobbler as 
“mechanicals.” In this period, “mechanical” was a term for manual laborer,68 but eventually the 
word’s connotations developed to include references to machinic qualities in the human, such as 
lacking thought or spontaneity, or the quality of work produced by machines. The trajectory of 
this meaning points to the developments in Western thought as conceptions of the thinking 
subject and nonhuman material grew more distant. This development is exemplified in 
Descartes’s introduction of mind-body dualism to philosophy (as in “Discourse on the Method” 
first published in 1637). A strong binary between subject and object developed, as the reasonable 
“I” stood in contrast to the other objects “over there,” distant and manipulatable by the 
controlling subject. And of course, this notion was mobilized to benefit colonial thought.69 This 
display of an onto-machine in relation to an early modern text underscores this lineage of 
Western thought, which emphasizes the value of this alternative view on stage. Rather than 
continuing the separation of subject and object, Castellucci’s dramaturgy finds the affective 
agency of the onto-machine, locating knowledge in the body itself, and highlighting materiality’s 
already active agency in our communications. The object is not distant, but intimately a part of 
																																																								




69 Rosemarie Garland also addresses how this kind of thinking has been used to marginalize 
disabled bodies. Medical technology used to measure the “healthy” body was also used as a 
supposedly objective measure of the body’s capacity to work (50), and by extension, who was 
not allowed to work. This supports the need argued here to reconsider the body as always already 
“working,” and the need to attune to different means of labor and communication. Rosemarie 
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us. The object is not controllable, but active in its own right. Our material bodies are always 
responding to input as well as creating output into the world, and this often occurs without our 
perception and without trained language or rhetoric. Therefore, bringing the subject and object 
together in the onto-machine resists objectification and exploitation of the object, which can 
easily occur when the object is removed and seen as passive. In a provocative wink to the ways 
in which this vision of the onto-machine relates to society, Castellucci stages even the most 
powerful—Julius Caesar and Mark Antony—as objects themselves.  
 
Within Castellucci’s dramaturgy, the affective capacity of the body is relevant in the political 
sphere through the reference of iconic political figures, but affective agency is powerful off stage 
as well. The affective interactions stemming from aesthetic aspects are those that reach out from 
the onto-machine and relate to others via the afore-mentioned onto-power. As Massumi argues, 
the body responds to affect directly, and so the affective production of the onto-machine directly 
manifests in fellow onto-machines in an intimate way. It is so intimate, in fact, that these 
affective relations might even shape another’s perception and actions. As Massumi describes 
ontopower, it is a priming that can catalyze affective attunement, creating connections and flows. 
Priming, from psychology, is “a phenomenon in which exposure to a stimulus, such as a word or 
image, influences how one responds to a subsequent, related stimulus.”70 One type of stimulus, 
then, is an affective input. “In priming, the meaning and content come after, in effect. And the 
model is not one of communication to pass a message, but of activation for producing something 
that has never come to pass before—a novel modulation.”71	In Massumi’s conception of 
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ontopower, it functions as a powerful influence in the workings of the state. For instance, the 
affect of fear primes attenuation to threats, leading to a logic of preemption as a means to 
undercut those threats. But, as the affect of fear is real, the empirical status of a threat is 
irrelevant. “Once a futurity, always a futurity: the threat always could have eventuated. That’s 
the affective fact of the matter.”72 The stakes are high, as affective interactions can prime actions 
that have far-reaching consequences, as Massumi’s example of the “war on terror” makes clear. 
But we must bring this back to the body, because the communication of affect stems from the 
body itself, and it does not need language to operate. Indeed, it could even be working 
simultaneously with language, but communicating information that is contradictory to the 
meaning of the spoken words. And yet, the affective information is taken in first, and directly 
into the body. Masini’s Marc Antony speech must therefore be understood as extremely 
“successful,” despite the failure of word formation. Further, this knowledge urgently points 
toward the need of seriously examining aesthetic and affective qualities of bodies in interactions, 
and different perspectives on what constitutes a successful or worthwhile communication. If 
body’s are in intimate relation with their atmosphere, having agentic effects through their body 
itself, then all kinds of bodies are equal in their agentic capacity. 
 
To conclude, Julius Caesar. Spared Parts presents the human body as an affective onto-machine 
through a multitude of dramaturgical techniques, the largest of which is thematic play between 
seen and unseen, and withdrawn and sensually affective. But saying that the body is an object is 
not to divorce the body from agency, complexity, or feeling, as an object always has all of these 





performer’s body is an affective object, communicating viscerally and intimately with the 
audience’s bodies. This intimacy occurs through aesthetic and sensual means in a messy and 
disorganized manner. Rather than a clear cause and effect, give and take, or delivery of goods 
and services, the bodies are communicating as material, sometimes even beyond human reason’s 
means of perception. The onto-machine here cannot be entirely subsumed into societal structures 
as we know them, with something still withdrawn from society’s ability to measure. But, this 
withdrawn nature does not inhibit the onto-machine from communicating. In fact, it only aids in 
the primacy of the affective communication between multiple bodies, which have profound 
implications for ensuing perception and action. 
 
Means of Perceiving the Onto-machine: Ryoji Ikeda’s supercodex [live set] 
In Hansel and Gretel, the participants’ bodies become the performing objects, while in Julius 
Caesar. Spared Parts, the actors’ bodies engage directly with the audience’s bodies through 
affective means. The design of Hansel and Gretel engages with traditions of performance art and 
installation art, in which the spectator’s body is implicated in the structure. The audience’s 
immersion in the physical space, where their material body interacts with other materials, in 
some ways makes this sense of the body-object more evident. However, it is also possible to 
achieve this direct engagement with the audience’s material onto-machine even in a proscenium 
theatre and seated auditorium. In Ryoji Ikeda’s supercodex [live set], as performed in the 
Crossing the Line Festival in New York City in 2017, the spectator’s material body, including 
the body’s functions and the brain’s ability to perceive these functions, is an integral part of the 
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performance’s affective tone.73 Ikeda is an electronic composer and visual artist based in Paris, 
whose supercodex album experiments with electronic sounds, including tones above and below 
the human ear’s capacity to detect. In the [live set] performance, these tones act on the body’s 
materiality, with vibrations activating the sensorium of the body that create a disturbance through 
their intensity. As the body responds to the sound waves, the audience briefly accesses a 
perception of the body’s independent response to environmental actants. By forcing this 
momentary shift in perception, the performance offers a glimpse at a different mode of 
perceiving one’s surroundings, and a training ground in which to practice this alternative mode. I 
argue that this almost atomic interaction with the human body promotes a posthuman 
understanding of the body as an object, and that this affective experience of the body as an onto-
machine supports a creative, positive posthuman subjectivity that is, as Braidotti says, something 
that is “materialist and vitalist, embodied and embedded.”74 
 
Ikeda and the posthuman potential of sound 
Ryoji Ikeda began his career as a sound artist, working as a deejay in 1990 before partnering 
with the Japanese performance group Dumb Type as a composer in 1994. He then transitioned 
into experimenting with sound art through installations, live performances, and recordings, and 
eventually added multimedia visual elements to his live performances. Ikeda is known for his 
experimentation with samples of noise, clicks, beeps, blips, and sine waves, which pulse 
rhythmically to create a genre that is literally electronic music. As the category of sound art has 
grown, along with the theories that accompany it, the definition of noise has become more 
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specific. For Caleb Kelly, “irregular vibrations of the air constitute noise, whilst regular 
vibrations produce tones.”75 More broadly the genre of noise music has become an important 
part of sound art as a whole. In noise music, the sonic register is treated as raw and expressive 
noise that shares with Ikeda’s work a sense of being extra to human experience and 
overwhelming to the senses. The category of volume also comes into play in Ikeda’s work: 
“volume, as distinct from noise, draws our attention to our bodies, alerting us to the phenomena 
of sound entering the body.”76 Within his compositions, Ikeda experiments with the extremities 
of noise, tones, and volume. Where the intensity of sounds is measured in decibels, the 
frequency, or pitch, of sound is measured in Hertz (Hz). “Humans can generally sense sounds at 
frequencies between 20 and 20,000 cycles per second, or hertz (Hz)—although this range shrinks 
as a person ages.”77 To put this in perspective, a human heartbeat is 1 Hz, a deep human voice is 
about 100 Hz, where an E flat on a violin is 659.3 Hz, a microwave oven is 2.4 gigahertz, and an 
x-ray is 10 petaherz. Our ability to hear up to 20,000 Hz can’t compare to a cat’s ability to hear 
up to 79,000 Hz, or a dolphin’s to 150,000. Ikeda works with ranges past 20,000, on the fringe of 
the human capacity to hear. The vibrations, however, might be felt in other ways, which I will 
later go on to describe. 
 
Ikeda’s oeuvre exists within the world of sound art, as he crafts soundscapes that envelop his 
audience in every setting, whether concert venue, museum, or theatre, and affect the material 
body beyond the ear. R. Murray Schafer defines the soundscape as “any acoustic field of 
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study,”78 describing it as something that occurs organically in our social environments, but it can 
also occur as a specifically designed space. Indeed, the soundscape is indelibly linked to space, 
both because sound occurs through vibrations in the air, but also in its structuring of space. As 
Paul Hegarty defines sound art, it both reflects upon this creation of space and enacts it. 
Furthermore, sound art implicates its listener and the position of the listener, taking into account 
the materiality at play in this event. Indeed, “the acoustical event is also a social one.”79 Ikeda’s 
work reflects these interests, working with large scales and high volumes that emphasize the 
body’s location and the limits of the body’s perceptive capacities. More specific to Ikeda’s work 
than to the more general sound art genre is Ikeda’s interest in “the essential physics of sound”80 
and its relation to mathematics and big data. In his datamatics project (2006- ), Ikeda works with 
conversion software that turns any data into barcodes, zeros, and ones. Ikeda uses his source 
material as a sort of readymade score with instructive algorithms that call for a certain tone 
whenever the computer encounters certain patterns in the binary data set. As in Schafer’s 
“soundscape” conceptualization, Ikeda is engaging with the sounds already present in our 
atmosphere. But for Ikeda, the atmosphere he engages is a digital one, bringing our digital 
environment into a different relation with human perception. 
 
Crossing the Line Festival presented supercodex [live set] in the Grace Rainey Rogers 
Auditorium, framing the noise music as an audiovisual concert in the concert hall located 
beneath the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The audience filed into the formal setting with fixed 
orchestra seating, and had the chance to pick up a pair of earplugs with their Met program. This 
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contrasts to another common format in which Ikeda works—the festival concert setting where 
the audience can dance to the electronic noise. In the Met, however, the event was framed as a 
staged show with its assigned seating and proscenium stage, and the audience behaved according 
to these norms. The stage was nearly bare, save for a deejay set up with computer center stage, 
and a full-size video screen as backdrop. The lights went down as Ikeda took his position behind 
the computer, and the electronic music and video immediately expanded to fill the space with an 
assault to the senses. The music was composed entirely of technological sounds—cracks and 
blips and beeps and sizzles and static—undulating rhythmically and even, somehow, 




Figure 22. Ryoji Ikeda in performance of supercodex [live set]. Photo by Ryoji Ikeda Studio. 
 
I cannot speak for the physical sensations of the audience members around me, but my own 
experience was an intense corporeal response. Most obviously, some of the high pitches hurt my 
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ears. I also noticed the feeling of pressure in my spine, deep in my abdomen, and in my sensitive 
right knee. I felt a distinct pressure in my sinuses, and my front teeth stung in the way they do 
when I bite into something cold. And then, suddenly, my teeth and sinuses were relieved, 
although I didn’t hear any specific change in the music. This is one example of Ikeda’s use of 
high frequencies, which Ikeda describes in the CD booklet on his album +/- : “a high frequency 
sound is used that the listener becomes aware of only upon its disappearance.”81 And in this 
moment of disappearance, the listener also becomes aware of how their body’s materiality, 
withdrawn to one’s own perception and control, was in contact with the atmospheric stimuli. My 
experience aligns with others who have written about Ikeda’s work, such as Martin Herber, who 
in describing 2008’s spectra [Amsterdam] wrote of “a faint fearfulness. [… There was the 
awareness] that one was taking in – dangerously – more than human faculties can process.”82 As 
my body experienced stinging pain in response to the noise, I also noted an apprehension in 
myself as the realization that I was at the mercy of the vibrations set in.  
 
In addition to the noise, supercodex also featured multimedia video flashing in rhythm with the 
sound, which links the visual stimuli with the more physical sensations. The video was 
comprised entirely of black and white lines, 1s and 0s, in two screens working next to each other 
in complementary designs. As A. Vandsø point out, “in the basic code line of the computer, 
sound is not different from the image—both are numerical data—and this is why the computer 
can easily transcode from sound to image.”83 The visual elements respond to the same 
mathematic signals from which the sound derives, and so both the sound and the visual elements 
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are equal, active affective objects. Ikeda believes “the purest beauty is in mathematics. Its perfect 
assemblage of numbers, magnitudes, and forms persist, independent of us.”84 Like the sound, the 
pulsing visuals are beautiful, if unusually so. The pulsing design gives the effect that the black 
and white lines are dancing, shifting dramatically from columns to helix structures to a full white 
or black screen. But like the sound’s disregard for the human’s perception or comfort, the video 
flashes so quickly that each individual frame is barely perceptible on its own, and attempts to 
make sense or keep track of the images are impossible. It is true that the work made me aware of 
mathematics’ nature as independent from human concerns, as Ikeda believes. The sounds and 
visuals were not performing for the human, as they’re creating objects uncomfortable for the 
human body, or out of range of the human body’s capacity to perceive. Indeed, Ikeda’s music 
draws attention toward digital technology’s disregard for the human sensory and cognitive 
systems. “Instead it allows us to experience the difference between human and digital listening 
as fundamental to this doubling of the act of perception.”85 It also draws us into the notion that 
we are also data, and our bodies are able to be activated remotely by vibration and image.  
 
While the technology was not performing for the cognitive system, it was instead having real and 
intimate effects on the material of the body. As different areas of my body pulsed with 
alternating pressure and relief, and the relief was what made me aware of the prior tension, I 
realized that my body was responding to its environment independently of my own perception. I 
was suddenly aware of the materiality of the sound waves, just as I was aware of my own 
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material responding to them. What my brain wasn’t equipped to perceive due to my ear not 
sending it signals, my body could. The intensity of Ikeda’s volume and frequencies, and the 
bodily experience of this intensity, resonates with the experience at a rock or punk rock concert. 
For instance, in reference to the extreme volume and tones at a My Bloody Valentine concert, 
Steven Shaviro describes how “this music doesn’t just assault your ears; it invests your entire 
body. It grasps you in a physical embrace, sliding over your skin, penetrating your orifices, 
slipping inside you and squeezing your internal organs.”86 Shaviro’s vibrant description is in the 
service of his larger argument that the material presence of sound merges with the body’s 
material in a way that enlightens alternative perspectives. Shaviro argues, “The music has 
become an extension of your flesh; or better, your flesh is now an extension of the music.”87 This 
experience stretches the sensory organs. “In such altered states, as Deleuze and Guattari say, ‘the 
imperceptible is perceived.’”88 Indeed, such an altered perception is of significant potential. 
 
In my own experience of Ikeda’s performance, the off-putting but fascinating sensation was the 
visceral experience of my body as an independent entity, not wholly under my control, but as an 
onto-machine unto its own in relationship to the atmosphere. This onto-machine contains 
separate, individual elements that are all receiving and responding to input, and then enacting 
effects of their own. That this revelation came through sound waves is no coincidence. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, “waves are vibrations, shifting borderlines inscribed on the 
plane of consistency as so many abstractions.”89 In other words, waves are capable of 
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transversing the borders of arranged territories of matter, accessing and interacting with all 
matter as a “pure plane of immanence.”90 To the waves, my body is not a defined, whole entity 
that is me, but is a composition of material, only different from its environment in that is 
assembled into a nameable territory. It is only different in its relations of movement to its 
environment. To translate my experience into the language of Deleuze and Guattari, I was 
experiencing becoming, made perceivable by the sound’s affect. “Becoming” refers to a process 
or a shifting within an assemblage. It is not progress, but a change, and it produces nothing aside 
from the becoming itself. Becoming is an “involution”91 as something that involves and creates 
relationships between the discrete entities of the assemblage. The notion of becoming is helpful 
here for its refusal of any assemblage (the body, the audience, the theatre space) as an organic 
whole. Rather, it is composed of different parts drawn together through relational affinities. It is 
also helpful in that the process of becoming generates new ways of being, as new functions 
emerge among the parts in the assemblage. The notion of affect is essential in this formulation as 
a way to account for the capacities of different entities to affect and be affected, which is also the 
capacity to form assemblages. Ikeda’s sonic and visual stimuli are pure affect in action, which 
provides a way of accessing our own becomings. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, “affects 
are becomings,” and “all becomings are molecular.”92 Therefore, it stands to reason that 
witnessing affect is a way to access the molecular within ourselves, just as Ikeda allowed for.  
 
To continue with this approach, the nature of this experience could be considered as one method 
of exploring the experience of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a Body-without-Organs (BwO), 
																																																								
90 Ibid., 255. 
91 Ibid., 238.		
92 Ibid., 256; 275. 
	
	 289	
which is helpful in conceptualizing the intimacy of the body with its surrounding atmosphere. 
They define a BwO as a “field of immanence” that aims to transcend the binaries and (often 
fascist) territorializations of the body as defined through modernity. But, the BwO “is not at all 
the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO 
is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called the organism.”93 This is 
not an idea intended literally in Deleuze and Guattari’s text, rather it is way of describing 
intensities and the effects of power on the social body. In this context however, we see a 
productive example of their idea as the very materialization and intensity of sound in Ikeda’s 
work directly affects the organs in the body. This does not mean that the body cannot be 
maintained, but rather, that the body can be opened up to its surroundings. As Deleuze and 
Guattari write: 
Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body 
to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and 
thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations 
measured with the craft of a surveyor.94 
The experience of the body as an onto-machine during Ikeda’s performance approaches these 
intensities, as the subject is led to an awareness, however brief, of the connections between 
interior organs and external actants, making visible the pathways and connections that were 
already there, but hidden by habits of limited perception. By “tearing the consciousness away 
from the subject”95 and toward the body itself, the experience allows for a means of exploration.  
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Not only is the experience of the body as onto-machine a trajectory toward the materialization of 
a BwO, it is a becoming that I argue is distinctly posthuman, and moreover, a positive, creative 
aspect of the posthuman. As we have seen, a foundational posthuman perspective understands 
the human as separate from the governing concept of “human nature,” where the human is 
autonomous, rational, and perhaps most importantly, the apex of existence. Where humanist 
thought perceives the human, or specifically Man, to be the measure by which all other beings 
fall short, the posthuman perspective sees a sense of fluidity and disunity within the human 
subject, so that the human is always “becoming,” shifting among identities and relationships. N. 
Katherine Hayles has pointed out concerns with such a fluid concept of becoming. “Identified 
with the rational mind, the liberal subject possessed a body but was not usually represented as 
being a body. To the extent that the posthuman constructs embodiment as the instantiation of 
thought/information, it continues the liberal tradition rather than disrupts it.”96 Hayles asserts that 
the posthuman human as an informational being is still a human body. While the posthuman 
asserts the human material as a sender and receiver of information, all of this action is still 
located in and accomplished by a body in a fixed sense of being at the center of its operations. In 
Ikeda’s performance, each human body receives information, but in this case, it is clear that the 
action is happening in the body without cognitive control. This allows a way to think beyond a  
liberal subject where the rational mind predetermines its bodily material and sense of being. 
Hayles goes on to envision a version of the posthuman that “understands human life is embedded 
in a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our continued survival.”97 
A posthuman subjectivity where the human body is a finite material embedded in its 
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environment is paramount in order to return the body to its material present, and to find a greater 
sensibility and responsivity in our ways of perceiving and relating to nonhuman elements in our 
atmosphere. Thus, we envisage a body and subject more in terms of a matrix or a network, a 
receptor for data and an actant. Ikeda’s work processes big data into sound and light waves that 
activate the body. In some of his works the movement of the body in space also activates sound 
and light effects; thus there is sense of the body as a part of a responsive data machine and a data 
loop that is potentially endless and algorithmic in its structure.   
 
As Ikeda’s work demonstrates, maintaining a focus on the human as embedded in its 
environment is especially important given the posthuman interest in ecology, as well as the 
imperative to devise new social and ethical means of thought and action. To this end, Rosi 
Braidotti’s vision of posthumanism is “an opportunity to empower the pursuit of alternative 
schemes of thought, knowledge and self-representation. The posthuman condition urges us to 
think critically and creatively about who and what we are actually in the process of becoming.”98 
The posthuman subjectivity advocated by Braidotti is therefore “materialist and vitalist, 
embodied and embedded, firmly located somewhere, according to a feminist ‘politics of 
location’”99 in order to remain accountable to the surrounding environment and grounded in 
materiality and its relations. Braidotti reads the becoming-machine of Deleuze and Guattari not 
as one of functionalism or capitalism tied to current technological directives. Rather, it is a way 
of releasing the body from its historical humanist ties to efficiency and organization, into 
something that just works. The body can therefore be reimagined back into the world as 
something that simply is. It is necessary to understand my own argument of experiencing the 
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body as machine not as a machine that labors for a specific purpose, but a machine that labors 
without the brain’s organizing into a specific purpose, nor the domain of power over-coding 
human thought and action.  
 
Rather, the organization that occurs here is a material organization within broader relations in the 
environment, where relations transverse the environment making for the potential of an existence 
—a way of being—with/into innumerable configurations. For Braidotti, the situated nature of 
“transversality actualizes an ethics based on the primacy of the relation, of interdependence, 
which values non-human or a-personal Life.”100 Here, Ikeda’s sound and lightscapes create 
transversality, highlighting the primacy of relation between the body and/in the environment. In 
the case of Ikeda’s performance, the highlighted actants are Ikeda’s composed sound and light 
waves, in addition to the other, less-featured objects such as other audience members, and the 
room, stage, walls, carpet and electrical wiring of the performance space.  
 
The ways in which Ikeda’s actants engage and ground the material body are not unique to his 
performance. Indeed, sound and light are foundational dramaturgical objects in theatre and 
performance, and they are always functioning on the molecular level. This is something audience 
members uniquely experience on their own individual basis through their perceptive capacities. 
Think of the growing sense of tension in a thriller that is affectively communicated to the 
audience body through the rising and rhythmic hum of music. The Jaws theme song comes to 
mind. Or the sudden silence after a major action thriller’s climax that ushers in a sudden calm 





we come to associate with artistic genres, and these formulas are specific in their ability to 
manipulate the audience through affective relations to the body. What is new here is both the 
intensity of the work and its abstract formation as data. It is not a way of expressing dramatic 
effect but a way of materializing the very sense of affect.  
 
Of course, sound and light frequencies are constantly circulating in our environment, 
unbeknownst to the human senses, and despite the fact that we are unable to perceive these 
frequencies, they do have effects on us. To move toward a posthuman subjectivity is to access 
this awareness, to practice sensing these actants, and to experiment with attempts to be a part of 
these sensations and to be part of a commons of data and affective materials. This is another key 
to understanding Ikeda’s performance as a way to experience posthuman subjectivity: the 
performance required that the audience give over to the sensorial objects. The effects of the light 
and sound were often uncomfortable, and my brain had to release its attempts to understand, 
organize and give orders. Attempting to ward off the sound vibrations only resulted in more 
discomfort and anxiety, as any attempt at control was fruitless. But trusting Ikeda and allowing 
my brain to step back and observe my body led to an awed calm. This is an aspect of how I relate 
Ikeda’s work to Braidotti’s idea of creative posthuman subjectivity. Attempts toward a more 
open, creative subjectivity are the antithesis to feelings of control and anxiety. Rather than 
control, awareness and new sensitivities (new becomings) are a possible outcome of this work. 
 
Studies in phenomenology and cognitive science argue that practicing an expanded sense of 
perception, like the one achieved during Ikeda’s performance, is possible. Relevant here is Alva 
Noë’s idea of enactive perception. As he argues: “perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not 
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something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do.”101 What we are able to perceive is 
determined by what we do. This invites the notion that there are things able to and ready to be 
perceived that we are not ready or trained to perceive yet. Noë’s enactive notion is bound up in 
the body itself, as Noë connects what the body can do and how it encounters its environment to 
perception itself. Additionally, what the body is doing, even in ways that are in the background 
of consciousness, are acting in ways that affect perception. Therefore, Noë’s concept supports 
the body’s independent responses to Ikeda’s affective input, but that the body, by responding, is 
affecting the resulting perception of said input. Noë’s theories foreground that our perception is 
capable of changing, of developing and expanding. Perhaps then, in this experience in the 
theatre, where we feel our body’s atomic reactions to stimulus, we are bringing the body’s 
perceptual capability to the forefront of our attention, rather than allowing it to remain in the 
periphery. Ikeda’s performance questions the assumption of a sealed-off, cognitively ordered and 
unified body, thereby promoting a posthuman view of the body that is material and in intimate 
contact with its atmosphere. And by enabling perception of the material body’s responsivity, the 
performance offers a glimpse at a posthuman subjectivity that is material and embedded, 
ultimately pointing toward the possibility of expanded perception that is more sensitive to 
nonhuman forces. 
 
In conclusion, Ikeda’s performance considers the audience’s material body, by creating an 
intensity of sound and light as actants that enter the body and transform its organic-atomic 
structure. Through pulsing high and low frequencies—above and below the spectrum of human 
perception, the audience has the opportunity to perceive the materialization of these sounds in 
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and through the body, even though the ear and eye cannot transmit their codes to the brain. Ikeda 
therefore gives the audience a profound, if momentary, access to their invisible atmosphere, 
highlighting the body as an onto-machine functioning within an atmosphere, independent of a 
cognitive system. This experience of becoming-machine requires submission, a moment of 
allowing the mind and the ego to give up their usual humanistic primacy. The body’s material 
can receive and give affect on its own. While I find Ikeda’s performance to be especially helpful 
in understanding and experiencing a posthuman subjectivity, the objects activated in Ikeda’s 
dramaturgy are not unique among theatre and performance. Rather, he is highlighting affective 
agents of sound and light that are basic components of all performance. This suggests theatre, 
then, as a prime mode in which to experiment with and train a posthuman subjectivity, and more 
importantly, a subjectivity characterized by creativity, openness, and awe—a subjectivity that is 
embedded within the environment, interacting with surrounding materials. I agree with Braidotti 
in that art is “an intensive practice that aims at creating new ways of thinking, perceiving and 
sensing Life’s infinite possibilities.”102 By inviting a perception of the body’s physical responses, 
and highlighting all the actants interacting with the body, Ikeda’s performance moves toward 
Braidotti’s idea of art, not as a model of society, but as a means to step outside a paralyzing 
anxiety toward new ways of sensing and thinking. Ikeda’s performance fulfills Noë’s ideal of art 
as well, “catch[ing] experience in the act of making the world available.”103 Perhaps then, 
Ikeda’s consideration of the audience body-object as active within the dramaturgical network can 
be a helpful model to theatre practitioners and scholars alike. 
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Conclusion: Towards a Subjectivity of Posthuman Solidarity 
As analysis of these three performances has explored, the status of the body is shifting as its 
means and registers of relating to the world changes. Data transforms the time and space of 
human agency, and the vastness of nonhuman agency across the digital and physical worlds alike 
reveals humankind’s limited means of perception. Because the body is the site of our lived 
experience, these corporeal relations affect the very basis of human subjectivity. However, as 
this chapter has argued, conceiving of the body as an object provides helpful methods in 
processing and responding to this contemporary state-of-being. First, as in the example of Hansel 
and Gretel, an object-oriented approach to the human body embedded in twenty-first-century 
media suggests the possibility of human as hyperobject in order to conceive of the ways in which 
the human data-body is an intimate and affiliated component of the human body itself, agential 
in a speed and scope beyond our means of perception. Yet, the human-hyperobject 
simultaneously suggests that there is a tangible, withdrawn aspect of the human that remains a 
property of the individual, unable to be subsumed entirely into any structural system. 
Furthermore, the aesthetic aspects of the human, which remain undeniably agentic, are shifting 
and capable of creating messy and disjunctive data. The theme of messy, immeasurable, and 
covert relationality continues in my discussion of Julius Caesar. Here, the performing body is 
conceived as an affective onto-machine, robustly communicating through the affective 
poignancy of the body’s materiality and fleshy condition. This mode of relationality between 
human onto-machines as objects is intimate and effective, independent of language and even 
reason. Instead, affective relations occur in the material form itself, infinitesimally preceding 
cognitive reason. Accounting for the agency of the body’s materiality gestures towards a 
reconnection/collapse of binaries such as brain and body, of subject and object, consciousness 
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and action, and puts forward a more egalitarian conception of bodies in relation to their means of 
laboring and communicating. Finally, in supercodex [live set], the audience is given insight into 
their own status as onto-machines, encountering the ways in which elements of the body are in 
direct contact with the atmosphere and responding independently outside of cognitive control. 
This experience of the body in its encounter with Ikeda’s use of sound and light offers a taste of 
deterritorialization and the creation of a body without organs, where the presumed unity of the 
organism is dismantled in favor of a more open assemblage of the organs within an extended 
way of being, a shift into a shared atmosphere. The experience of release leads toward a change 
of perception, practicing a sense of extended sensibilities in communion with that atmosphere.  
 
To conceive of the body as an object supports a posthuman resistance to binaries, instead 
insisting upon a real embeddedness of the material body within the equally material atmosphere. 
This approach to the body’s materiality through the notion of the onto-machine emphasizes the 
human as a real, physical body agentic in the present moment. Objecthood, therefore, can be 
understood as an antidote to objectification, stealing power back for the object itself. As Berardi 
suggests in After the Future, heightened sensibility of the body’s own presence and sensual 
connections offers a means towards combating “the effect of the semiocapitalist acceleration and 
overexploitation of nervous energies.”104 Where Berardi proposes art and therapy to practice 
these new means of perception, I suggest theatre, whose means of creating affective atmospheres 
is already primed for these purposes. Engaging with actor and audience bodies as objects can be 
a method towards a positive posthuman subjectivity, as well as an ecoconscious effort in training 
expanded sensibilities. 
																																																								




In this dissertation, objects are examined as the “star” of performance, reevaluated as a focal 
point dramaturgically, theoretically and epistemologically. In showing a heightened sensitivity to 
nonhuman objects, I have worked to reveal the ways in which objects communicate with the 
human, and I have found this communication to be highly sensual, intimate, and both affective 
and effective in producing new forms of experience. In order to access the nonhuman sphere, the 
human self does not need to disappear. In fact, as my study shows, the opposite occurs. To attend 
to sensual and affective elements and atmospheric aspects of object performance, the human’s 
own materiality—the very fleshiness, tangibility, and embeddedness of the human body—must 
be radically embraced. A new materialist attention to nonhuman relations produces a distinctly 
posthuman understanding of the self, which is to say, the self is revealed to have an embodied 
materiality that is in constant contact and co-creation with its surroundings. 
 
Performance makes the posthuman self present and visible in a variety of ways. As the 
relationship with puppets on stage shows, the posthuman self is humbled by objects, benefitting 
from a heightened sense of awe, which thereby promotes a solidarity with nonhuman matter and 
a partnership, where the object can guide the human to relate to the world differently. As the 
relationship with robots teaches us, anthropomorphism aids in training an attention and 
responsivity to objects, and yet, the theatre frame is a device that can also show a similar 
attention and responsivity to less and less humanoid objects. Additionally, the theatre space is an 
especially provocative form with which to work through questions regarding the human’s 
relationship to objects, as opposed to film or literature, because the theatre space makes the 
object tangible and literal, facing the human’s materiality directly rather than remaining an 
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imaginary. Another benefit of the theatre is the medium of atmosphere, produced through the 
collaborative presence of the human and nonhuman objects. Atmospheres draw attention to the 
human’s material effects in contributing to interactions, and bring focus to the present moment: 
who and what is at work right now. With this heightened sense of the potential of the present 
moment, it remains important to underscore human responsibility in the ongoing mattering of 
events. As the performances discussed have shown, the human is integral in creating possible 
futures, but the performances simultaneously propose a leveling of the human-non-human 
divide. And finally, attention to the human body as an object highlights the body’s own means of 
affective communication, often occurring in ways beyond cognitive awareness, which 
deconstructs the myth of the bounded self. The body expands in relation to other objects, 
communicating intimately through the material of the body itself. Therefore, a return to the 
senses offers a means toward developing an expanded sensibility that renegotiates normative 
hierarchies by embedding the human self deeply within the atmosphere of environment, society, 
and the anthroposphere.  
 
My thesis has explored theatre’s compelling potential as a space to experiment and develop this 
posthuman subjectivity. Indeed, analysis of case studies has shown that theatre offers a profound 
and heightened relationality between human and nonhuman objects. The shared time and space 
required in performance puts bodies into direct contact with nonhuman ways of being. The 
theatre removes bodies from their everyday relationality and presumed habits, instead offering an 
alternate set of rules and a renewed attention to nonhuman agency. In fact, dramatic traditions 
and conventions can be harnessed for this exact purpose, guiding the human audience to see the 
communicative agency in objects and even empathize with forms that diverge wildly from the 
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human self. And perhaps most vitally, theatre is a form in which practitioners are already 
engaged with the sensual realm, as scenic, lighting, sound, and costume design all employ 
nonhuman elements as the material generators of affective phenomena. The theatre space is a 
hotbed for the senses, and as I have argued, a return to the senses engenders a creative 
posthuman subjectivity with existential and political significance. 
 
There remain unknowns and tensions among the theories investigated in this dissertation. I move 
through new materialism, OOO, and posthumanism, with influences from affect theory, 
cognitive science, and phenomology. However, as Stacy Alaimo asserts, the anthropocene is not 
the time for “transcendent, definitive mappings, transparent knowledge systems, or confident 
epistemologies,”1 and it’s not my project to decide if and which any of these are “right.” Rather, 
the ways in which the performances themselves gesture toward different theories—sometimes 
supporting them through tangible examples of embodiment, other times offering echoes or 
rebuttals—points toward the theoretical value of these artworks. They are ways to access new 
understanding of the world and our need for new relations within it. 
 
To this end, one decisive conclusion of the thesis points to the limits of human perception. New 
materialist, object-oriented, and posthuman theories all aid in reorienting the human in its 
atmosphere, in part by highlighting the gaps in our own ability to perceive. We cannot know all 
that surrounds us, and we cannot control or master it either. Both the theories and the 
performances are helpful in pointing toward what we do not and cannot know, and also how we 
might live in and through this presence of others. Through this effort, the human is humbled, and 
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the need for an embodied, sensual experience of what the world around us might reveal is even 
more important. The embodied, sensual experience will also leave absences or gaps, but by 
attending to these experiences, even those gaps become valuable input.  
 
My project grows evermore relevant, as nonhuman agency grows more visible and the need for 
the human to adjust becomes more urgent through the effects of climate change, the movement 
of toxicities and pathogens across borders, and the growing technosphere. A question remains 
how to facilitate the circulation of this discourse beyond the relatively insular community of elite 
international theatre and performance genres, to engage a more expansive community and 
become a more accessible and familiar approach. Indeed, an even larger question haunts this 
issue: how to encourage the ecoconscious project more broadly, highlighting the ways in which 
ecoconscious concerns are bound up in the fight for equality among differently-identified groups. 
Thankfully, more and more performances are actively addressing ecoconscious concerns. Among 
my examples, those drawn from the commercial theatres and Broadway show a potential for new 
materialist perspectives to reach a wider audience that is constituted of diverse classes and 
groups, and to reach a level of analysis as popular culture. Meanwhile, artists and audiences in 
the contemporary alternative theatre are much more concerned with the politics and practice of 
diversity, visibility and ecological activism than mainstream groups. They are the vanguard of an 
object theatre that is transforming spectatorship and subjectivity. 
	
While I have focused on a variety of performances throughout this dissertation, only some of 
these are pointedly addressing climate change. Yet, I have argued that all productions imply a 
human relationality to their environment, including worldviews that implicate the human in 
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hierarchical scales. In the performances discussed, efforts are made toward reconfiguring that 
normative hierarchy, whether or not the eco-critical concerns figure. Thus, it is of value to retain 
and develop our attention toward these relationalities no matter the subject matter. Moreover, as 
the performances actively addressing eco-concerns develop and proliferate, future study can 
address those with more directly placed critical focus and even activism.  
 
In concluding, I’d like to finish with this most recent example of a performance that addresses 
ecoconscious concerns through a dramaturgical leveling of the human and nonhuman: Toshiki 
Okada’s Eraser Mountain (2020). Created in Japan in 2019 and performed in New York in 2020, 
a detailed analysis of this work is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet several aspects of work are 
compelling and demonstrate the overarching ideas that this thesis has addressed. Okada—who is 
a playwright and a theatre director and has his own theatre group based in Japan—created Eraser 
Mountain after seeing the hilly landscape behind his home be stripped of soil. The soil was 
transported to the area around Fukushima, to mitigate the effects of radiation contamination from 
the ruptured nuclear power station in the aftermath of the Tōhoku earthquake and nuclear 
disaster of March 11, 2011.   
 
Eraser Mountain creates an atmosphere through a dense fabric of objects—some of which are 
autonomous, non-humanoid but perhaps robotic, others manipulated by humans, but not in order 
to anthropomorphize them. The human actors also become objects on stage, mimicking some of 
the objects’ aesthetics and positions. Along with the landscape of objects, Okada employs a 
poetic language that is non-narrative, but aids in creating a repetitive, durational sense of time 
that is not conducive to the human. Indeed, it seems that the performance is not “for” humans at 
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all. This is signaled by having the performers oriented away from the audience, and the use of a 
loud, grating noise through the entirety of the first section that is markedly uncomfortable. All of 
this is to imagine a posthuman future where “there is no audience” (a refrain in the last section of 
the play) for the ongoing life of nonhuman objects. And yet, this possibility is not presented as 
dystopic, but as beautiful. The performance makes an attempt to “raise doubts about the so-called 
criteria or measures that humans use.” Okada asks, “Can we use theater to present a world in 
which people and objects are completely equal, rather than trapped in their usual subservient 
relationship?”2 
 
I predict that this trend of presenting work that questions the human position will continue, and 
proof resides in the pioneering scholar of ecocriticism, Una Chaudhuri’s “ecospheric” theatre 
manifesto, called the “Climate Lens Playbook.” Among the sixteen directives include 
instructions to “practice literalism,” “practice glocality” by focusing on the material location of 
the self, “flatten your ontologies” to invite everything in, and “de-sentiminalize nature” in order 
to “forge new affective pathways to the non-human.” Chaudhuri’s manifesto stands in solidarity 
with my own call to theatre: 
Stand alongside our fellow species like a breathing exercise, to open up space in our cells 
for epistemologies of the biosphere that our bodies currently don’t hold, or ones we need 
to re-ignite. Physicalize awe.3 
The playbook is also being developed into a workbook, and these influences are freely available 
spreading into different artistic and scholarly communities around the US and beyond. As these 
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theatrical impulses spread, a return to the senses does as well. As I have argued, a return to the 
senses in both theory and practice works to reconnect the human to their material body and to 
their nonhuman environment. This embedded awareness offers existential and political insight, 
grounding the human body in a specific time, place, and community that resists neoliberal 
acceleration and ever-intensifying expectations to perform. Instead, space is made for a sense of 
stillness, awe, and quietude. It awakens the human to the vastness of the atmosphere, and 
conversely, to the limited significance of the human itself. To become attuned to these limits 
develops a refreshed sensitivity to what other forces are significant; a sensitivity that could make 
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